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Intrusions on computer network systems are major security issues these days. 
Therefore, it is of utmost importance to prevent such intrusions. The prevention of 
such intrusions is entirely dependent on their detection that is a main part of any 
security tool such as Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Intrusion Prevention System 
(IPS), Adaptive Security Alliance (ASA), checkpoints and firewalls. Therefore, 
accurate detection of network attack is imperative.  A variety of intrusion detection 
approaches are available but the main problem is their performance, which can be 
enhanced by increasing the detection rates and reducing false positives. Such 
weaknesses of the existing techniques have motivated the research presented in this 
thesis.  
One of the weaknesses of the existing intrusion detection approaches is the usage 
of a raw dataset for classification but the classifier may get confused due to 
redundancy and hence may not classify correctly. To overcome this issue, Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) has been employed to transform raw features into 
principal features space and select the features based on their sensitivity. The 
sensitivity is determined by the values of eigenvalues. The recent approaches use 
PCA to project features space to principal feature space and select features 
corresponding to the highest eigenvalues, but the features corresponding to the 
highest eigenvalues may not have the optimal sensitivity for the classifier due to 
ignoring many sensitive features. Instead of using traditional approach of selecting 
features with the highest eigenvalues such as PCA, this research applied a Genetic 
Algorithm (GA) to search the principal feature space that offers a subset of features 
with optimal sensitivity and the highest discriminatory power.  
Based on the selected features, the classification is performed. The Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) and Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) are used for classification 
purpose due to their proven ability in classification. This research work uses the 
Knowledge Discovery and Data mining (KDD) cup dataset, which is considered 
 viii   
benchmark for evaluating security detection mechanisms. The performance of this 
approach was analyzed and compared with existing approaches. The results show that 
proposed method provides an optimal intrusion detection mechanism that outperforms 
the existing approaches and has the capability to minimize the number of features and 
maximize the detection rates. 
  




Pencerobohan ke atas sistem rangkaian komputer merupakan isu keselamatan yang 
utama dewasa ini. Maka, adalah sangat penting untuk menghalang daripada 
pencerobohan ini. Langkah-langkah pencegahan ini bergantung sepenuhnya kepada 
sistem pengesanan di mana ia merupakan bahagian terpenting kepada alat 
keselamatan seperti Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Intrusion Prevention System 
(IPS), Adaptive Security Alliance (ASA), checkpoints dan firewalls. Justeru dengan 
itu, pengesanan yang tepat daripada ancaman rangkaian perlu diberi perhatian. 
Terdapat pelbagai kaedah pengesanan pencerobohan tetapi masalah utama ialah 
prestasi, di mana ia perlu ditingkatkan dengan meningkatkan kadar pengesanan dan 
mengurangkan ketidaktepatan. Kelemahan teknik yang sedia ada ini  telah memberi 
motivasi kepada kajian yang dipersembahkan dalam tesis ini.  
Salah satu kelemahan kaedah pengesanan pencerobohan sedia ada adalah 
penggunaan set data mentah untuk pengkelasan tetapi pengelas mungkin keliru 
disebabkan oleh penindanan data yang mengakibatkan pengkelasan yang tidak betul. 
Untuk mengatasi masalah ini, Principle Component Analysis (PCA) telah digunakan 
untuk mengubah ciri-ciri mentah kepada ruang ciri-ciri utama dan memilih ciri-ciri 
berdasarkan kepada kepekaan mereka. Kepekaan ditentukan dengan eigenvalues. 
Kaedah terkini dengan menggunakan PCA untuk menghasilkan ciri-ciri ruang kepada 
ruang ciri-ciri utama dan memilih ciri-ciri bergantung kepada eigenvalues yang 
tertinggi, namun ciri-ciri ini mungkin tidak memiliki kepekaan yang optimum untuk 
pengkelasan disebabkan  oleh banyak cirri-ciri yang sensitif. Kajian ini tidak 
menggunakan kaedah traditional dalam memilih ciri-ciri dengan menggunakan 
eigenvalues seperti PCA, sebaliknya kajian ini menggunakan satu Generic Algorithm 
(GA) untuk mencari ruang ciri-ciri utama yang menawarkan satu bahagian ciri-ciri 
dengan sensitiviti optimum dan kuasa diskriminasi yang tertinggi. 
Berdasarkan kepada ciri-ciri pilihan, pengkelasan dilaksanakan. Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) dan Multiplayer Perceptron (MLP) telah digunakan untuk tujuan 
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pengkelasan kerana bukti keupayaan mereka dalam pengkelasan. Kerja kajian ini 
menggunakan Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) set data cawan, dimana 
ia dianggap sebagai batu pengukur untuk menilai mekanisma pengesanan 
keselamatan. Prestasi kaedah ini telah dianalisa dan dibandingkan dengan kaedah-
kaedah yang sedia ada. Keputusan menunjukan kaedah yang dibentangkan 
menghasilkan mekanisma pengesanan pencerobohan yang optima dan mengatasi 
kaedah-kaedah yang sedia ada dan mempunyai keupayaan untuk mengurangkan 
jumlah cirri-ciri dan memaksimakan kadar pengesanan. 
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This chapter covers the motivation, the prevalent issues in the existing intrusion 
detection approaches based on which this work is carried out, and the objectives to be 
accomplished. It also describes relevant research questions, which should be 
answered, the methodology adopted, and the research workflow followed. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with the contributions and the organization of the thesis. 
1.1 Research Motivations 
The rapid development of computer networks and mostly of the Internet has created 
many stability and security problems such as intrusions on computer and network 
systems. Further, the dependency of companies and government agencies is 
increasing on their computer networks and the significance of protecting these 
systems from attack is serious because a single intrusion can cause a heavy loss or the 
consistency of network becomes insecure. During recent years, number of intrusions 
has dramatically increased. Therefore, it is very important to prevent such intrusions. 
The hindrance of such intrusions is entirely dependent on their detection that is a key 
part of any security tool such as Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Intrusion 
Prevention System (IPS), Adaptive Security Alliance (ASA), checkpoints and 
firewalls. Consequently, interest in network intrusion detection has increased among 
the researchers (Ahmad et al. 2009), (Ahmad et al. 2008). Several intrusion detection 
approaches are available but the main problem is their performance, which can be 
enhanced by increasing the detection rates and reducing false alarms. Such 
weaknesses of the existing techniques motivated the research presented in this 
dissertation.  
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1.2 Problems in Intrusion Detection 
The accurate intrusion detection in computer and network systems has always been an 
elusive aim for system administrator and security researchers. Initially, traditional 
intrusion detection systems (IDSs) were developed. However, these systems have 
many limitations like time consuming statistical analysis, regular updating, non-
adaptive, accuracy and flexibility. After this, intelligent IDSs (rule based, graphical 
and hybrid) were introduced but they also suffered many problems such as false 
positive, false negative, and performance efficiency.  Recently, Neural Network (NN) 
inspired by nervous system has become an interesting tool in the applications of 
intrusion detection. But it still suffers from many problems; training/learning 
overhead, detection rate and false alarms (Zargar and Kabiri 2010).  
One of the drawbacks of the existing intrusion detection approaches is the usage 
of a raw dataset for classification but the classifier may get confused due to 
redundancy and hence may not classify correctly. To handle this problem, Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) has been applied to change raw features into principal 
features space and select the features based on their sensitivity (Liu and Yi 2006). The 
sensitivity is measured by the values of eigenvalues (Sun et al. 2004). The modern 
methods use PCA to project features space to principal feature space and pick features 
corresponding to the highest eigenvalues, but the features corresponding to the 
highest eigenvalues may not have the finest sensitivity for the classifier due to 
ignoring many sensitive features. Therefore, the selection of optimized subset of 
features is another important issue for the intrusion detection system. Other problems 
include the selection of dataset for training and testing, and the classifier architecture 
that classifies connections into normal and intrusive. 
1.3 Research Objectives  
The main goal of the research is to develop an optimized intrusion detection 
mechanism using soft computing techniques that provide the potential to identify 
network activity in a robust way. To achieve this goal, a number of specific objectives 
have been defined as follows: 
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 Transformation of raw features set of packet into new feature space. 
 Selection of optimized subset of features that has higher discriminatory 
power. 
 Selection of the most suitable architecture that identifies network activity 
into normal and intrusive. 
 Development and implementation of the proposed model for intrusion 
detection. 
 Train and test the develop system. 
 Implement the developed system in different case studies. 
 1.4 Research Questions 
Based on the abovementioned issues and problems, we can derive research questions 
as the following: 
 Why did we move from conventional to unconventional IDS? 
 Why did we use soft computing techniques? 
 What are the necessary components (software, services) that are desirable 
to support the architectural framework? 
 What are the specifications of the ideal network intrusion detection system 
(NIDS) that will ensure best performance? 
 How can we map soft computing techniques to NIDS? 
 Will the adaptation of this approach into NIDS improve NIDS in some 
ways or address some issues in NIDS? 
 How can we implement /simulate my work? 
1.5 Research Methodology 
The overall research is divided into several phases, each one is concerned with the 
specific goals to finally fulfill the main objective. These phases are described as 
follows:  
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Figure 1.1 Methodology phases 
1.5.1 Selection of Dataset for Experiments 
The capability of the intrusion detection mechanism depends on the dataset. If the 
training data is more accurate then performance of trained system will be improved. 
So, the collecting of data for training and testing is a critical dilemma (Liu et al. 
2007). Therefore, different issues will be discussed in obtaining or selecting dataset 
for experimental purpose in this research work. This phase of methodology will 
discuss which dataset is best and why? 
1.5.2 Pre-processing of the Dataset 
The selected dataset KDD cup consists of 41 raw features, which fall into different 
categories such as basic features and derived features (Liu et al. 2007). The basic 
features describe single network connection.  
The derived features can be divided into content-based features and traffic based 
features (Ahmad et al. in 2008). The content-based features are derived using domain 
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knowledge and the traffic-based features are obtained by studying the sequential 
patterns between the connection records as well as the correlation between basic 
features. The second step is the pre-processing of data so that it can be given as input 
to my designed system. In this phase, this research work will apply PCA for features 
transformation and GA for the selection of optimal feature set for this proposed 
approach. 
1.5.3 Classification Approach 
After features selection, the next phase is determining the approach for classification. 
This is also another problem. For this purpose, this research work used the Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) and Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) for classification purpose 
due to their proven ability in classification (Sun et al. 2004) and (Pervez et al. 2007). 
Both approaches are applied and tested in different scenarios to compare their 
performance.  
1.5.4 Training the System 
The next phase is training the system. During training, both input patterns and desired 
outputs related to each input pattern are available.  Further, the dataset is divided into 
three parts; (i) cross validation dataset, (ii) test dataset and (iii) training dataset so that 
better performance of the developed system may be achieved (Ahmad et al. 2007). 
Aim of the training is to minimize the error output produced by the system in 
comparison to the desired output. In order to achieve this goal, weights are updated by 
carrying out certain steps known as training. 
1.5.5 Testing the System 
After training, the weights of the system are frozen and performance of the system is 
evaluated. Testing the system involves two steps, which are verification step and 
generalization step. In verification step, system is tested against the data which is used 
in training. Aim of the verification step is to test how well trained system learned the 
 6   
training patterns in the training dataset. In generalization step, testing is conducted 
with data which is not used in training. Aim of the generalization step is to measure 
generalization ability of the trained network (Principe et al. 2000). After training, the 
system only involves computation of the feed forward phase. For this purpose, this 
method used a production dataset that has input data but no desired data. 
1.6 Research Activities 
To achieve the goals, the research activities have been organized as follows: 
 
Figure 1.2 Research activities 
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1.7 Research Contributions 
The research has significant positive impact on the performance of network intrusion 
detection systems, including addressing new open research issues. The main 
achievement is the development of intrusion detection mechanism that outperforms 
the existing approaches and has the capability to minimize the number of features and 
maximize the detection rates. 
The major impact of the research span over the following areas: 
 Performance optimization such as improving detection rate and reducing 
false alarms; false positive and false negative 
 Minimizing training overheads and number of features for the intrusion 
detection approaches 
 Prototype of the architectural framework 
 Contribution to the existing intrusion detection technologies, knowledge 
and applications 
 Help and guidance for the security implementers in the area of intrusion 
detection 
Therefore, in this research work, an optimized intrusion detection mechanism 
using soft computing techniques; PCA, GA, SVM and MLP is proposed and 
implemented. This work uses the KDD cup dataset, which is considered a benchmark 
for evaluating security detection mechanisms. The performance of this approach was 
analyzed and compared with previous approaches. The outcomes demonstrate that 
proposed method provides an optimal intrusion detection mechanism that outperforms 
the existing approaches and has the capability to reduce the number of features and 
increase the detection rates. 
1.8 Organization of the Thesis 
After describing the motivation, objectives, research questions, methodology, 
research workflow and contributions of the work, the remainder of the thesis is 
organized as follows: 
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Chapter 2 introduces the basic ideas about intrusion detection system, its 
components, classification, and foundations and describes the related approaches that 
are mainly used in designing intrusion detection systems. The chapter thereafter 
describes the KDD cup dataset that is considered standard in the evaluation of 
intrusion detection mechanism. Then, the chapter highlights the issues in existing 
intrusion detection studies and reasoning of using KDD cup dataset. Next, the chapter 
discusses the background of soft computing techniques, its unique property, and 
future of soft computing. Then, it explains an overview of applied techniques in my 
research. The chapter then describes the background of neural networks, Support 
Vector Machine and Genetic Algorithm that are basic soft computing techniques. The 
chapter then discusses Principal Component Analysis that is applied for features 
transformation and organization in this research. Further, the chapter  discusses the 
literature consulted in order to understand and investigate the research problem in the 
field of network intrusion detection. The chapter then summarizes and evaluates 
relevant research, and discusses the relationships between different works and 
describes how it relates to this research. The chapter finally discusses the issues in 
existing literatures and directs towards methodology that is adopted in this research 
work. 
Chapter 3 explains the set of methods, techniques, and tools used in this research. 
The chapter, thereafter, demonstrates the workflow process of designing the system 
and architecture for network intrusion detection. Then, it describes different phases of 
adopted methodology like selection of dataset, pre-processing of dataset, determine 
the architecture, training and testing the designed system. Finally, the chapter 
provides directions towards implementation of the proposed model. 
Chapter 4 describes the proposed model with its basic architecture in block 
diagram, and then details of each part or block of its main architecture. Then, it 
explains features description of the dataset used for experiments, feature 
transformation process using PCA and optimal features subset selection using GA. 
After this, the chapter describes the details of classification architectures with basic 
algorithms and mathematical foundation of multilayered perceptron model (MLP) and 
Support Vector Machine (SVM). 
 9   
 
 Then, the chapter explains system implementation, and the basic parameters used 
during training and testing. Finally, the chapter concludes with the contributions, and 
the chapter summary 
Chapter 5 presents the experimental results obtained by the developed system. 
After that, it discusses the performance evaluation of the system by examining the 
number of false positives and false negatives that they generated during testing. Then, 
it discusses the results and their comparison with existing published results.  
Chapter 6 concludes the work by summarizing the main contributions and 
findings of the study, the limitations of the study and some possibilities for future 
research and development.  
The appendix „A‟ provides a list of publications during this research work and 
appendix „B‟ describes some terminologies used in this thesis. 




BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes basic background of intrusion detection systems, their 
functional components, classification and characteristics in the following Sequence: 
(i) Staging of an overview of IDS foundations and analysis techniques to intrusion 
detection. (ii) Description of intrusion detection approaches such as anomaly, misuse 
detection and combined or hybrid approach. (iii) Description of attack dataset: KDD 
cup dataset, a standard dataset for evaluating security detection mechanisms that is 
used to train and test the proposed system. (iv) An overview of the soft computing, its 
properties, its applications in a variety of fields and its future usage. Then, the chapter 
describe technical background of soft computing techniques: Neural Networks (NN), 
Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Genetic Algorithm (GA) utilized in this 
research work. Later, the chapter describes the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
and its different steps towards feature transformation into PCA space. Further, the 
chapter presents the literature review to intrusion detection. Followed by, the 
presentation of the related study to intrusion detection using SVM, MLP, PCA and 
GA. Finally, the chapter describes a systematic review of related work and issues in 
the existing intrusion detection approaches. 
2.2 Intrusion Detection Systems 
This section describes some basic and fundamental concepts to Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDSs). First work in the field of intrusion detection was performed by 
Anderson in the early 1980s. Anderson defines an intrusion as any unauthorized 
attempt to access, manipulate, modify, or destroy information, or to render a system 
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unreliable or unusable (Anderson 1980). Intrusions are caused by accessing the 
systems from Internet, by attackers, by authorized users of the systems who attempt 
to gain additional privileges for which they are not authorized, and authorized users 
who misuse the privileges given to them. IDSs are software or hardware products that 
monitor the system in question and try to detect any attack against the system. A truly 
secure system is still a dream, as there are always bugs in application programs, and 
also communication protocols always have vulnerabilities that can be exploited by 
attackers. In addition, passwords can be cracked, users can lose their passwords, and 
entire crypto system can be broken. As a result, security mechanisms (e.g. firewalls), 
which are deployed to protect the information system, may not be able to prevent all 
security breaches. IDSs are usually deployed along with the other security 
mechanisms, such as access control, authentication and firewalls, as a last defence 
line to improve security of the information system (Amini and Jalili 2005).  The main 
goal of an IDS is to provide high rates of attack detection with very small rates of 
false alarms (Pervez et al. 2007). There are two important types of errors in intrusion 
detection: 
False positives: False positives are the errors occurring when IDS flags a normal 
activity as an attack. Simply, false positives are false alarms. 
False negatives: False negatives are the errors occurring when IDS fails to detect an 
ongoing attack. 
2.3 IDS Functional Components 
This section explains functional components of IDS. An IDS consists of three 
functional components as shown in Figure 2.1 (Bace and Mell  2001): (1) Information 
source that provides a stream or flow of event records, (2) Analysis engine that 
analyzes and classifies intrusions; and (3) Response component that generates 
reactions based on the output of the analysis engine. 
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Figure 2.1 Functional components of IDS 
2.3.1 Information Sources 
The first component of an intrusion detection system is the data source, where input 
information, which will be analyzed, is collected. Input information can be audit 
trails, system logs or network packets.  
2.3.2 IDS Analysis 
Second component of IDS is the analysis engine, which analyse data from 
information source and classify it into normal or intrusive. The IDS analysis engines 
are classified into two categories such as misuse detection and anomaly detection. 
2.3.3 Response Component 
Response component is the third component of an IDS, where reaction to a detected 
attack is given. According to the response types, IDS can be either active or passive. 
An IDS is said to be active, if it actively reacts to the attack by taking corrective 
(closing holes) or proactive actions (logging out possible attackers, closing down 
services). If an IDS just generates alarms, it is said to be passive. Passive IDS 
responses provide information to system administrator who takes necessary actions 
based on that information. 
2.4 Classification of Intrusion Detection Systems 
This section describes two classes of IDS based on the type of the data source. 
According to the data sources used, IDSs can be classified into two categories; host-
based IDSs and network-based IDSs (Jonsson et al. 2004).  
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2.4.1 Host-based IDS  
Host-based IDSs observe activities within an individual computer system and work 
on information obtained from these activities (Ahmad et al. 2007). As target 
environment was mainframe environment, and all users were local to the system, 
initial researches in the field of IDSs were performed on the host-based IDSs. Host-
based IDSs normally use two information sources, operating system audit trails, and 
system logs. Operating system trails are generally generated at the kernel level; hence 
they are more detailed and better protected than system logs. However, system logs 
are simpler and smaller than operating system trails; consequently, they can be 
understood more easily. Further, some benefits and drawbacks of this class of IDS are 
listed here. 
Benefits 
 As host-based IDSs monitor local activities, therefore they can detect attack 
that can not be detected by network-based IDSs. 
 Information sources of the host-based IDSs are generally generated on a 
plaintext data, therefore they can successfully operate in an environment 
where network traffic is encrypted.    
 Performance of the host-based IDSs is not affected by the topology of the 
network they operate in. They successfully operate on switched networks. 
 Drawbacks 
 As host-based IDSs should be placed on every monitored host, it is harder to 
manage and configure host-based IDSs. 
 Host-based IDSs run on the host targeted by attacks, and it may be disabled by 
a successful attack. For instance, certain denial-of-service attacks. 
 As host-based IDSs can only see network packets received by its host, 
detection rate of host-based IDSs is poor in the case attacks are targeted to the 
entire network. 
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 Amount of information used by network-based IDSs can be huge; hence host–
based IDSs are unable to generate good results. 
 IDS may need extra storage on the system on which it is running. 
 Host-based IDSs share the computing resources (e.g. CPU, main memory) 
with the monitored host. Consequently, they cost additional operational 
overheads and may affect the performance of the hosting computer. 
2.4.2 Network-based IDS 
As computing environments shifted from mainframe to the networks of workstations, 
studies on intrusion detection started to focus on attacks targeted to the network.  
Network attacks cannot be detected by examining operating system trails or system 
logs, or at least detection of network attacks by examining data sources on the host 
computer is not an easy task. As a result, network-based IDSs were developed, which 
capture network packets and search attacks in these network packets. Network based 
IDSs monitor activities on a network segment or switch, so that they can protect hosts 
connected to the monitored segment (Amini et al. 2006). Network-based IDSs 
generally consist of sensors which are placed at various points (such as at LAN and 
WAN backbones) in the network. Sensors collect network packets and feed them to 
the network-based IDS that classify them into normal or intrusive class (Cannady 
1998). Further, some benefits and drawbacks of network based IDS are listed here. 
Benefits 
 A huge network can be monitored easily by using a few numbers of sensors, if 
sensors are placed at the critical parts of the network (as at hubs, routers or 
probes). 
 Network-based IDSs are generally passive devices and do not affect the 
normal operation of the network. 
 Network-based IDSs can be very secure against attacks, and even they can be 
made invisible to the attackers. 
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Drawbacks 
 If monitored network is large or network traffic is high, it may be difficult to 
process all network packets. 
 Problems arise when network-based IDSs are placed on a switched network. 
Most of the switches do not provide universal monitoring ports and this fact 
limits the monitoring ability of network-based IDS. 
 Network-based IDSs can not analyze encrypted traffic. This is due to the fact 
that, the sensors analyze packet headers to determine source and destination 
addresses and type of data being transmitted, and analyze the packet payload 
to discover information in the data being transmitted. 
 Distorted network packets may cause a network-based IDS to crash. 
2.5 Characteristics of Intrusion Detection Systems 
This section listed some characteristics of an ideal IDS (Ahmad et al. 2008). 
 Intrusion detection systems should be automatic and reliable to monitor its 
front end and back end running programs. 
 System should be fault tolerant in such a way that system crash should not 
affect its knowledge base where attack pattern are being stored for detecting 
intruders activities. 
 System must be able to monitor itself to ensure subversion resistant. 
 These systems should have less computational overhead to avoid degradation 
in system performance. 
 System should have capability to detect deviation from normal behaviour. 
 Its defence mechanism should be adaptable to new patterns as use patterns of 
every system are different. 
 As system behaviour changes due to the addition of new applications in the 
system. Therefore, the IDS should have potential to adapt these changes and 
be able to detect any intrusion. 
 Last but not the least its architecture should be like that intruders could not be 
successful to modify it for their desired activities. 
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2.6 Foundations of an Intrusion Detection System  
This section describe the basic elements of IDS such as; metrics, models and profiles 
(Cannady 1998) and (Pervez et al. 2007). These elements are described here briefly.  
2.6.1 Metrics 
Any statistical intrusion detection methodology needs the use of a set of metrics. 
These metrics characterize the utilization of a variety of system resources (i.e., CPU 
usage, number of files accessed, number of login attempts). These metrics are usually 
one of three different types. The first metric, event counters identify the occurrences 
of a specific action over a period of time. These metrics may include the number of 
login attempts, the number of times that a file has been accessed, or a measure of the 
number of incorrect passwords that are entered. The second metric, time intervals 
identify the time interval between two related events. Each time interval compares the 
delay in occurrence of the same or similar event .An example of a time interval metric 
is the periods of time between a user‟s logins. The third metric is resource 
measurement that includes the expenditure of CPU time, number of records written to 
a database, or the number of files transmitted over the network. Keystroke dynamics 
is another method of quantifying a user's activities, which offers an effective measure 
of user identification. The concept involves the development of an electronic 
signature of a user based on their individual typing characteristics. These 
characteristics include; (i) typing speed, (ii) intervals in typing, (iii) number of errors, 
and (iv) the user's typing rhythm. These characteristics may be verified on login and 
monitored throughout a session. Complete intrusion detection mechanisms have been 
developed exclusively around the use of keystroke dynamics techniques.  
2.6.2 Models 
The selected metrics are then used in statistical models, which attempt to identify 
deviations from an established norm. The models, which have been most frequently 
used, include the operational model, average and standard deviation model, the 
multivaried model, the markovian model, and the time series model. The operational 
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model makes the assumption that an anomaly can be identified through a comparison 
of an observation with a predefined limit. This model is frequently used in the 
situations where a specific number of events, (i.e., failed logins), is a direct indication 
of a possible attack. The average and standard deviation model is based on the 
traditional statistical determination of the commonness of an observation based on its 
position relative to a specific confidence range. This model offers the advantage that 
it “learns” a user‟s behavior over time instead of requiring prior knowledge of the 
user‟s activities. As a result, the model can establish a foundation for the 
identification of potential anomalies for each user and identify potential problems 
from users who consistently behave in a manner, which would indicate normally the 
misuse of system resources. This is particularly useful in identifying what is normal 
for an individual user without relying on a comparison with other users. The 
multivaried model is built upon the average and standard deviation model. The 
difference between these two approaches is that the multivaried model is based on a 
correlation of two or more metrics. This model permits the identification of potential 
anomalies where the complexity of the situation requires the comparison of multiple 
parameters. The markovian model is used with the event counter metric to determine 
the normalcy of a particular event, based on the events that preceded it. The model 
characterizes each observation as a specific state and utilizes a state transition matrix 
to determine if the probability of the event is high (normal) based on the preceding 
events. This model is particularly useful when the sequence of activities is 
particularly important. The final model, the Time Series Model, attempts to identify 
anomalies by reviewing the order and time interval of activities on the network. If the 
probability of the occurrence of an observation is low, then the event is labeled as 
abnormal. This model provides the ability to evolve over time based on the activities 
of the users (Denault et al. 1994) and (Denault et al. 1994). 
2.6.3 Profiles  
These models are then used in the development of a variety of profiles, which attempt 
to map the nonintrusive activities of the system. The profiles serve to establish a 
baseline of a user‟s behavior, which can then be used for comparisons with the 
current observations. Profiles usually consist of specific characteristics, such as login 
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information, (i.e., frequency, origin, duration), program execution information, (i.e., 
frequency, CPU utilization), database access information, (i.e., tables accessed, data 
manipulation functions), and file access information (i.e., types of files accessed, 
created, or destroyed) (Jonsson et al. 2004). 
2.7 Analysis Techniques for Intrusion Detection 
This section explains analysis techniques those are fundamental components in an 
intrusion detection system, which examines the captured information into normal or 
intrusive class (Cannady 1998) and (Pervez et al. 2007). There are many approaches 
towards intrusion detection but this section describes an overview of five common 
approaches that have been used in numerous traditional intrusion detection 
mechanisms. 
2.7.1 Statistical Analysis  
This approach involves statistical comparison of specific events based on a 
predetermined set of criteria. The data was collected from the system and the 
network. This collected data was tested for attack analysis by statistical models.  
The models which have been used most frequently, include the operational model, 
average and standard deviation model, the multivaried model, the markovian model, 
and the time series model. This was much laborious and time consuming work.  
2.7.2 Rule Based System 
This approach relies on sets of predefined rules, which are provided by an 
administrator, automatically created by the system, or both. Each rule is mapped to a 
specific operation in the system. The rules serve as operational preconditions, which 
are continuously checked in the audit record by the intrusion detection mechanism. If 
the required conditions of a rule are satisfied by user activity, the specified operation 
is executed. This approach was unable to detect novel intrusion. A frequent update of 
rules is required in this approach (Lunt 1989).  
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 2.7.3 Expert Systems 
The use of expert system techniques in intrusion detection mechanisms was a 
significant milestone in the development of effective intrusion detection system in 
information security systems. An expert system consists of a set of rules, which 
encode the knowledge of a human "expert". Unfortunately, expert systems require 
frequent updates by a system administrator to remain current. The lack of 
maintenance or update will degrade the security of the entire system by causing the 
system's users to be misleading into believing that the system is secure, even as one 
of the key components becomes increasingly futile over time (Mukherjee et al. 1994). 
2.7.4 Pattern Recognition 
In this approach, a series of penetration scenarios are coded into the system. Pattern 
recognition possesses a distinct advantage over anomaly and misuse detection 
methods in that it is capable of identifying attacks, which may occur over an extended 
period of time, or by multiple attackers working in concert. This approach is effective 
in reducing the need to review a potentially large amount of audit data. 
2.7.5 Network Monitoring 
This technique monitors network activity for indications of attacks. The greatest 
advantage of network monitoring mechanisms is its independence on audit data. 
Because this method does not require input from any operating system's audit trail, it 
can use standard network protocols to monitor heterogeneous sets of operating 
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2.8 Approaches to Intrusion Detection 
The following are the approaches being utilized to accomplish the desirable elements  
of an intrusion detection system (Fox et al. 1990). This section describe here these  
approaches briefly. 
2.8.1 Anomaly Detection 
Anomaly detection is the general category of intrusion detection, which works by 
identifying activities, which vary from established patterns for users, or groups of 
users. Anomaly detection typically involves the creation of knowledge bases which 
contain the profiles of the monitored activities (Khan et al. 2007). This approach has 
some benefits and drawbacks those are listed below. 
Benefits 
 As any significant deviation from normal profile will be flagged as 
anomalous, anomaly detectors can detect unknown attacks. 
 Anomaly detectors do not require constant updating of rules or signatures of 
novel intrusion. 
 Anomaly detectors can produce information that can in turn be used to define 
signatures for misuse detectors. 
Drawbacks 
 The high false positive rate is the main drawback of the anomaly IDSs. This is 
due to the fact that, the normal profile of a system cannot be fully learned 
and/or behavior of users or programs may change over time. 
 In order to build normal profile of a system, system in question should be 
monitored and information should be collected, which in turn will be used to 
draw normal behaviour of the system. However, if the collected information 
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contains attacks, intrusive behavior will be a part of the normal profile, and in 
future, these attacks will go undetected. 
 Anomaly detection approaches need extensive data sets to build profile of the 
system. 
2.8.2 Misuse Detection 
The second general approach to intrusion detection is misuse detection. This 
technique involves the comparison of a user's activities with the known behaviors of 
attackers attempting to penetrate a system. Misuse detection also utilizes a knowledge 
base of information (Mukherjee et al. 1994). This approach has some benefits and 
drawbacks those are listed below.  
Benefits 
 Misuse IDSs can detect intrusion with a certain degree of certainty. Misuse 
detectors are very effective in detecting attacks without giving high false 
alarm rates. 
 Misuse IDSs can detect all intrusions whose signatures are known. 
 Misuse IDSs are easy to implement (state machine, signature analysis) and 
deploy (no need to form a profile of the system). 
Drawbacks 
 Detection ability of misuse detectors is limited to signatures that they posses. 
A new intrusion or even a variation of a known intrusion may be undetected. 
So misuse IDS require regular updates of signatures in order to remain 
current. 
 The process of developing a new attack signature is time consuming. 
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2.8.3 Combined Anomaly and Misuse Detection 
Research has also been conducted into intrusion detection methodologies, which 
combine the anomaly detection approach and the misuse detection approach. The 
combined approach permits a single intrusion detection system to monitor for 
indications of external and internal attacks (Pervez et al. 2007). 
All current intrusion detection systems make four statements about the systems 
that they are designed to protect: 
 Activities taken by system users, either authorized or unauthorized, can be 
monitored. 
 It is possible to identify those actions, which are indications of an attack 
on a system 
 Information obtained from the intrusion detection system can be utilized 
to enhance the overall security of the network. 
 A fourth element, which is desirable from any intrusion detection 
mechanism, is the ability of the system to make an analysis of an attack in 
real-time. 
 2.9 Attack Dataset 
This section explains attack dataset that has used in this research work. The defense 
advanced research projects agency (DARPA) project was prepared and executed by 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory, USA (Pervez et 
al. 2007), (Bankovic et al. 2009). One of the reasons for choosing this dataset is that 
the dataset is standard. This will make it easy to compare the results of this work with 
other similar works. Another reason is that it is difficult to get another data set, which 
contains so rich a variety of attacks as the one used here.  
There are 41 features, which fall into different categories such as basic features 
and derived features. The basic features describe single network connections. The 
derived features can be divided into content-based features and traffic based features. 
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The content-based features are derived using domain knowledge and the traffic-based 
features are obtained by studying the sequential patterns between the connection 
records as well as the correlation between basic features.  
In order to create the feature set, the raw tcpdump data has been pre-processed 
into connection records. The basic features are directly obtained from the connection 
records. The derived features fall into two groups; (i) Content-based features and (ii) 
Traffic based features. Table 2.1 explains 41 features of KDD cup dataset in terms of 
feature number, name of feature and type of feature. These features form a record that 
represents an attack or normal activity. Table 2.2 shows connection-based features, 
Table 2.3 shows content-based features and Table 2.4 shows nine time-based features 
from the KDD cup dataset 
Table 2.1 Features of KDD cup dataset 
Feature # Name of feature Type of feature 
1 DURATION CONTINUOUS 
2 PROTOCOL_TYPE SYMBOLIC 
3 SERVICE SYMBOLIC 
4 FLAG SYMBOLIC 
5 SRC_BYTES CONTINUOUS 
6 DST_BYTES CONTINUOUS 
7 LAND SYMBOLIC 
8 WRONG_FRAGMENT CONTINUOUS 
9 URGENT CONTINUOUS 
10 HOT CONTINUOUS 
11 NUM_FAILED_LOGINS CONTINUOUS 
12 LOGGED_IN SYMBOLIC 
13 NUM_COMPROMISED CONTINUOUS 
14 ROOT_SHELL CONTINUOUS 
15 SU_ATTEMPTED CONTINUOUS 
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Feature # Name of feature Type of feature 
16 NUM_ROOT CONTINUOUS 
17 NUM_FILE_CREATIONS CONTINUOUS 
18 NUM_SHELLS CONTINUOUS 
19 NUM_ACCESS_FILES CONTINUOUS 
20 NUM_OUTBOUND_CMDS CONTINUOUS 
21 IS_HOST_LOGIN SYMBOLIC 
22 IS_GUEST_LOGIN SYMBOLIC 
23 COUNT CONTINUOUS 
24 SRV_COUNT CONTINUOUS 
25 SERROR_RATE CONTINUOUS 
26 SRV_SERROR_RATE CONTINUOUS 
27 RERROR_RATE CONTINUOUS 
28 SRV_RERROR_RATE CONTINUOUS 
29 SAME_SRV_RATE CONTINUOUS 
30 DIFF_SRV_RATE CONTINUOUS 
31 SRV_DIFF_HOST_RATE CONTINUOUS 
32 DST_HOST_COUNT CONTINUOUS 
33 DST_HOST_SRV_COUNT CONTINUOUS 
34 DST_HOST_SAME_SRV_RATE  CONTINUOUS 
35 DST_HOST_DIFF_SRV_RATE CONTINUOUS 
36 DST_HOST_SAME_SRC_PORT_RATE CONTINUOUS 
37 DST_HOST_SRV_DIFF_HOST_RATE  CONTINUOUS 
38 DST_HOST_SERROR_RATE CONTINUOUS 
39 DST_HOST_SRV_SERROR_RATE CONTINUOUS 
40 DST_HOST_RERROR_RATE CONTINUOUS 
41 DST_HOST_SRV_RERROR_RATE CONTINUOUS 
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Table 2.3 Content-based features 
No. Feature name Description  
10 HOT Number of hot indicators 
11 NUM_FAILED_LOGINS Number of failed login attempts 
12 LOGGED_IN 1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise 
13 NUM_COMPROMISED Number of compromised conditions 
14 ROOT_SHELL 1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise 
15 SU_ATTEMPTED 1 if su root command attempted; 0 otherwise 
16 NUM_ROOT Number of root accesses 
17 NUM_FILE_CREATIONS Number of file creation 
18 NUM_SHELLS Number of shell prompts 
19 NUM_ACCESS_FILES Number of operations on access control files 
20 NUM_OUTBOUND_CMDS  Number of outbound commands  
21 IS_HOST_LOGIN  1 if the login belongs to the host else 0  
22 IS_GUEST-LOGIN 1 if the login belongs to the guest else 0  
Table 2.2 Connection-based feature 
No. Feature name Description  
1 DURATION  Length (number of seconds) of the connection  
2 PROTOCOL_TYPE  Type of the protocol, e.g. tcp, udp, etc.  
3 SERVICE  Network service on the destination 
4 SRC_BYTES  Number of data bytes from source to destination  
5 DST_BYTES  Number of data bytes from destination to source  
6 FLAG  Normal or error status of the connection  
7 
LAND  1 if connection is from/to the same host/port 
8 
WRONG_FRAGMENT  Number of `wrong' fragments  
9 URGENT Number of urgent packets 
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Table 2.4 Time-based features 
No. Feature name Description  
23 COUNT  
Number of connections to the same host as the current 
connection in the past two seconds  
Note: The following features refer to these same-host connections. 
24 SERROR_RATE  % of connections that have ``SYN'' errors  
25 RERROR_RATE  % of connections that have ``REJ'' errors  
26 SAME_SRV_RATE  % of connections to the same service  
27 DIFF_SRV_RATE  % of connections to different services  
28 SRV_COUNT  
number of connections to the same service as the current 
connection in the past two seconds  
Note: The following features refer to these same-service connections. 
No. Feature name Description  
29 SRV_SERROR_RATE  
% of connections that have ``SYN'' 
errors  
30 SRV_RERROR_RATE  
% of connections that have ``REJ'' 
errors  
31 SRV_DIFF_HOST_RATE  % of connections to different hosts  
32 DST_HOST_COUNT Number of connection to host 
33 DST_HOST_SRV_COUNT Number of services requested to host 
34 DST_HOST_SAME_SRV_RATE % of connection with same service 
35 DST_HOST_DIFF_SRV_RATE % of connection with different services 
36 DST_HOST_SAME_SRC_PORT_RATE 
% of connection using the same source 
port 
37 DST_HOST_SRV_DIFF_HOST_RATE 
% of connection with same service but 
to different host 
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No. Feature name Description  
38 DST_HOST_SERROR_RATE % of connection that have SNY error 
39 DST_HOST_SRV_SERROR_RATE 
% of connection with same service that have 
SYN error 
40 DST_HOST_RERROR_RATE % of connection that have REJ errors 
41 DST_HOST_SRV_RERROR_RATE 
% of connection with same service that have 
REJ errors 
 
The description of these types of attacks requires some domain knowledge and 
cannot be done only based on information available in the packet header. Most of 
these attacks are R2L and U2R attacks. Traffic based features have been computed 
automatically. They are effective for the detection of DOS and probe attacks. A list of 
the computer attacks is described briefly that are considered in this research work. 
2.9.1 Denial of Service (DOS) Attacks 
DOS is a type of attack that aims to make an organization's services or resources 
unavailable for an indefinite amount of time by flooding it with useless traffic (Kim et 
al. 2005). The examples of DOS attacks are given as follows. 
 Ping of Death (pod): It makes the victim host unavailable by sending it 
oversized internet control message protocol (ICMP) packets as ping requests. 
 Back: It is a denial of service attack against apache web servers. The attacker 
sends requests containing many front slashes. The processing of which is time 
consuming. 
 Land: Spoofed synchronization (SYN) packet sent to the victim host resulting 
in that host repeatedly synchronizing with itself. 
 Smurf: A broadcast of ping requests with a spoofed sender address which 
results in the victim being bombarded with a huge number of ping responses. 
 Neptune: The attacker half opens a number of transmission control protocol 
(TCP) connections to the victim host making it impossible for the victim host 
to accept new TCP connections from other hosts. 
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 Teardrop: Confuses the victim host by sending it overlapping internet 
protocol (IP) fragments: overlapping IP fragments are incorrectly dealt with 
by some older operating systems.  
Each feature of KDD record is separated by semicolon. A sample of DOS attack 
and its normal pattern is shown in Table 2.5.  
2.9.2 Probing Attacks 
Probing attack involves discovering the algorithms and parameters of the 
recommender system itself (Kim et al. 2005). It may be necessary for an intruder to 
acquire this knowledge through interaction with the system itself. The examples of 
probing attacks are given as follows. 
 Ipsweep: It probes the network to discover available services on the network. 
 Portsweep: It probes a host to find available services on that host. 
 Nmap: It is a complete and flexible tool for scanning a network either 
randomly or sequentially. 
 Satan: It is an administration tool; it gathers information about the network. 
This information can be used by an attacker. 
Each record of KDD consists of features that are separated by semicolon. A 




Table 2.5 A DOS attack and its normal pattern 
Attack pattern Normal pattern 
0;18;21;20;1480;0;0;1;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0
;0;0;0;0;1;1;0.00;0.00;0.00;0.00;1.00;0.0
0;0.00;1;1;1.0;0.00; 1.00; 0.00; 0.00; 
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2.9.3 Remote to Local (R2L) Attacks 
R2L attack involves unauthorized access from a remote machine (Ahmad et al. 2007). 
The examples of remote to local attacks are given below: 
 
 Imap: It causes a buffer overflow by exploiting a bug in the authentication 
procedure of the imap server on some versions of LINUX. The attacker gets 
root privileges and can execute an arbitrary sequence of commands.  
 Ftpwrite: This attack exploits a misconfiguration affecting write privileges of 
anonymous accounts on a file transfer protocol (FTP) server. This allows any 
ftp user to add arbitrary files to the FTP server. 
 Phf: This is an example of badly written common gateway interface (CGI) 
scripts that is distributed with the apache server. Exploiting this flaw allows 
the attacker to execute codes with the http privileges. 
 Warezmaster: This attack is possible in a situation where write permissions 
are improperly assigned on a FTP server. When this is the case, the attacker 
can upload copies of illegal software that can then be downloaded by other 
users.  
 Warezclient: This attack consists in downloading illegal software previously 
uploaded during a warezmaster attack. 
 
Every feature of KDD record is separated by semicolon. A sample of R2L attack 
and its normal pattern is shown in Table 2.7.  
Table 2.6 A Probing attack and its normal pattern 
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2.9.4 User to Root (U2R) Attacks 
U2R attack involves unauthorized access to local super user privileges by a local 
unprivileged user (Ahmad et al. 2007). A sample of U2R attack and its normal pattern 
is shown in Table 2.8.  The examples of such attacks are described as follows. 
Loadmodule: This attack exploits a flaw in how SUNOS 4.1 dynamically load 
modules. This flaw makes it possible for any user of the system to get root privileges. 
Perl: Exploits a bug in some practical extraction and report language (PERL) 
implementations on some earlier systems. This bug consists in these PERL 
implementations improperly handling their root privileges. This leads to a situation 
where any user can obtain root privileges. 
Buffer Overflow: It consists in overflowing input buffers in order to overwrite 
memory locations containing security relevant information. Table 2.8 shows 38 
features of the dataset that are separated by semicolon. 
Table 2.7 A R2L attack and its normal pattern 








Table 2.8 A U2R attack and its normal pattern 
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2.9.5 Other Attacks 
There are some other types of attacks; guessing passwords, making use of spy 
programs, and making use of rootkit and multihop attack (Ahmad et al. 2008). A 
sample of such attacks and their normal patterns are shown in Table 2.9. 
2.10 Soft Computing  
This section provides brief information to Soft Computing (SC) in general and 
explains applied SC techniques in specific. SC refers to algorithms that are able to 
deal with uncertainty and incomplete information and that are still capable of 
discovering approximately good solutions to complex computational problems, and 
doing so faster from a computational perspective. These algorithms include neural 
networks, evolutionary computing (genetic algorithms and genetic programming), 
Support Vector Machines and fuzzy logic etc. Actually, the role model for soft 
computing is the human mind. The soft computing is tolerant of imprecision, 
uncertainty, partial truth, and approximation while hard computing shows precision, 
certainty, and rigor (Saad 2008) and (Eiben and Smith 2003). The guiding principle 
of soft computing is exploiting the tolerance for imprecision, uncertainty, partial 
truth, and approximation to achieve flexibility, robustness and low solution cost 
(Jirapummin et al. 2002) and (Bäck 1996). Mostly applications of soft computing 
techniques are those areas where imprecision, or inaccuracy is acceptable, and the 
solution is tolerable of imprecision. 
 
Table 2.9 A sample of another attack and its normal pattern 
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2.10.1 Unique Property of Soft Computing 
The unique property of soft computing is described below (Michalewicz 1996).  
 The soft computing learns from experimental data.  
 The soft computing techniques derive their power of generalization from 
approximating to produce outputs from previously unseen inputs by using 
outputs from previous learned inputs.  
 The generalization is done usually in a high dimensional space. 
2.10.2 Applications of Soft Computing 
The soft computing has been used in different areas. But few applications of soft 
computing are listed here (Bebis et al. 2000).  
 Hand written recognition  
 Automotive systems and manufacturing 
 Image processing and data compression  
 Architecture  
 Decision-support systems  
 Power systems  
 Neuro fuzzy systems 
 Fuzzy logic control etc. 
2.10.3 Future of Soft Computing 
Soft computing is playing an important role in science and engineering, but sooner or 
later, its influence may extend much farther. It represents a significant paradigm shift 
in the aims of computing which reflects the fact that the human mind, unlike current 
computers, possesses a remarkable ability to store and process information which is 
imprecise, and uncertain (Verikas et al. 2010) and (Jang et al. 1997).  
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2.11 Overview of Soft Computing Techniques  
The primary techniques of soft computing (SC) are fuzzy logic (FL), neural networks 
(NN), SVM, evolutionary computation (EC), and machine learning (ML) and 
probabilistic reasoning (PR) (Jang et al. 1997). However, this section describes an 
overview of applied techniques in this research work such as neural networks, SVMs 
and GAs. 
2.11.1 Neural Networks (NN) 
Neural network is an information processing model that is inspired by the biological 
nervous systems, such as the brain, process information. The main element of this 
model is the novel structure of the information processing system. It is composed of a 
large number of highly interconnected processing elements (neurons) working in 
combination to solve particular problems (Hammerstrom 1993). 
Neural networks (NNs), like people, learn by example. Neural network is 
configured for a specific application, such as pattern recognition or data 
classification, through a learning process. Learning in biological systems involves 
adjustments to the synaptic connections that exist between the neurons. This is true of 
artificial neural networks or neural networks as well (Yu et al. 2005) and (Fausett 
2009).  
2.11.1.1 Neurobiological Background 
The nervous system of living organisms is a structure consisting of many elements or 
processing units working in parallel fashion and in connection with one another. This 
structure (neural cell of the brain) is known as neuron that is developed in 1836. The 
structure of biological neuron is shown in Figure 2.2 as ascribed in the literature 
(Fausett 2009). 
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Figure 2.2 Structure of biological neuron 
This is a result worth of the Nobel Prize (1906). The neuron has many-inputs and 
one-output units as shown in Figure 2.2 (Fausett 2009). The output can be excited or 
not excited, just two possible choices (like a flip-flop). The signals from other 
neurons are summed together and compared against a threshold to determine if the 
neuron shall excite ("fire"). The input signals are subject to attenuation in the 
synapses which are junction parts of the neuron. The concept of synapse was 
introduced in 1897.The next important step was to find that the synapse resistance to 
the incoming signal can be changed during a "learning" process (1949). If an input of 
a neuron is causing the neuron to fire repeatedly and persistently, a metabolic change 
happens in the synapse of that particular input to reduce its resistance (Fausett 2009).
        
2.11.1.2 Artificial Neuron         
The first artificial neuron was produced in 1943 by the neurophysiologist Warren 
McCulloch and the logician Walter Pits. But the technology available at that time did 
not allow them to do too much (Jirapummin et al. 2002). The structure of ANN is 
shown in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3 Structure of artificial neuron 
A simple mathematical expression can be expressed of a neuron model as given 
in equation (2.1). The unit‟s output activation is given in Equation 2.1. 
            
 
   
  (2.1) 
Where    is the output activation of unit j and     is the weight on the link from 
unit j to this unit. 
An artificial neuron is a processing element with many inputs and one output. The 
neuron has two types of operation; one is the training phase and the other is using or 
testing phase. In the training phase, the neuron can be trained to fire (or not), for 
specific input patterns or exemplars. In the using or testing phase, when a taught input 
pattern or exemplar is detected at the input, its associated output becomes the current 
output. If the input does not belong in the taught list of input patterns, the firing rule 
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2.11.1.3 Architecture of Neural Networks 
This section explains two types of neural networks. One is feed-forward and other is 
feedback. 
a). Feed-forward Networks        
Feed-forward ANNs allow signals to travel one way only; from input to output. There 
is no feedback (loops) i.e. the output of any layer does not affect that same layer. 
Feed-forward ANNs tend to be straightforward networks that associate inputs with 
outputs. They are used extensively in pattern recognition (Yu et al. 2005) and 
(Ahmad et al. 2007). This type is also referred to as bottom-up or top-down that is 
shown in Figure 2.4.  
 
Figure 2.4 Feed -forward ANN 
b). Feedback Networks 
Feedback networks can have signals traveling in both directions by introducing loops 
in the network. Feedback networks are dynamic; their state is changing continuously 
until they reach an equilibrium point. They remain at the equilibrium point until the 
input changes and a new equilibrium needs to be found. It is also known as interactive 
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or recurrent (Ahmad et al. 2007) and (Ahmad et al. 2008). This type of neural 
network is shown in Figure 2.5. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Feedback ANN 
2.11.1. 4 Characteristics of Neural Networks 
The neural network is popular due to the following characteristics (Fausett 2009). 
 The NNs demonstrate capabilities, that is, they can map input patterns to 
their associated output patterns. 
 The NNs learn by examples. They can be trained with known examples of 
a problem before testing. 
 The NNs possess the capability to generalize. Thus, they can predict new 
outcomes from past trends. 
 The NNs are robust systems and are fault tolerant. They can recall full 
pattern from incomplete, partial or noisy patterns. 
 The NNs can process information in parallel, at high speed, and in a 
distributed manner. 
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2.11.1.5 Learning Methods 
There are two main learning methods in neural networks; supervised and 
unsupervised. This section describes them briefly. 
a). Supervised Learning 
It includes an external teacher, so that each output unit is told what its desired 
response to input signals ought to be. During the learning process global information 
may be required. Models of supervised learning include; (i) error-correction learning, 
(ii) reinforcement learning, and (iii) stochastic learning. An imperative issue 
regarding supervised learning is the problem of error convergence, i.e. the 
minimization of error between the desired and computed unit values. The aim is to 
determine a set of weights, which minimizes the error. One well-known method, 
which is common to many learning models, is the least mean square (LMS) 
convergence (Browne 2000).  
b). Unsupervised Learning 
It uses no external teacher and is based upon local information only. It is also known 
as self-organization, in the sense that it self-organizes data presented to the network 
and detects their evolving collective properties. Paradigms of unsupervised learning 
are hebbian lerning and competitive learning (Sandhya 2009). 
2.11.1.6 Transfer Function  
The behavior of an ANN (Artificial Neural Network) depends on both the weights 
and the input-output function (transfer function) that is specified for the units. This 
function typically falls into one of three categories (Sandhya 2009).  
a) Linear  
b) Threshold 
c) Sigmoid 
 39   
 
a) Linear units: The output activity is proportional to the total weighted output.  
b) Threshold units: The output is set at one of two levels, depending on whether 
the total input is greater than or less than some threshold value.  
c) Sigmoid units: The output varies continuously but not linearly as the input 
changes. Sigmoid units bear a greater similarity to real neurons than do linear 
or threshold units, but all three must be considered rough approximations.  
2.11.1.7 Neural Network Analysis       
An artificial neural network consists of a collection of processing elements that are 
highly interconnected and transform a set of inputs to a set of desired outputs. The 
result of the transformation is determined by the characteristics of the elements and 
the weights associated with the interconnections among them. By modifying the 
connections between the nodes the network is able to tune to the desired outputs 
(Bankovic et al. 2007). Unlike expert systems, which can provide the user with an 
absolute answer if the characteristics, which are analyzed precisely, match those, 
which have been coded in the rule base, a neural network conducts an analysis of the 
information and provides a probability estimate that the data matches the 
characteristics, which it has been trained to recognize. While the probability of a 
match determined by a neural network can be 100 %, the accuracy of its decisions 
relies totally on the experience the system gains in examining examples of the stated 
problem. The neural network gains the experience initially by training the system to 
identify correctly preselected examples of the problem. The response of the neural 
network is analyzed and the configuration of the system is clarified until the neural 
network‟s analysis of the training data reaches an agreeable level. In addition to the 
initial training period, the neural network also gains experience over time as it 
conducts analyses on data related to the problem (Hammerstrom 1993) ,(Cannady 
2000a) and (Pervez et al. 2007).          
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2.11.1.8 Neural Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
A limited amount of research has been conducted on the application of neural 
networks to detecting computer intrusions. Artificial neural networks offer the 
potential to resolve a number of the problems faced by the other current approaches to 
intrusion detection. Artificial neural networks are alternatives. Neural networks were 
specifically proposed to identify the typical characteristics of system users and 
identify statistically significant variations from the user's established behavior (Fu 
1992). Artificial neural networks have also been designed for use in the detection of 
computer viruses. They were proposed as statistical analysis approaches in the 
detection of viruses and malicious software in computer networks. The neural 
network architecture, which was selected, was SOM a self-organizing feature map 
which uses a single layer of neurons to represent knowledge from a particular domain 
in the form of a geometrically organized feature map. The proposed network was 
designed to learn the characteristics of normal system activity and identify statistical 
variations from the norm that may be an indication of a virus (Denault et al. 1994).  
2.11.1.9 Advantages of Neural Network-based IDS      
The first advantage of a neural network in the detection of instances of misuse would 
be the flexibility that the network would provide. A neural network would be capable 
of analyzing the data from the network, even if the data is incomplete or distorted. 
Similarly, the network would possess the ability to conduct an analysis with data in a 
non-linear fashion. Further, because some attacks may be conducted against the 
network in a coordinated attack by multiple attackers, the ability to process data from 
a number of sources in a non-linear fashion is especially important. The built in speed 
of neural networks is another benefit of this approach. Because the protection of 
computing resources requires the timely identification of attacks, the processing 
speed of the neural network could enable intrusion responses to be conducted before 
permanent damage occurs to the system. Because the output of a neural network is 
expressed in the form of a probability, the neural network provides a predictive 
capability to the detection of instances of misuse. A neural network-based misuse 
detection system would identify the probability that a particular event, or series of 
events, was indicative of an attack against the system. As the neural network gains 
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experience it will enhance its aptitude to determine where these events are likely to 
occur in the attack process. This information could then be used to generate a series 
of events that should occur if this is in fact an intrusion attempt. By tracking the 
subsequent occurrence of these events the system would be capable of improving the 
analysis of the events and possibly conducting defensive measures before the attack is 
successful. However, the most important advantage of neural networks in intrusion 
detection is the ability of the neural network to "learn" the characteristics of intrusion 
attacks and identify instances that have been observed before by the network. The 
probability of an attack against the system may be estimated and a potential threat 
flagged whenever the probability exceeds a specified threshold (Fox et al. 1990), 
(James 1997) and (Ahmad et al. 2008).  
2.11.1.10 Disadvantages of Neural Network-based IDS    
There are two primary reasons why neural networks have not been applied to the 
problem of misuse detection in the past. The first reason relates to the training 
requirements of the neural network. Because the ability of the artificial neural 
network to identify indications of an intrusion is completely dependent on the 
accurate training of the system, the training data and the training methods that are 
used are critical. The training routine requires a very large amount of data to ensure 
that the results are statistically accurate. The training of a neural network for intrusion 
detection purposes may require thousands of individual attacks sequences, and this 
quantity of sensitive information is difficult to obtain (Pervez et al. 2007) and 
(Cannady 2000b). However, the most significant disadvantage of applying neural 
networks to intrusion detection is the "black box" nature of the neural network. 
Unlike expert systems, which have hard-coded rules for the analysis of events, neural 
networks adapt their analysis of data in response to the training which is conducted on 
the network. The connection weights and transfer functions of the various network 
nodes are usually frozen after the network has achieved an acceptable level of success 
in the identification of events. While the network analysis is achieving a sufficient 
probability of success, the basis for this level of accuracy is not often known.  
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The "Black Box Problem" has overwhelmed neural networks in a number of 
applications. This is an on-going area of neural network research (Cannady 2000a) 
and (Fox et al. 1990). 
In the last few years, the intrusion detection field has developed significantly and 
therefore many IDSs have been developed. The initial IDSs were anomaly detection 
tools but now, most of the commercial IDSs are misuse detection tools. IDSs have 
become a need, as number of computer and network systems increased seriously. The 
purpose of this research is to propose and analyze the applicability of soft computing 
in the field of intrusion detection. The proposed network based intrusion detection 
system is network-based, because it uses network data to determine whether an 
intrusion has taken place or not. 
2.11.2 Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
SVM was introduced in computational learning theory conference (COLT-92) in 
1992. Support vector machines (SVMs) are a set of related supervised learning 
methods used for classification and regression (Cortes and Vapnik 1995).  
SVM can be applied to the problem of traffic classification in computer network 
systems. This technique is suitable for solving classification problems with high 
dimensional feature space and small training set size. Although the basic technique 
was conceived for binary classification, several methods for single and multi-class 
problems have been developed. As a supervised method, it relies on two phases: 
training and testing. The algorithm acquires knowledge about the classes by 
examining the training set during the training phase. During the evaluation or testing 
phase, a classification method examines the evaluation or testing set and associates its 
members to the classes that are available. During the training phase, the target of the 
algorithm is the estimation of boundaries between the classes described by the 
samples in the training sets. To describe the method with a very simple example one 
can think of a two class problem where a single regular surface perfectly divides the 
features space in two regions, each one fully representative of the corresponding class 
(Este et al. 2009). There can be some issues noticed with neural networks. Some of 
them are having many local minima and also finding how many neurons might be 
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needed for a task is another issue, which determines whether optimality of that NN is 
reached. Another thing to note is that even if the neural network solutions used tends 
to converge, this may not result in a unique solution. SVM performs better in term of 
not over generalization (Mitchell 1997). 
Figure 2.6 shows two different types of data and there are many hyper planes, 
which can classify it. However, which one is better? Which of the linear separators is 
optimal? Therefore, the solution of this problem of selecting suitable hyperplane is 
SVM (Smith  and Gales 2002). 
 
Figure 2.6  Hyper planes for classification of data 
From above Figure 2.6, there are many linear classifiers (hyper planes) that 
separate the data. However, only one of these achieves maximum separation. The 
reason of using hyper plane is to classify data into two classes. However, hyper plane 
may be closer to one dataset compared to others and this is not good to happen and 
thus the concept of large margin classifier or hyper plane is a clear solution. The next 
Figure 3.6 gives the large margin classifier example, which provides a solution to the 
above-mentioned problem (Cristianini and Shawe 2000). 
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Figure 2.7 Linear SVM 
The expression for large margin is given as; 
                  
    
       
   
       
    
  
   
 
(2.2) 
Figure 2.7 is the large margin linear classifier with the maximum range. In this 
context, it is an example of a simple linear SVM classifier. There are some good 
explanations, which include better empirical performance. One advantage is that if 
there is a small error in the location of the boundary than this gives a least chance of 
misclassification. The other advantage would be avoiding local minima and better 
classification. Now, the SVM is expressed mathematically and try to present a linear 
SVM. The goals of SVM are separating the data with hyper plane and extend this to 
non-linear boundaries using kernel trick (Mitchell 1997).  For calculating SVM, the 
goal is to classify all the data correctly.  
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For mathematical calculations, SVM can be represented in the following 
equations, 
[a]                   (2.3) 
[b]                   (2.4) 
[c]                       (2.5) 
In this equation x is a vector point and w is weight and is also a vector. So to 
separate the data [a] should always be greater than zero. Among all possible hyper 
planes, SVM selects the one where the distance of hyper plane is as large as possible.  
If the training data is good and every test vector is located in radius r from training 
vector than chosen hyper plane is located at the farthest possible from the data (Lewis 
2004). This desired hyper plane which maximizes the margin also bisects the lines 
between closest points on convex hull of the two datasets. Thus afore mentioned 
equations (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5) are drawn in Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8 Representation of hyper planes 
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Distance of closest point on hyperplane to origin can be found by maximizing the 
x as x is on the hyper plane. Similarly, there will be similar scenario for the other side 
points. Thus solving and subtracting the two distances, the resultant is the summed 
distance from the separating hyperplane to nearest points.  
 
Maximum Margin = M = 2 / ||w||. Now maximizing the margin is same as 
minimum (Lewis 2004).  Suppose a quadratic optimization problem and there is need 
to solve for w and b. To solve this problem, the quadratic function has to optimize 
with linear constraints. The solution involves constructing a dual problem and where 
a Langlier‟s multiplier αi is associated. The target is to find w and b such that Φ (w) 
=½ |w‟||w| is minimized; and for all {(xi, yi)}p:  yi (w * xi + b) ≥ 1. 
After solving the result is that w =Σαi * xi; b= yk- w *xk for any xk such that αk 0 
and the classifying function will have the following form:   f(x) = Σαi yi xi  * x + b.      
 
Figure 2.9 Representation of Support Vectors 
2.11.2.1 SVM Representation 
This section describes the quadratic programming (QP) formulation for SVM 
classification (Mitchell 1997), (Lewis 2004) and (Burges 1998). The simple 
representation of SVM can be expressed as, 
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SV classification: 
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SVM classification, Dual formulation: 
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   Where                  ;     and          
 
    
 
             
     
 
Variables i are called slack variables and they measure the error made at point 
(xi,yi).Training SVM becomes quite challenging when the number of training points 
is large. A number of methods for fast SVM training have been proposed (Mitchell 
1997), (Lewis 2004) and (Burges 1998). 
2.11.2.2 Soft Margin Classifier  
In real world problem, it is not likely to get an exactly separate line dividing the data 
within the space and there might have a curved decision boundary. There might be a 
hyperplane, which might exactly separate the data, but this may not be desirable if the 
data has noise in it. It is better for the smooth boundary to ignore few data points than 
be curved or go in loops, around the outliers. This is handled in a different way using  
slack variables those are introduced in existing research work (Mitchell 1997),  
(Lewis 2004), (Burges 1998). This can be expressed as, yi(w‟x + b) ≥ 1 - Sk.. This 
allows a point to be a small distance Sk on the wrong side of the hyper plane without 
violating the constraint. This might end up having huge slack variables which allow 
any line to separate the data, thus in such scenarios the Lagrangian variable are 
 48   
introduced which penalizes the large slacks. 
          
              
                    
(2.9) 
Where reducing α allows more data to lie on the wrong side of hyper plane and 
would be treated as outliers which give smoother decision boundary (Burges 1998). 
 
 
Figure 2.10 Soft margin classification 
2.11.2.3 Kernel and Feature Space 
a). Kernel: If data is linear, a separating hyper plane may be used to divide the data. 
However, it is often the case that the data is far from linear and the datasets are 
inseparable. To allow for this kernels are used to non-linearly map the input data to a 
high-dimensional space. A very simple illustration of this is shown in Figure 2.11. 
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Figure 2.11 Use of kernels 
This mapping is defined by the Kernel:      
                 (2.10) 
b). Feature Space: Transforming the data into feature space makes it possible to 
define a similarity measure on the basis of the dot product. If the feature space is 
chosen suitably, pattern recognition can be easy. 
                             (2.11) 
 
Figure 2.12 Feature space representation 
Note the legend is not described, as they are sample plotting to make understand 
the concepts involved. Now getting back to the kernel trick, when w,b is obtained the 
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problem is solved for a simple linear scenario in which data is separated by a hyper 
plane. The Kernel trick allows SVM‟s to form nonlinear boundaries. The steps 
involved in kernel trick are given (Burges 1998), (Cristianini et al. 2002). 
 The algorithm is expressed using only the inner products of data sets. This is 
also called as dual problem. 
 Original data are passed through non linear maps to form new data with 
respect to new dimensions by adding a pair wise product of some of the 
original data dimension to each data vector. 
 Rather than an inner product on these new, larger vectors, and store in tables 
and later do a table lookup, this can be represented by a dot product of the 
data after doing non linear mapping on them. This function is the kernel 
function.  
a). Dual Problem 
First, the problem is converted with optimization to the dual form in which try to 
eliminate w, and a Lagrangian now is only a function of λi. There is a mathematical 
solution for it. To solve the problem maximize the LD with respect to λi.  The dual 
form simplifies the optimization and the major achievement is the dot product 
obtained from this method (Burges 1998) and (Cristianini et al. 2002). 
b). Inner Product Summarization 
This section represents the dot product of the data vectors used. The dot product of 
nonlinearly mapped data can be expensive. The kernel trick just picks a suitable 
function that corresponds to dot product of some nonlinear mapping instead (Burges 
1998) and (Cristianini et al. 2002). A particular kernel is chosen only by trial and 
error on the test set, choosing the right kernel based on the problem or application 
would enhance SVM‟s performance. 
c). Kernel Functions 
The idea of the kernel function is to enable operations to be performed in the input 
space rather than the potentially high dimensional feature space. Hence the inner 
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product does not need to be evaluated in the feature space. The function performs 
mapping of the attributes of the input space to the feature space. The kernel function 
plays a critical role in SVM and its performance. It is based on reproducing Kernel 
Hilbert Spaces (Nello 2000).  
The below mentioned Equation (2.12) shows mapping from input space to the 
feature space.  
                     (2.12) 
 
If K is a symmetric positive definite function, which satisfies Mercer‟s conditions 
than, 
           
 
 
    
                
(2.13) 
                                  (2.14) 
Then the kernel represents a legitimate inner product in feature space. The 
training set is not linearly separable in an input space. The training set is linearly 
separable in the feature space. This is called the “kernel trick” (Cristianini et al. 2002) 
and (Nello 2000).  The different kernel functions are listed below. 
Polynomial: A polynomial mapping is a popular method for non-linear modeling. The 
second kernel is usually preferable as it avoids problems with the hessian becoming 
Zero. 
                (2.15) 
                    (2.16) 
Gaussian Radial Basis Function: Radial basis functions most commonly with a 
Gaussian form. 
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(2.17) 
Exponential Radial Basis Function:  A radial basis function produces a piecewise 
linear solution which can be attractive when discontinuities are acceptable. 
               
        
    
  
(2.18) 
Multi-Layer Perceptron: The long established MLP, with a single hidden layer, also 
has a valid kernel representation. 
                        (2.19) 
2.11.2.3 Applications of SVM 
The SVM has been used in the following areas (Bebis et al. 2002). 
 Hand written recognition  
 Data Classification 
 Image processing and data compression Geo- and Environmental Sciences 
 Character Recognition 
 Intrusion Detection 
 Bioinformatics 
 Face Recognition  
 Decision Tree Predictive Modeling 
 E-learning etc. 
2.11.3 Genetic Algorithm (GA) 
Genetic algorithms are a part of evolutionary computing, which is a rapidly growing 
area of artificial intelligence. Genetic algorithms (GA) are search algorithms based on 
the principles of natural selection and genetics. The bases of GA approach are given 
by Holland and it has been deployed to solve wide range of problems (James 1997). 
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In a GA, a population of strings (called chromosomes or the genotype of the 
genome), which encode candidate solutions (called individuals, creatures, or 
phenotypes) to an optimization problem, evolves toward better solutions. 
Traditionally, solutions are represented in binary as strings of 0s and 1s, but other 
encodings are also possible. The evolution usually starts from a population of 
randomly generated individuals and happens in generations. In each generation, the 
fitness of every individual in the population is evaluated, multiple individuals are 
stochastically selected from the current population (based on their fitness), and 
modified (recombined and possibly randomly mutated) to form a new population. The 
new population is then used in the next iteration of the algorithm (James 1997). 
Commonly, the algorithm terminates when either a maximum number of 
generations has been produced, or a satisfactory fitness level has been reached for the 
population. If the algorithm has terminated due to a maximum number of generations, 
a satisfactory solution may or may not have been achieved. 
A typical GA requires a genetic representation of the solution domain and a 
fitness function to evaluate the solution domain. A standard representation of the 
solution is as an array of bits. Arrays of other types and structures can be used in 
essentially the same way. The main property that makes these genetic representations 
convenient is that their parts are easily aligned due to their fixed size, which 
facilitates simple crossover operations. Variable length representations may also be 
used, but crossover implementation is more complex in this case. Tree-like 
representations are explored in genetic programming and graph-form representations 
are explored in evolutionary programming. 
The fitness function is defined over the genetic representation and measures the 
quality of the represented solution. The fitness function is always problem dependent. 
For instance, in the knapsack problem one wants to maximize the total value of 
objects that can be put in a knapsack of some fixed capacity. A representation of a 
solution might be an array of bits, where each bit represents a different object, and the 
value of the bit (0 or 1) represents whether or not the object is in the knapsack. Not 
every such representation is valid, as the size of objects may exceed the capacity of 
the knapsack. The fitness of the solution is the sum of values of all objects in the 
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knapsack if the representation is valid, or  0 otherwise. In some problems, it is hard or 
even impossible to define the fitness expression; in these cases, interactive GAs are 
used. Once the genetic representation and the fitness function are defined, then GA 
proceeds to initialize a population of solutions randomly, then improve it through 
repetitive application of mutation, crossover, inversion and selection operators 
(Bankovic et al. 2009).  
2.11.3.1 Initialization 
Initially many individual solutions are generated randomly to form an initial 
population. The population size depends on the nature of the problem, but typically 
contains several hundreds or thousands of possible solutions. Traditionally, the 
population is generated randomly, covering the entire range of possible solutions (the 
search space). Occasionally, the solutions may be "seeded" in areas where optimal 
solutions are likely to be found (Bankovic et al. 2009). 
2.11.3.2 Selection 
During each successive generation, a proportion of the existing population is selected 
to breed a new generation. Individual solutions are selected through a fitness-based 
process, where fitter solutions (as measured by a fitness function) are typically more 
likely to be selected. Certain selection methods rate the fitness of each solution and 
preferentially select the best solutions. Other methods rate only a random sample of 
the population, as this process may be very time-consuming. Most functions are 
stochastic and designed so that a small proportion of less fit solutions are selected. 
This helps keep the diversity of the population large, preventing premature 
convergence on poor solutions. Popular and well-studied selection methods include 
roulette wheel selection and tournament selection (Bankovic et al. 2009).  
a). Roulette Wheel Selection  
Parents are selected according to their fitness. The better the chromosomes are, the 
more chances to be selected they have. Chromosome with bigger fitness will be 
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selected more times. Imagine a roulette wheel where all chromosomes in the 
population are placed, everyone has its place accordingly to its fitness function as in 
Figure 2.13.  
 
Figure 2.13 Roulette wheel 
b). Rank Selection  
The previous selection will have problems when the fitness differs very much. For 
example, if the best chromosome fitness is 90% of all the roulette wheel then the 
other chromosomes will have very few chances to be selected (Bankovic et al. 2007).  
Rank selection first ranks the population and then every chromosome receives 
fitness from this ranking. The worst will have fitness 1, second worst 2 etc. and the 
best will have fitness N (number of chromosomes in population).  
After this, all the chromosomes have a chance to be selected. However, this 
method can lead to slower convergence, because the best chromosomes do not differ 
so much from other ones.  
 
 
Situation before ranking (graph of fitness) 
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Situation after ranking (graph of order numbers) 
Figure 2.14 Graph before and after roulette wheel selection 
c). Steady State Selection  
This is not particular method of selecting parents. Main idea of this selection is that 
big part of chromosomes should survive to next generation (Bankovic et al. 2009).  
GA then works in the following way. In every generation a few (good - with high 
fitness) chromosomes are selected for creating a new offspring. Then some (bad - 
with low fitness) chromosomes are removed and the new offspring is placed in their 
place. The rest of population survives to new generation.  
2.11.3.3 Reproduction 
The next step is to generate a second generation population of solutions from those 
selected through genetic operators: crossover (also called recombination), and/or 
mutation. For each new solution to be produced, a pair of "parent" solutions is 
selected for breeding from the pool selected previously. By producing a "child" 
solution using the above methods of crossover and mutation, a new solution is created 
which typically shares many of the characteristics of its "parents". New parents are 
selected for each new child, and the process continues until a new population of 
solutions of appropriate size is generated. Although reproduction methods that are 
based on the use of two parents are more "biology inspired", some research  suggests 
that more than two "parents" are better to be used to reproduce a good quality 
chromosome. These processes ultimately result in the next generation population of 
chromosomes that is different from the initial generation. Generally the average 
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fitness will increase by this procedure for the population, since only the best 
organisms from the first generation are selected for breeding, along with a small 
proportion of less fit solutions (Bankovic et al. 2009).  
a). Crossover 
Crossover is a genetic operator that combines (mates) two chromosomes (parents) to 
produce a new chromosome (offspring). The idea behind crossover is that the new 
chromosome may be better than both of the parents if it takes the best characteristics 
from each of the parents (Bankovic et al. 2009). Crossover occurs during evolution 
according to the Crossover Probability. This probability should usually be set fairly 
high (0.9 is a good first choice). There are three basic crossover operators; one-point 
crossover, two-point crossover and uniform crossover. 
i. One Point - Randomly selects a crossover point within a chromosome then 
interchanges the two parent chromosomes at this point to produce two new 
offspring. Consider the following two parents that have been selected for 
crossover. The” |” symbol indicates the randomly chosen crossover point. 
 
Parent 1: 11001|010 
Parent 2: 00100|111 
After interchanging the parent chromosomes at the crossover point, the following 
offspring are produced: 
Offspring1: 11001|111 
Offspring2: 00100|010 
ii. Two Point - Randomly selects two crossover points within a chromosome then 
interchanges the two parent chromosomes between these points to produce two 
new offspring. Consider the following two parents that have been selected for 
crossover. The “|” symbols indicate the randomly chosen crossover points. 
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Parent 1: 110|010|10 
Parent 2: 001|001|11 
After interchanging the parent chromosomes at the crossover point, the following 
offspring are produced: 
Offspring1: 110|001|10 
Offspring2: 001|010|11 
iii. Uniform - Decides (with the probability defined by the mixing ratio) which parent 
will contribute each of the gene values in the offspring chromosomes. This allows 
the parent chromosomes to be mixed at the gene level rather than the segment 
level (as with one and two point crossover). For some problems, this additional 
flexibility outweighs the disadvantage of destroying building blocks. 
 
Consider the following two parents, which have been selected for crossover: 
Parent 1: 11001010 
Parent 2: 00100111 
 
If the mixing ratio is 0.5, approximately half of the genes in the offspring will 
come from parent 1 and the other half will come from parent 2. Below is a possible 




In this research method, one point cross over is used that is simple and performs 
the best as compared to others. The crossover probability used in all experiments is 
0.9. 
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b). Mutation 
Mutation is a genetic operator that alters one or more gene values in a chromosome 
from its initial state. This can result in entirely new gene values being added to the 
gene pool. With these new gene values, the GA may be able to arrive at a better 
solution than was previously possible. Mutation is an important part of the genetic 
search as it helps to prevent the population from stagnating at any local optima. 
Mutation occurs during evolution according to the probability defined. This 
probability should usually be set fairly low. If it is set too high, the search will turn 
into a primitive random search (Bankovic et al. 2007).  
2.11.3.4 Termination 
This generational process is repeated until a termination condition has been reached 
(Bankovic et al. 2007). Common terminating conditions are: 
 A solution is found that satisfies minimum criteria 
 Fixed number of generations reached 
 Allocated budget (computation time/money) reached 
 The highest ranking solution's fitness is reaching at such a point that 
successive iterations no longer produce better results 
 Manual inspection 
 Combinations of the above 
 Means Square Error (MSE) 
 Root Means Square (RMSR) 
2.11.3.5 Applications of GA 
A list of GA application is given. 
 Feature selection 
 Optimization 
 Bioinformatics  
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 Mathematics  
 Physics and other fields 
2.12 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
PCA was invented in 1901 by Karl Pearson (Pearson 1901). PCA is a useful 
statistical technique that has found application in fields such as face recognition and 
image compression, and is a common technique for finding patterns in data of high 
dimension. The entire subject of statistics is based on around the idea that you have 
this big set of data, and you want to analyze that set terms of the relationships 
between the individual points in that set (Smith 2002).  
The goal of PCA is to reduce the dimensionality of the data while retaining as 
much as possible of the variation present in the original dataset. It is a way of 
identifying patterns in data, and expressing the data in such a way as to highlight their 
similarities and differences. However, this method uses PCA for transformation of 
input vectors to the new search space. The selection of number of principal 
components is done by GA. 
The methodology applied in this work consists of different steps that are 
described here. The goal is to transform a given data set X of dimension M to an 
alternative data set Y of smaller dimension L. Equivalently, the goal is to find the 
matrix Y, where Y is the Karhunen–Loève transform (KLT) of matrix X: 
         (2.20) 
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Step 1: Organize the data set 
Suppose the data comprises a set of observations of M variables, and the goal is to 
reduce the data so that each observation can be described with only L variables,     L 
< M. Suppose further, that the data are arranged as a set of N data vectors X1, 
X2,...........XN with each Xn representing a single grouped observation of the M 
variables. 
 Write X1....................XN as column vectors, each of which has M rows. 
 Place the column vectors into a single matrix X of dimensions M × N. 
Step 2: Calculate the empirical mean 
 Find the empirical mean along each dimension m = 1, ...................., M. 
 Place the calculated mean values into an empirical mean vector u of 
dimensions M × 1. 
     
 
 
       
 
   
 
(2.21) 
Step 3: Calculate the deviation from the mean 
Mean subtraction is an integral part of the solution towards finding a principal 
component basis that minimizes the mean square error of approximating the data 
(Miranda 2008). Further may be proceeded by centring the data as follows: 
 Subtract the empirical mean vector u from each column of the data matrix X. 
 Store mean-subtracted data in the M × N matrix B. 
        (2.22) 
Where h is a 1x N row vector of all 1s: 
                            (2.23) 
Step 4: Find the covariance matrix 
Find the M × M empirical covariance matrix C. 
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(2.24) 
Where 
 is the expected value operator,    is the outer product operator, and * is the 
conjugate transpose operator. If B consists entirely of real numbers, which is the case 
in many applications, the "conjugate transpose" is the same as the regular transpose. 
The covariance matrix in PCA is a sum of outer products between its sample vectors, 
indeed it could be represented as B.B*.  
Step 5: Find the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the covariance matrix 
Compute the matrix V of eigenvectors that diagonalizes the covariance matrix C: 
         
 
(2.25) 
Where D is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of C. This step will typically 
involve the use of a computer-based algorithm for computing eigenvectors and 
eigenvalues. 
Matrix D will take the form of an M × M diagonal matrix, where 
                        (2.26) 
         (2.27) 
is the mth eigenvalue of the covariance matrix C, and         
Matrix V, also of dimension M × M, contains M column vectors, each of length 
M, which represent the M eigenvectors of the covariance matrix C. The eigenvalues 
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Step 6: Rearrange the eigenvectors and eigenvalues 
 Sort the columns of the eigenvector matrix V and eigenvalue matrix D in 
order of decreasing eigenvalue. 
 Make sure to maintain the correct pairings between the columns in each 
matrix. 
Step 7: Select a subset of the eigenvectors as basis vectors 
Save the first L columns of V as the M × L matrix W: 
                 
                       ,                        
(2.28) 
Where                  . Use the vector g as a guide in choosing an appropriate value 
for L. The goal is to choose a value of L as small as possible while achieving a 
reasonably high value of g on a percentage basis. For example, you may want to 
choose L so that the cumulative energy g is above a certain threshold, like 90 percent. 
In this case, choose the smallest value of L such that, 
                       
 
   
  
(2.29) 
2.13 Literature Review 
Intrusion detection initiates from traditional audit systems. In early age of computing 
environments, large mainframe systems produced sequential records of system events 
which could then be observed manually for purposes such as accounting and security. 
In the 1970s, the U.S. Department of Defence (DOD) made security goals for such 
audit mechanisms, among which were allowing the discovery of attempts to bypass 
protection mechanisms.  
Later, James P. Anderson in 1980 introduced the concept of intrusion detection. 
Further, he also provided the foundation for future intrusion detection system design 
and development (Anderson 1980) . His work was the start of host-based intrusion 
ML 1
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detection and IDS in general. Denning  proposed an intrusion detection model which 
became a landmark in the research in this area (Denning 1987). The model, which she 
proposed, forms the fundamental core of most of the intrusion detection 
methodologies in use these days. Denning conducted a study to create user profiles by 
analyzing audit trails of the government mainframe computers. The first prototype for 
intrusion detection, the Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES) was formed with 
the help of Denning. IDES analyzes audit trails from government systems and tracks 
user activity. IDES provided a foundation to the intrusion detection development. 
Further, she explained that how anomalous activity could be used as an indicator of 
potential security incidents. 
An artificial neural network consists of a collection of processing elements that 
are highly interconnected and transform a set of inputs to a set of desired outputs. The 
result of the transformation is determined by the characteristics of the elements and 
the weights associated with the interconnections among them. By modifying the 
connections between the nodes the network is able to adapt to the desired outputs. 
Further, they described that a neural network is an implementation of an algorithm 
inspired by research into the brain. In fact, one branch of neuroscience uses 
computers to model cognitive functions. But the neural networks discussed here have 
little to do with biology. Rather, they show technology in which computers learn 
directly from data, thereby assisting in classification, function estimation, data 
compression, and similar tasks. Neural networks are valuable because these are 
adaptive and have generalization ability (Hammerstrom 1993). There are several 
methods of responding to a network intrusion, but they all require the precise and 
well-timed identification of the attack (Cannady 2000b). The existing approaches to 
misuse detection involve the use of rule-based expert systems to identify indications 
of known attacks. However, these techniques are less successful in identifying 
attacks, which vary from expected patterns. He presented an approach to the process 
of misuse detection that utilizes the analytical strengths of neural networks, and he 
provided the results from his preliminary analysis of this approach. He made his own 
dataset using some software packages like the RealSecure™, the Internet Scanner™ 
products from Internet Security Systems (ISS), Inc, and the Satan scanner. His 
experimental dataset consists of 10,000 packets in which approximately 3000 were 
simulated attacks. The nine elements (Protocol ID, Source Port, Destination Port, 
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Source Address, Destination Address, ICMP Type, ICMP Code, Raw Data Length 
and Raw Data) were selected because they were typically present in network data 
packets and they provide a complete description of the information transmitted by the 
packet. He used Multiple Layered Perceptron (MLP) architecture for training and 
testing his proposed approach. He used parameters root mean square error (RMSE), 
Training and Testing data correlation to test their result‟s sensitivity. This presented 
work has many drawbacks but it was a good initiative towards the application of 
neural networks in the area intrusion detection. 
Jing and their colleagues described a mechanism in intrusion detection by using 
artificial neural network (Jing-Xin et al. 2004). They described that the traditional 
intrusion detection systems mainly consist of two kinds, one is misuse IDS, and the 
other is anomalous IDS. Misuse IDS works by rule matching, suffering from the 
updating, the searching and the matching of the rule sets. Anomalous IDS works by 
statistically computing, suffering from the establishment of the exact statistical model 
and the selection of the threshold. All of those lower the usability of the traditional 
intrusion detection systems. To address these problems, several new methods have 
been proposed, such as data mining, artificial neural networks and artificial immune 
systems, etc. They mainly discussed the application of the artificial neural networks 
in the field of IDS research. They have designed and implemented a network 
intrusion detection system based on the artificial neural networks; and the testing 
results of the prototype system revealed the validity of the method and the advantages 
over other methods suggested. In contrast with the traditional methods, the main 
advantages of the artificial neural networks include the fast / rapid information 
processing, the stronger ability of tolerance and the ability of self-learning. All of 
these help to overcome the problems of the traditional IDS (Jing et al. 2004). 
Lilia and their colleagues presented a network intrusion detection method to 
identify and classify illegitimate information in TCP/IP packet payload based on the 
Snort signature set that represents possible attacks to a network (Lilia et al. 2004). 
Further, they used a neural network named Hamming Net for their experiments. They 
selected this network on the base of its capability to classify network events in real-
time, and  to learn faster than other neural network models, such as, multilayer 
perceptron with backpropagation and Kohonen maps.TCP/IP packet payloads were 
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used as input pattern to the Hamming Net and Snort signature as exemplar patterns. 
The challenges faced to model the input and exemplar data and the strategies adopted 
to capture and scan relevant data in TCP/IP packets and in Snort signatures were 
described in their work. Their system showed 70% accuracy in the classification of 
attacks (Lilia  et al. 2004). 
Este and their colleagues described an approach to traffic classification based on 
SVM (Este et al. 2009). They applied one of the approaches to solving multi-class 
problems with SVMs to the task of statistical traffic classification, and described a 
simple optimization algorithm that allows the classifier to perform correctly with as 
little training as a few hundred samples. The accuracy of the proposed classifier is 
then evaluated over three sets of traffic traces, coming from different topological 
points in the Internet. Their presented results confirmed that SVM-based classifiers 
could be very effective at discriminating traffic generated by different applications, 
even with reduced training set sizes. Further, they used different data sets for instance 
the lawrence berkeley national laboratory (LBNL) data set, the cooperative 
association for internet data analysis (CAIDA) dataset and self-simulated data set. 
Their results showed 90 % accuracy. The system has some drawbacks; it could not 
handle out-of-order packets, packet loss, and fragmentation in a robust way (Este et 
al. 2009). 
SVM for traffic classification also described in another work by (Li and Guan 
2007) . They used a technique to train a classifier to recognize seven different classes 
of applications. In this approach, flows are divided in common classes such as bulk, 
multimedia, etc. The authors pointed out that changing the features influence the 
accuracy of classification results. For regular traffic samples with biased prior 
probability, they achieved an accuracy of approximately 99.4%. For un-biased 
samples, with uniform prior probability, their method yielded approximately 96.9% 
accuracy. The way of selecting features was not much more efficient in their work. 
They did not use standard data set and compared their results with recent approaches. 
 A detection mechanism was proposed for traffic flooding attacks by Yu and their  
colleagues (Yu et al. 2008). They used simple network management protocol (SNMP) 
management information base (MIB) statistical data gathered from SNMP agents, 
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instead of raw packet data from network links. The involved SNMP MIB variables 
were selected by an effective feature selection mechanism and gathered effectively by 
the MIB update time prediction mechanism. Then, they used a machine learning 
approach based on SVM for attack classification. Using MIB and SVM, they 
achieved fast detection with high accuracy, the minimization of the system burden, 
and extendibility for system deployment. The proposed mechanism is constructed in a 
hierarchical structure, which first differentiates attack traffic from normal traffic and 
then classifies the types of attack. They used various types of flooding; transmission 
control protocol synchronization (TCP-SYN) flooding, user data protocol (UDP) 
flooding, and internet control management protocol (ICMP) flooding. Using MIB 
datasets collected from real experiments involving a distributed denial of service 
(DDOS) attack, they validated the possibility of their approaches. It is shown that 
network attacks were detected with high efficiency (97.07 %), and classified with low 
false alarms (Yu et al. 2008). 
Several researchers have applied data mining techniques in the design of network 
intrusion detection system (NIDS) (Khan et al. 2007). One of the promising 
techniques is SVM, which has concrete mathematical foundations that provided 
satisfying results. SVM separates data into multiple classes (at least two) by a 
hyperplane, and simultaneously minimizes the empirical classification error and 
maximizes the geometric margin. Thus, it is also known as maximum margin 
classifiers. 
Osareh and Shadgar  applied NN and SVM techniques on the standard  KDD cup 
99 dataset which has been utilized in the evaluation of security detection mechanism 
as a benchmark dataset in several different research works. They selected four 
different categories of attack such as DOS, probing, R2L and U2R. They proved 
through simulations that the accuracy of NN is higher than that of SVM, but false 
alarm and detection rate of SVM is better. They used full features of dataset that 
decreases the performance of the NN and SVM architecture that will also affect on 
training and testing overheads. Further, their proposed system demonstrated up to 
83.5 % accuracy in detection (Osareh and Shadgar 2008). 
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Even though SVMs have shown good results in data classification, but they are 
not favorable for huge dataset because the training complexity is dependent on the 
amount of data in the training set. Larger amount of data would lead to higher training 
complexity. However, many data mining applications involve millions or even 
billions of pieces of data records. For instance, in the KDD cup 1999 dataset, there 
are more than 4 million and 3 million records in the training set and test set, 
respectively. The SVM technique is powerless to operate at such a large dataset due 
to system failures caused by insufficient memory, or may take too long to finish the 
training. Since this work used the KDD cup 1999 dataset, to reduce the amount of 
data, a combined (PCA+GA) method was applied to preprocess the dataset before 
SVM training. This approach improved the performance of the system. 
The PCA is an important technique in data compression and feature extraction 
(Oja 1992) and it has been also applied to the field of intrusion detection 
(Kuchimanchi et al. 2004) , (Labib and Vemuri 2004), (Shyu et al. 2003). A neural 
network PCA (NNPCA) and nonlinear component analysis (NLCA) were proposed to 
reduce the dimensionality of network traffic; their approaches focused on retaining 
the information of the compressed data compared with that of the original data. PCA 
was used to detect selected denial-of-service and network Probe attacks; the authors 
analyzed the loading values of the various feature vector components with respect to 
the principal components (Labib and Vemuri 2004). Based on principal and minor 
components, a method called principle component classifier (PCC) studied the use of 
robust PCA in outlier detection; this method was able to distinguish the nature of the 
anomalies whether they were different form the normal instances in terms of extreme 
values or different correlation structures; the PCC achieved about 98% detection rate 
with 1% false positive ratio. However, all the mentioned PCA methods are based on 
conventional statistical analysis utilizing batch mode computation, which are not 
suitable for adaptive learning and online computing (Shyu et al. 2003). 
Liu and Yi  had worked on unsupervised learning method based on PCA self-
organizing map (PCASOM) for network sessions clustering, and a simplified winner-
takes-all SOM was used to generate data clusters with a mean vector and principal 
basis vectors (Liu and Yi  2006). 
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Liu and their colleagues  described a hierarchical ID model based on the PCANN, 
which has been used for adaptive computing for both misuse detection and anomaly 
detection (Liu et al. 2007). The design of PCANN based classifier is detailed and a 
particular selection of features was made by principal components Analysis. First, 
they selected 22 features then these features were provided to their system. So, there 
is a possibility to lose much important features that are more sensitive for the 
classifier (Liu et al. 2007). Although there are many well-known drawbacks of the 
PCA neural networks, e.g., the inability to provide a nonlinear mapping, the 
convergence speed of stochastic neural PCA learning algorithms, etc, their 
simulations perform well for the specific domain of intrusion detection. They 
introduced two levels in their proposed model. The top level of model is constructed 
with a norm profile, and it can distinguish „bad‟ connections from „good‟ ones at the 
first stage; all the lower levels are signature-based misuse detectors which can give a 
specified detection; furthermore, their proposed model trained a new classifier using 
clustered abnormal connections with data flags, and this enabled them to construct an 
integrated IDS. They performed different experiments to demonstrate the 
performance of the proposed model on DARPA 1998 evaluation data sets. Their 
comparative results showed an improvement in detection performance.  
Lakhina  and their colleagues described that attacks on the network infrastructure 
are major threats against network and information security. Most of the existing 
intrusion detection approaches use all 41 features in the network to measure and look 
for intrusive pattern some of these features are redundant and irrelevant. The 
drawback of this approach is time-consuming detection process and degrading the 
performance of intrusion detection system. They presented hybrid algorithm 
PCANNA (Principal Component Analysis neural network algorithm) to reduce the 
number of computer resources, both memory and CPU time required to detect attack. 
They used PCA to reduce the feature and trained neural network to identify attacks. 
Test and comparison were made on KDD dataset. They demonstrate that their 
proposed model showed improvement up to 80.4% data reduction, approximately 
40% reduction in training time and 70% reduction in testing time. Their proposed 
method not only reduces the number of the input features and time but also increases 
the classification accuracy (Lakhina et al. 2010).  
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The aforementioned work related to PCA on intrusion detection has emphasized 
the issues of feature extraction and classification; however, relatively less attention 
has been given to the critical issue of feature selection. The main trend in feature 
extraction has been representing the data in a lower dimensional space, for example, 
using PCA. Without using an effective scheme to select an appropriate set of features 
in this space, however, these methods rely mostly on powerful classification 
algorithms to deal with redundant and irrelevant features. Therefore, this method 
providing a new way of feature subset selection in the area of intrusion detection. 
Bankovic and their colleagues presented a serial combination of two genetic 
algorithm-based intrusion detection systems. They proposed many solutions for 
intrusion detection based on machine learning techniques, but most of them 
introduced major computational overhead, which made them time consuming and 
thus increased their period of adapting to the environmental changes. In the first step 
of their solution they deployed feature extraction techniques using PCA in order to 
reduce the amount of data that the system needed to process. Hence, their system was 
simple and reduced significant computational overhead, but at the same time is 
accurate, adaptive and fast due to genetic algorithms. Furthermore, on account of 
inherent parallelism, their solution offered a possibility of implementation using 
reconfigurable hardware with the implementation cost much lower than the that of the 
traditional systems. They used two types of classifier; linear and rule based. The 
model was tested on KDD99 benchmark dataset and showed 92.1 % detection rate 
(Bankovic et al. 2009). 
Bankovoc and their colleagues proposed a misuse detection system based on 
genetic algorithm (GA) approach. They used the KDD99Cup dataset for evolving and 
testing new rules for intrusion detection. Further, they deployed PCA to extract the 
most important features of the data (Bankovic et al. 2007). In that way, they were able 
to keep the high level of detection rates of attacks while speeding up the processing of 
the data. However, there is one drawback that is a chance to miss some important 
features that are more sensitive for the classifier. Genetic algorithm (GA) approach is 
one of the future approaches in computer security, especially in intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) ( Folino  et al. 2005).  
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GA operates on a population of potential solutions applying the principle of 
survival of the fittest to produce better and better approximations to the solution of 
the problem that GA is trying to solve. At each generation, a new set of 
approximations is created by the process of selecting individuals according to their 
level of fitness value in the problem domain and breeding them together using the 
operators borrowed from the genetic process performed in nature, i.e. crossover and 
mutation. This process leads to the evolution of populations of individuals that are 
better adapted to their environment than the individuals that they were created from, 
just as it happens in natural adaptation (Bankovic et al. 2009). 
Kim and their colleagues proposed fusions of GA and SVM for efficient 
optimization of both features and parameters for detection models (Kim et al. 2005). 
Their method provided optimal anomaly detection model which was capable to 
minimize amounts of features and maximize the detection rates. In experiments, they 
showed that the proposed method was efficient way of selecting important features as 
well as optimizing the parameters for detection model and it provided more stable 
detection rates. One of the drawbacks of using GA for features selection is that the 
raw features are not in well organized form so there are chances to miss some key 
features that are important for the classifier (Kim et al. 2005). 
Rayan and their colleagues performed one of the first works to intrusion detection 
by NN (Ryan et al. 1998).  They trained and tested an offline neural network intrusion 
detection mechanism (NNIDS) on a system of ten users. They used 2-Layer MLP 
architecture for their system and backpropagation for training purpose. The data 
source for training and testing was operating system logs in UNIX environment. The 
result parameters to evaluate the performance of the system were false positive and 
false negative. They implemented their system in the PlaNet neural network simulator 
(Ryan et al. 1998).  Cannady  made another work in the same field. He also used the 
2-Layer MLP architecture for his system and backpropagation for training purpose. 
The data source for training and testing was network packets collected by real secure. 
Nine of the packet characteristics of network data were selected and presented to the 
MLP network which has four fully connection layers .He used root means square 
error (RMSE) parameter for training and testing data for performance measuring.  
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Ghosh and their colleagues presented a host based IDS that focused on building 
program profiles and used these program profiles to identify normal software 
behavior and malicious software behavior. The system was trained and tested on SUN 
platform and used basic security module (BSM) as source of data. Input data were 
extracted from BSM and a distance metric, which constituted input vectors of the NN.  
The IDS presented was a single hidden layer MLP. The number of input nodes was 
equal to the number of exemplar strings. Lucky bucket algorithm is used to capture 
the temporal locality of anomalous events. Performance analysis was done with 
DARPA database.  Ghosh and Schwartzbard in 1999  also used Elman Networks for 
intrusion detection (Ghosh and Schwartzbard 1999) . Rhodes et al. 2000 described 
another work in intrusion detection. They proposed the use of self-organizing neural 
networks to recognize anomalies in network data stream. Unlike from other 
approaches which use self organizing maps to process entire state of a network or 
computer system to detect anomalies, proposed system breaks down the system by 
using collection of more specialized maps. A monitor stack was constructed and each 
neural network became a kind of specialist to recognize normal behavior of a protocol 
and raise an alarm when a deviation from normal profile occurs. The test intrusions 
were buffer overflow attempt (Rhodes et al. 2000).  
Lippmann and Cunningham of MIT Lincoln Laboratory conducted a misuse 
detection model with neural networks, by searching attack specific keywords in the 
network traffic. They used a MLP network to detect Unix-host attacks, and attacks to 
obtain root-privilege on a server. The data that they presented to the neural network 
consisted of attack-specific keyword counts in network traffic. Two neural networks 
were used in the system, one for providing an attack probability and one for 
classifying attacks. A two-layer perceptron was designed with k input nodes, 2k 
hidden nodes and 2 outputs ( Lippmann and Cunningham 2000).  
In another study by Zhang and their colleagues, statistical analysis was used in 
conjunction with MLP networks (Zhang et al. 2001). System is a distributed 
hierarchical application in the sense that system consists of hierarchy of Intrusion 
Detection Agents (IDAs) at multiple tiers where each tier corresponds to different 
network scope. IDAs are IDS components that monitor the activities of a host or a 
network.  An IDA, which consists of components such as the probe, the event pre-
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processor, the statistical processor, the neural network classifier and the post 
processor.  Probe collects network traffic and abstracts it into statistical variables. 
Event pre-processor collects data from probes and other agents and formats it for the 
statistical analyzer. Statistical model compares the data to the previously compiled 
reference model, which describes the normal state of the system. A stimulus vector is 
formed and forwarded to the NN. Neural network analyzes the vector and decides 
whether it is anomalous or normal. Post processor generates reports for the agents at 
higher tiers or it may display the results through a user interface. Backpropagation, 
perceptron, perceptron-backpropagation hybrid, fuzzy ART MAP, radial-basis 
function networks with 2-8 hidden nodes were tested. The experimental test bed 
consisting of 11 workstations and 1 server was built by using operations network 
(OPNET) network simulation software. UDP flooding attack was simulated within 
the test bed (Zhang et al. 2001).  
Lee and Heinbuch worked on experimental IDS with a hierarchy of neural 
networks. Each of the neural networks in the hierarchy focused on different portions 
of nominal TCP behavior. Portions of these observed TCP behaviors are connection 
establishment, connection termination and port usage. System was trained to detect 
three kinds of attack, which are SYN flood, fast SYN port scan, and stealth SYN port 
scan (Lee and Heinbuch 2001).  
Jirapummin and their colleagues presented an alternative methodology for both 
visualizing intrusions by using self organizing map (SOM) and classifying intrusions 
by using resilient propagation (Jirapummin et al. 2002). Neptune attack (SYN 
flooding), portsweep and satan attacks (port scanning) were selected from KDD cup 
1999 data set. For resilient backpropagation (RPROP), 3 layer NN is utilized with 70 
nodes in first hidden layer, 12 neurons in second hidden layer and 4 neurons in the 
output layer. The transfer functions for the first hidden layer, second hidden layer and 
the output layer of RPROP were tan-sigmoidal, log-sigmoidal and log-sigmoidal 
respectively  (Jirapummin et al. 2002).  
Bivens and their colleagues proposed a neural network model for a network-based 
intrusion detection system. Their anomaly detection system used MLP network for 
detection. System uses tcpdump data (Bivens et al. 2002). Another study was made 
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by Shyu and their colleagues. They used KDD cup 1999 as a data source for training 
and testing of their system. The neural network used by them was PCC (Shyu et al. 
2003).  
Yu and their colleagues worked on FTP brute force attacks (Yu et al. 2005). They 
used samples that were collected from local network traffic. They used Hybrid 
backpropagation/chaotic neural network (BP/CNN) as neural network architecture. A 
receiver operator characteristics  (ROC) curve is used to evaluate the system 
performance by them.  
Amini and Jalili 2006 worked on intrusion detection by using adaptive resonance 
theory1 (ART1) and adaptive resonance theory2 (ART2). They compare both NN and 
showed that ART-1 is better in performance wise but ART-2 is better in response 
wise. They also used standard data set KDD cup 1999 (Amini and Jalili 2005). In 
another work Amini et al. , they worked on IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP packets in the 
local area network (LAN) environment (Amini et al. 2006).  
Ahmed and their colleagues worked in the field of intrusion detection. They used 
full featured Kddcup 99 data set for their system. They used RBPROP NN for 
training and testing of the network (Ahmad et al. 2007). Another work is also 
presented by Ahmed et al. in which different backpropagation algorithms were 
benchmarked. They used MLP architecture in their system (Ahmad et al. in 2008).  
Statistical approach, rule based approach, expert system approach, pattern 
recognition approach, graph-based approach, hybrid approach and artificial neural 
network approach toward intrusion detection are evaluated using analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP) (Pervez et al. 2007) and (Sandhya S 2009).  The evaluation process 
takes into account two different types of criteria i.e. main criteria and sub-criteria. 
The strength of main criteria is based on its efficiency, adaptability, less updating, 
suitability and maturity, while the sub-criteria consists of economical, time saving, 
detection rate, minimum false positive, minimum false negative and having the 
capability to handle varied intrusion and also coordinated intrusion.  According to the 
study (Ahmad et al. in 2008), it has been concluded that among all the approaches, 
the artificial neural network approach is most suitable to tackle the current issues of 
intrusions detection systems such as regular updating, detection rate, false positive, 
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Figure 2.15 Comparative analysis of intrusion detection approaches 
Different neural networks for intrusion detection mechanism such as self-
organizing map (SOM), adaptive resonance theory (ART), online backpropagation 
(OBPROP), resilient backpropagation (RPROP) and SVM are evaluated using Multi-
criteria Decision Making (MCDM) technique (Dutta et al. 2006) and (Yatim and 
Utomo 2006). The evaluation based on two types of criteria i.e. the main criteria and 
sub criteria. The main criteria consists of adaptable, minimum training, performance, 
maturity and aptitude, while on the other side, the sub criteria consist of detection 
rate, minimum false positive, minimum false negative, cost, time, handling co-
ordinated and varied intrusion.  
The hybrid approach using artificial neural networks is a more suitable tactic 
among other approaches to tackle present issues of intrusion detection systems such 
as regular updating, detection rate, false positive, false negative, and flexibility. The 
comparison among them is shown in Figure 2.16. 
 76   
 
 
Figure 2.16 Comparative analysis of NN intrusion detection approaches 
Three supervised neural networks training algorithms are investigated for 
intrusion detection mechanism like batch backpropagation (BPROP), online 
backpropagation (OBPROP) and resilient backpropagation (RPROP) using Java 
object oriented neural environment (JOONE) and multi-criteria analysis (MCA) 
technique (Yatim and Utomo 2006) and (Dutta et al. 2006) . The investigation based 
on two types of criteria; main criteria and sub criteria. The main criteria consist of 
minimum mean squared error (MSE), less training overhead, performance, memory 
usage and usability. The criterion “performance” is divided into sub-criteria namely 
detection rate, minimum false +ve and minimum false -ve. Further, it had concluded 
that RPROP approach is more suitable approach among other approaches to tackle 
present issues to intrusion detection systems such as detection rate, false positive, 
false negative, MSE and memory usage. The comparison among three investigated 
networks is shown in the Figure 2.17. 
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Figure 2.17 Comparative analysis of supervised neural networks 
The supervised neural network (SNN) uses supervised learning algorithms such 
as batch backpropagation (BPROP), online backpropagation (OBPROP), and resilient 
backpropagation (RBPROP) (Yatim and Utomo 2006) and (Dutta et al. 2006). These 
SNN algorithms have only one drawback that is unable to detect novel attacks or 
patterns. On the other hand, unsupervised neural network (UNN) such as self 
organizing maps (SOMS), and adaptive resonance theory (ART) show poor 
performance such as detection rate, false positive and false negative but these are 
more efficient in flexibility and adaptivity (Min and Wang 2009) , (Amini and Jalili 
2005). So, a design can be presented for neural network intrusion detection system 
that merges the advantages of both networks such as SNN and UNN. The working of 
the designed architecture consists of three phases and is shown in Figure 2.18. The 
brief detail of each phase is described here. 
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Figure 2.18 Architecture of hybrid learning for NIDS 
a) Training SNN 
First of all designed SNN is trained on the standard dataset like DARPA. The training 
process consists of three steps. (1) The Feedforward of input training pattern. (2) The 
calculation and backpropagation of associated error. (3) The adjustment of the 
weights. 
b) Saving Weights 
When SNN is trained well then it freezes its weights. These frozen weights are saved 
in a file. These saved weights are given to UNN for its initialization and further 
training and testing process. 
c) Training and Testing UNN 
Every NN needs weights initialization to start its training process. The optimal 
assignment of weights to each neuron of neural network is a big issue. A lot of time is 
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required to reach the optimal weight value through training overhead. Therefore, 
saved weights used as a starting point for UNN. This is further trained in 
unsupervised manner to improve performance. However, good results could not 
obtain due to the problem of different architecture in nature. Because the layered 
structure of supervised and unsupervised neural networks are different. Therefore, 
several different types of issues arises; training overhead, saving weights, their proper 
initialization as inputs for unsupervised neural network architecture. 
2.14 A Systematic Review of Related Work 
The afore-mentioned work is summarized in a systematic way in Table 2.10. This 
review consists of main author, year of publication, data source used for training and 
testing, intrusion analysis structure and results parameters used in earlier research. 
Table 2.10 Systematic review of related work 
Author  Year  Data Source  Structure  Results  







J.P Anderson 1980 Introduce the concept of intrusion detection 
Denning 1987 
User profile 








 Oja  1992 
compression and 
feature extraction 
PCA Applied to ID 
Hammerstrom 
 et al. 
1993 Neural Networks (NN) in ID  












RMSE of 0.0582 for 
Training Data 
RMSE of 0.069 for Test 
Data. 
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Rhodes  et al. 2000 Buffer overflow SOM 
D.R (57%) 




2000 Network Packets 2-Layer MLP 
One False Alarm per 
Day 




















BPROP & HPBPROP 









Lee & Heinbuch 2001 
TCP packets 










KDD Cup 1999 
[TCP SYN 






















2003 KDD cup 1999 PCC 
DR95% 
FA5% 
Yu et al.  2004  
FTP brute force 
attacks samples 
from LAN  
Hybrid BP/CNN  ROC  
Jinget al. 2004 Proposed NNIDS  
Overcome traditional 
IDS issues 
Silva et al. 2004 
TCP/IP packet 
payload 
Hamming net Accuracy 70 % 
Kuchimanchi  2004 Feature reduction 
 
 
Applied to ID 
 
Labib  2004 Feature reduction PCA 
Applied to ID 
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Author  Year  Data Source  Structure  Results  
Shyu 2004 Feature reduction PCA Applied to ID 
Kuchimanchi 2004 KDD cup NNPCA  
K. Labib  2004 DOS PCA  
Folino G et al  2005 
KDD cup GA, RULE 
BASED 
 













ART-2 better in 
response wise 















NN and found 
SOM 
Optimum 
Li et al. 2007 Flow classes SVM Accuracy 96% 
Khan et al.,  2007  SVM  
Liu et al 2007 KDD 22 FEATURES PCA NN  




Bankovic  2007 KDD PCA, GA  



















 82   
 
 
The above work described in Table 2.10 shows that  data can be obtained by one 
of the following three methods; by using real traffic , by using sanitized traffic and by 
using simulated traffic but generally IDS are tested on a standard dataset KDD cup of 
MIT lab. USA. Different researchers used different architectures (NNs, SVM, PCA, 
Hybrid and Rule-based) to implement their proposed systems in the field of intrusion 
detection. Predominantly parameters for testing their results are false positives, false 
Author  Year  Data Source  Structure  Results  




SVM Accuracy  97 % 
Osareh, and Bita,  2008 KDD SVM Accuracy 83 % 
Ahmad et al.  2008  
KDDCUP99 









RPROP found best as 
compared to online and 
batch  




Accuracy  92 % 
Alice Este et al 2009 CAIDA SVM Accuracy 90 % 
Ahmad et al.  2009  Probing KDD 4- Layer MLP Detection rate 98 % 
Ahmad et al.  2009  
DOS Dataset a 






4- Layered    and 
output layer with 
two processing 
element/neuron 
Detection rate 96.16 %   
 
Lakhina et. al.  2010 KDD cup PCANNA Detection rate 80.4 % 
Ahmad et al.  2010 







3- Layered  and 
output layer with 
two processing 
element/neuron 
Detection rate 97.7 %   
Ahmad et al.  2010 






3- Layered and 
output layer with 
single processing 
element/neuron 
  Detection rate 90 % 
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negatives, detection rates and ROC. They used different tools: MATLAB, PlaNet, 
OPNET, JOONE, URANO, NeuralWorks simulators to implement and test their 
models for intrusion detection and some of them developed their own systems in a 
personalized way.   
2.15 Issues in Existing Intrusion Detection Approaches 
Undoubtedly, soft computing techniques play down a variety of drawbacks in 
traditional IDSs such as time consuming statistical analysis, regular updating, non 
adaptive, efficiency, accuracy and flexibility. But they also suffer from several 
problems in the research of intrusion detection. For instance, training and 
computational overheads, complex classifier‟s architecture, accuracy, false alarms, 
dataset availability, tuning overheads, raw feature set and pre-processing issues. One 
of the drawbacks of the past intrusion detection methods is the usage of a raw feature 
set for classification but the classifier may get confused due to redundancy and hence 
may not classify correctly. Some of the existing approaches of intrusion detection 
have focused on the issues of feature extraction and classification. However, 
comparatively less concentration has been given to the critical matter of feature 
selection. The foremost trend in feature extraction has been representing the data in to 
another feature space (the PCA space) using PCA. In this method of selecting features 
on the basis of highest eigenvectors is not appropriate because the features 
corresponding to the highest eigenvalues may not have the optimal sensitivity for the 
classifier due to ignoring many sensitive features. As a result, there are many chances 
to lose some important features that have higher discriminatory power for the 
classifier. Therefore, there must be an effective scheme to select an appropriate set of 
features in the PCA space. This leads the classifier to work in an efficient way and 
increases the overall performance of the intrusion analysis engine. Because, the 
redundant and irrelevant features increases overheads as well as confuses the 
classifier.  
 Therefore, in this thesis, an argument is made that feature selection is an 
important problem in intrusion detection and Genetic Algorithms (GAs) provide a 
simple, general, and powerful framework for selecting good subsets of features that 
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improve detection rates, reduces training and computational overheads, simplify 
architectural framework of intrusion analysis engine, reduces false alarms and 
memory usage and speed up the testing process in offline and real time mode.  After 
feature sub set selection, the classification is performed based on adopted 
methodology. The selection of classifier and determine its architecture is another 
problem.The collecting of dataset for training/testing is another problem. This can be 
achieved via three ways; (i) real traffic, (ii) sanitized traffic and (iii) simulated traffic. 
However some anomalies hinder the utilization of these approaches. Real traffic 
approach is very unbearable while sanitized approach is risky. The creation of a 
simulation is also a difficult task and costly. Further, in order to model various 
networks, different types of traffic is needed respectively. In order to skip issues 
arising out of all three approaches, KDD cup dataset is used for training/testing in the 
experimental work. Therefore presently a research is required that will develop 
optimized intrusion detection mechanism using soft computing techniques that will 
provide the potential to identify network activity in a robust. In addition, this will 
reduce overheads as well as increases performance.  Thus, in this context, this 
research work is based on the adopted methodology that results optimal subset of 
features for intrusion detection mechanism in the subsequent chapters. 
2.16 Summary 
This chapter details the background knowledge of the intrusion detection systems 
(IDS), related functional components, classifications and characteristics. Defines 
foundations, techniques, approaches (anomaly, misuse detection and combined or 
hybrid approach) to the intrusion detection system. Attack data sets such as KDD cup 
dataset used in the work. Overview of soft computing, applied techniques (neural 
networks, SVM and GA). Also explains PCA and its different steps towards feature 
transformation into PCA space. Further, this chapter describes the related work in 
intrusion detection using neural networks, SVM, PCA and GA. A tabular presentation 
of the above mentioned approaches in intrusion detection. The comparative study of 
existing approaches and related issues. The references of the other related works are 
also explained.  






Based on the identification of the issues via literature review presented in Chapter 3, 
this chapter describes the methodology incorporated into this research work. Further, 
the chapter explains different phases of applied methodology; The adopted 
methodology is divided into five sections; (1) Selection of dataset for training and 
testing, (2) Pre-processing of dataset, (3) Classification approach, (4) Training the 
system and (5) Testing the system. These sections of methodology are shown in 
Figure 3.1. Finally, the chapter concludes with the contributions and directs towards 
system design and architecture.  
 
Figure 3.1 Methodology phases 
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3.2. Selection of Dataset for Training and Testing 
The expertise of the intrusion detection mechanism depends on the dataset. Therefore, the 
performance depends on accuracy of dataset and vice versa. If the training data is 
optimally accurate with rich contents then efficiency of trained system is improved. 
Hence, the collection of data for training and testing is a critical dilemma.  There are three 
ways to collect data for experiments in the field of intrusion detection; (i) real traffic, (ii) 
sanitized traffic, and (iii) simulated traffic. Here, this section describes the pros and cons of 
these three ways of creating dataset for experimental purposes. 
3.2.1 Real Traffic  
The dataset is created using real traffic by attacking an organization‟s servers. In this case, 
the packets are real but it is unbearable to attack an organization. In addition to that, 
privacy of the users in the organization may be violated such as private e-mails, 
passwords and user identities may be released. Hence, this method leads to security 
and privacy issues. 
Advantage 
 The dataset consists of real traffic of network packets. 
Disadvantage 
 Privacy and security issues are raised. 
3.2.2 Sanitized Traffic  
The problem of security and privacy can be minimized using sanitized traffic. In this 
method, sensitive information is removed from the data stream and then attack data are 
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Advantage 
 The dataset consists of real packets without sensitive information and it can be 
freely distributed for evaluation and experimental purposes. 
Disadvantages 
 There is a possibility to lose some important features of a packet during the 
sanitization process. 
 It is possible to release sensitive data because it is practically impossible to 
verify huge amount of data during sanitization process. 
3.2.3 Simulated Traffic  
The third and the most common way to obtain data, is to create a testbed network and 
generate background traffic on this network. In the testbed environment, background 
traffic is generated either by using complex traffic generators modeling actual 
network statistics or by using simpler commercial traffic generators creating small 
number of packets at a high rate. 
Advantages 
 The dataset can be freely distributed, as it does not contain any sensitive 
information. 
 It is guaranteed that generated traffic does not contain any unknown attacks as 
the background traffic is created by simulators. 
Disadvantages 
 This is very costly and difficult to create a simulation. 
 In order to model various networks, different types of traffic is needed so it 
increases complexity and cost. 
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However, aforementioned anomalies hinder the utilization of these approaches. In order 
to skip issues arising out of all three approaches, this research work uses the defense 
advanced research projects agency (DARPA) dataset known as knowledge discovery 
and data mining (KDD) cup for training and testing in my experimental work.  
The DARPA project was prepared and executed by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory, USA. This research work uses the KDD cup 
dataset due to the following reasons: 
 One of the reasons for choosing this dataset is that the dataset is standard, 
which is considered as a benchmark for evaluating security detection 
mechanisms.  
 I evaluated my classification approaches for intrusion detection by analyzing 
the strengths and weakness of each compartment of the dataset. 
 This dataset makes it easy to compare the results of my work with other 
similar works. 
  Another reason is that it is difficult to get another dataset which contains 
so rich and variety of attacks as KDD cup includes. 
  The analysis of intrusion detection approaches in evaluating KDD cup 
may guide DARPA to future research. 
3.3 Pre-processing of Dataset 
The next step is preprocessing of selected dataset. Each record of KDD cup dataset 
consists of three types of features; connection based, content based and time based. 
There are nine (09) connection based features; thirteen (13) content based features 
and nineteen (19) are time based features. So, the total number of features are fourty 
one (41) in each record of KDD cup dataset. Each record represents a network packet 
that has 41 features. Each packet contains thirty eight (38) numeric features and three 
(03) symbolic features. First of all, three symbolic features are discarded out of fourty 
one because these three features do not affect on the applied classification approaches 
in this research work. A sample of features of the network activity, „pre‟ and „post‟ 
discarding of symbolic values is shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Feature set of a raw dataset 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 
0 udp prvt SF 105 146 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F14 F15 F16 F17 F18 F19 F20 F21 F22 F23 F24 F25 F26 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.0 0.0 
F27 F28 F29 F30 F31 F32 F33 F34 F35 F36 F37 F38 F39 
0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 255 254 1.00 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F40 F41            
Table 3.2 Feature set  after discarding symbolic features 
F1   F2   F3   F4   F5   F6   F7   F8   F9   F10   F11   F12   F13   
0 105 146 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F14   F15   F16   F17   F18   F19   F20   F21   F22   F23   F24   F25   F26   
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
F27   F28   F29   F30   F31   F32   F33   F34   F35   F36   F37   F38    
0.0 0.00 255 254 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
The remaining thirty eight (38) features are further processed using Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) and Genetic Algorithm (GA). The preprocessing of 
dataset is of great importance as it results in the increase the efficiency of intrusion 
detection mechanism in case of training, testing, and classification of network activity 
into normal and intrusive. Further, the preprocessing phase is divided into following 
parts; (i) feature transformation, and (ii) selection of optimal features.  
This part is the actual contribution in the intrusion detection mechanism that 
prove that my proposed model perform well as compared to existing intrusion 
detection approaches. The following sections explain these the sub phases of 
preprocessing. 
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3.3.1 Feature Transformation 
The usage of raw feature set is one of the drawbacks in existing intrusion detection 
approaches as it causes others problems in the field of intrusion detection like:- 
 The classifier or analysis engine of IDS may get confused and will generate false 
alarm. 
 It increases training overhead because the system process on each input feature 
even it is unimportant for the analysis engine or the classifier. 
 This consumes more memory and computational resources of the system during 
training and testing process of the system. 
 This decreases detection rate of an IDS. 
 This makes the intrusion detection architecture more complex and malfunction. 
3.3.1.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
In order to overcome above issues, this work uses PCA technique to transform 
original numeric features of dataset into PCA space. In past, the PCA has been use for 
feature reduction in several different areas; face recognition, hand written text 
recognition, image compression and intrusion detection.  This is a common technique 
for finding patterns in data of high dimension.  
Researchers used PCA to transform raw features into principal features space 
and select the features based on their sensitivity. The sensitivity is determined by the 
values of eigenvalues. But here, few other problems are raised: 
 Which features are selected?  
 How they are selected? 
 
 If features are selected based on the values of eigenvalues than there are chances 
to lose some important features that are more sensitive for the classifier. If all features 
are selected based on the values of eigenvalues than it will increases training 
overhead as well as increases architecture complexity that leads towards overall 
performance degradation. Therefore, This research work uses PCA for feature 
transformation and organization into new principal features space. This makes the 
 91   
features more visible, organized, arranged and sensitive that directly impact on the 
performance of intrusion detection mechanism.  The PCA algorithm flow applied for 
feature transformation and organization is shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2  PCA algorithm flow 
The PCA algorithm used in the pre-processing process for feature transformation 
and organization is shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
 92   
PCA Algorithm:  
Suppose                                 are NX1 vectors. Where M=38. 
 Step 1: Find Mean: 
   
 
 
   
 
   
 
Step 2:  Calculate deviation from mean:  Subtract the mean:             
Where i=1, 2,…………………………… M. 
Step 3: Find covariance matrix C:  





 Φ  
 
   Φ     
   
Step 4: Compute the eigenvalues of                        
 
Step 5: Compute the eigenvectors of                       
 
Since C is symmetric,                          form a basis, 
 (i.e. any vector x or actually       , can be written as a linear combination of the 
eigenvectors): 
                                   
 
   
 
Step 6: Arranged eigenvalues and eigenvectors in descending order. 
Step 7: The dimensionality reduction step (based on largest eigenvalues) is skipped as the 
selection of principal components is dine using GA. 
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A set of features from PCA feature space obtained after applying PCA is shown in 
Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 Feature set from PCA space 
F1   F2   F3   F4   F5   F6   F7   F8   
-2660.47 -310.209 -456.64 -3.68476 -4.04363 -0.63091 0.063043 -0.00053 
F9   F10   F11   F12   F13   F14   F15   F16   
-0.00116 -1.25E-05 0.002827 -0.00243 0.000403 0.000198 0.001066 0.000125 
F17   F18   F19   F20   F21   F22   F23   F24   
0.00010 0.000186 0.000122 -0.00062 1.78E-05 -0.00013 -4.18E-05 0.000115 
F25   F26   F27   F28   F29   F30   F31   F32   
1.89E-05 -2.47E-05 -6.49E-05 6.79E-06 4.57E-06 9.75E-08 -9.33E-06 1.59E-06 
F33   F34   F35   F36   F37   F38   
  
8.62E-06 1.55E-11 -1.70E-15 6.27E-16 -3.34E-16 1.27E-16 
  
After feature transformation and organization. The next phase is the feature subset 
selection. The recent approaches use the PCA to project features space to principal 
feature space and select features corresponding to the highest eigenvalues, but the 
features corresponding to the highest eigenvalues may not have the optimal sensitivity 
for the classifier because of ignoring many sensitive features. Instead of using 
traditional approach of selecting features with the highest eigenvalues such as PCA, a 
Genetic Algorithm (GA) is applied to search the principal feature space that offers a 
subset of features with optimal sensitivity and the highest discriminatory power.  
GA method is used to determine subset of feature. An appropriate feature set 
helps to build efficient decision model as well as to reduce the population of the 
feature set. Feature reduction will speed up the training and the testing process for the 
attack identification system considerably but this technically is a compromise 
between training efficiency (few PCA components) and the accurate results (a large 
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number of PCA components). So, there is no any effective scheme to select an 
appropriate set of features in the PCA space in the field of intrusion detection. This is 
the main problem of feature selection from the principal component space. This 
problem confuses the classifier or analysis engine when it deals with redundant and 
irrelevant features. 
Advantages 
 Training and testing efficiency ( few principal components) 
 Accurate results (a large number of components) 
 Simplify the classifier architecture 
Disadvantages 
 Selecting some percentage of the top principal components may lose some 
sensitive features that have higher discriminatory power for the analysis 
engine. 
 Selecting a large number of principal components decrease training and 
testing efficiency. Hence, it increases memory and computational 
overheads. 
 The classifier architecture becomes more complex as the number of 
components increases. 
3.3.2 Feature Subset Selection  
In order to overcome the above issues, GA is applied to search the principal 
components space so that an optimal subset of features are selected. This is my main 
contribution that positively impact on the performance of intrusion detection analysis 
engine. 
 This section describes feature subset selection process using GA. The block 
diagram of feature selection is shown in Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5. 
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 Figure 3.5  Feature subset selection based on GA+MLP 




3.3.2.1 Genetic algorithm 
Genetic algorithm operates iteratively on a population of structures, each one of 
which represents a candidate solution to the problem at hand, properly encoded as a 
string of symbols (e.g., binary). A randomly generated set of such strings forms the 
initial population from which the GA starts its search.  
Three basic genetic operators guide this search such as selection, crossover, and 
mutation. The genetic search process is iterative consisting of evaluation, selection, 
and recombination of strings. This continues to iterate in the population (generation) 
until some termination condition is reached.  The GA algorithm flow is shown in 






GA SVM PCs 
GA MLP PCs 
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Create initial a 
population
Evaluate population










Figure 3.6 Genetic algorithm flow 
GA Algorithm: 
Step 1. [Start]  
Generate random population of n chromosomes  
Step 2. [Fitness]  
Evaluate the fitness f(x) of each chromosome x in the population  
a. [New population] Create a new population by repeating following steps: 
b. [Selection] Select two parent chromosomes from a population  
c. [Crossover] With a crossover probability cross over the parents to form a new offspring 
(children). If no crossover was performed, offspring is an exact copy of parents.  
d. [Mutation] With a mutation probability, mutate new offspring at each locus (position in 
chromosome).  
e. [Accepting] Place new offspring in a new population  
Step 3. [Replace]  
Use new generated population for a further run of algorithm  
Step 4.  
[Test] If the end condition is satisfied, stop, and return the best solution in current population  
Step 5.  
 [Loop] Go to step 2  
Figure 3.7  Genetic algorithm 
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Evaluation of each string is based on a fitness function that is problem-dependent. 
It determines which of the candidate solutions are better. This corresponds to the 
environmental determination of survivability in natural selection. Selection of a 
string, which represents a point in the search space, depends on the string‟s fitness 
relative to those of other strings in the population. It probabilistically removes, from 
the population, those points that have relatively low fitness. Mutation, as in natural 
systems, is a very low probability operator and just flips a specific bit. Mutation plays 
a pivotal role of restoring lost genetic material. Crossover in contrast is applied with 
high probability. It is a randomized yet structured operator that allows information 
exchange between points. Its goal is to preserve the fittest individuals without 
introducing any new value. 
In brief, selection probabilistically filters out   solutions that perform poorly, 
choosing high performance solutions to concentrate on or exploit. Crossover and 
mutation, through string operations, generate new solutions for exploration. Given an 
initial population of elements, Genetic Algorithms use the feedback from the 
evaluation process to select fitter solutions, eventually resulting into a population of 
high-performance solutions. Genetic algorithms do not guarantee a global optimum 
solution. However, they have the ability to search through a very large search spaces 
and achieve utmost optimal solutions fast. Their ability for fast convergence is 
explained by the schema theorem (i.e., short-length bit patterns in the chromosomes 
with above average fitness, get exponentially growing number of trials in subsequent 
generations) (Sun et al. 2004) and (Goldberg 1989). 
a). Feature selection encoding 
A simple encoding scheme is used where the chromosome is a bit string whose length 
is determined by the number of principal components. Each principal component, 
computed using PCA, is associated with one bit in the string. If the i
th
 bit is 1, then the 
i
th
 principal component is selected, otherwise, that component is ignored. Each 
chromosome thus represents a different subset of principal components. 
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Table 3.4 A sample of five chromosomes (CHR) 
CHR Principal components 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 
4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 
5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 
b). Feature subset fitness evaluation 
The main goal of feature subset selection is to use less features to achieve the same or 
better performance. Therefore, the fitness evaluation contains two terms: (i) accuracy 
and (ii) the number of features selected. The performance of SVM and MLP is 
estimated using a validation dataset which guides the GA search. Each feature subset 
contains a certain number of principal components. If two subsets achieve the same 
performance, while containing different number of principal components, the subset 
with fewer principal components is preferred. Between accuracy and feature subset 
size, accuracy is the major concern. Fitness function is used to demonstrate the 
combination the two terms: 
fitness = 10
4
Accuracy + 0.5Zeros (3.1) 
Where Accuracy corresponds to the classification accuracy on a validation set for 
a particular subset of principal components and Zeros corresponds to the number 
principal components not selected (i.e., zeros in the chromosome). The Accuracy term 
ranges roughly from 0.50 to 0.99, thus, the first term assumes values from 5000 to 
9900. The Zeros term ranges from 0 to L −1 where L is the length of the 
chromosome, thus, the second term assumes values from 0 to 37 (L=38). Based on the 
weights that have been assigned to each term, the Accuracy term dominates the fitness 
value. This implies that individuals with higher accuracy will outweigh individuals 
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with lower accuracy, no matter how many features they contain. On the whole, the 
higher the accuracy is, the higher the fitness is. Also, the fewer the number of features 
is, the higher the fitness is. 
Selecting the weights for the two terms of the fitness function is more objective 
dependent than application dependent. For intrusion classification analysis among 
many factors, there is need to find the best balance between model compactness and 
performance accuracy. Under some scenarios, the best performance is preferable, no 
matter what the cost might be. If this is the case, the weight associated with the 
Accuracy term should be very high. Under different situations, compact models are 
favoured more over accuracy, as long as the accuracy is within a satisfactory range. In 
this work, the selection of a higher weight are better for the Zeros term. 
In this research work, four different experiments performed using GA and the 




(.99) + 0.5 (28) = 9900+14=9914 (3.2) 
 
Table 3.5 Fitness function 
Experiment# 
Time taken by 
experiment 
No of selected 
PCs 
No of non 
selected PCs 
Accuracy Fitness 
1-SVM 48 hrs 10 28 0.99 9914 
2-MLP 72 hrs 12 26 0.99 9913 
3-MLP 78 hrs 20 18 0.98 9808 
5-MLP 83 hrs 27 11 0.99 9911 
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c). Initial population 
In general, the initial population is generated randomly, (e.g., each bit in an individual 
is set by flipping a coin) (Srinivas M and Patnaik L 1995). This, however, would 
produce a population where each individual contains approximately the same number 
of 1‟s and 0‟s on the average. To explore subsets of different numbers of features, the 
number of 1‟s for each individual is generated randomly. Then, the 1‟s are randomly 
scattered in the chromosome. In all experiments, this approach used a population size 
of 50 and 100 generations. In most cases, the GA converged in less than 100 
generations. 
d). Selection 
Selection is a genetic operator that chooses chromosomes from the current 
generation‟s population for inclusion in the next generation‟s population. Before 
making into the next generation‟s population, selected chromosomes may undergo 
crossover and mutation. There are five selection operators; roulette, tournament, top 
percent, best and random (Eshelman 1989). 
 Roulette: The chance of a chromosome getting selected is directly 
proportional to its fitness (or rank). This is where the idea of survival of the 
fittest comes into play. There is also the option to specify whether the chance 
of being selected is based on fitness or on rank. 
 Tournament: it uses roulette selection N times (the Tournament Size”) to 
produce a tournament subset of chromosomes. The best chromosome in this 
subset is then chosen as the selected chromosome. This method of selection 
applies addition selective pressure over plain roulette selection. There is also 
the option to specify whether the chance of being selected is based on fitness 
or on rank. 
 Best: Selects the best chromosome (as determined by the lowest cost of the 
training run). If there are two or more chromosomes with the same best cost, 
one of them is chosen randomly. 
 Random: Randomly selects a chromosome from the population.  
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 Top Percent: Randomly selects a chromosome from the top N percent (the 
Percentage”) of the population. 
This research work used top percent selection method in experiments because it 
gives better performance as compared to other selection operators. 
Table 3.6 Selection method 
Experiment# 




Selection method Accuracy Fitness 
1-SVM 48 hrs 10 Top percent 0.99 9914 
2-MLP 72 hrs 12 Top percent 0.99 9913 
3-MLP 78 hrs 20 Roulette 0.98 9808 
5-MLP 83 hrs 27 Roulette 0.99 9911 
e). Crossover 
There are three fundamental crossovers types: one-point crossover, two-point 
crossover, and uniform crossover. For one-point crossover, the parent chromosomes 
are divided at a common point chosen randomly and the resulting sub-chromosomes 
are swapped. For two-point crossover, the chromosomes are thought of as rings with 
the first and last gene connected (i.e., wrap-around structure). In this case, the rings 
are divided at two common points chosen randomly and the resulting sub-rings are 
swapped. Uniform crossover is different from the above two schemes. In this case, 
each gene of the offspring is selected randomly from the corresponding genes of the 
parents (Bebis et al. 2000). For simplicity, this work used one-point crossover here. 
The crossover probability used in all of my experiments was 0.9.  
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e). Mutation 
Mutation is a genetic operator that alters one or more gene values in a chromosome 
from its initial state. This can result in entirely new gene values being added to the 
gene pool. With these new gene values, the Genetic Algorithm may achieve a better 
solution than the former. Mutation is an important part of the genetic search as it 
helps to prevent the population from stagnating at any local optima. Mutation occurs 
during evolution according to the probability defined. This probability should usually 
be set fairly low. If it is set too high, the search will turn into a primitive random 
search (Zorana et al. 2007). This work uses the traditional mutation operator which 
just flips a specific bit with a very low probability. The mutation probability used in 
all of my experiments was 0.01. 
e). Termination 
The GA generational process is repeated until a termination condition has been 
reached. There are many conditions on which GA process can be stopped (Bebis et al. 
2000) and (Sun et al. 2004). For example; 
 Population Convergence – It stops the evolution when the population is 
deemed converged. The population is deemed converged when the average 
fitness across the current population is less than the Threshold” percentage 
away from the best fitness of the current population. 
 Gene Convergence – It stops the evolution when the ‘percentage’ of the genes 
that make up a chromosome are deemed converged. A gene is deemed 
converged when the average value of that gene across all of the chromosomes 
in the current population is less than the ‘threshold’ percentage away from the 
maximum gene value across the chromosomes.  
 Fitness Convergence – It stops the evolution when the fitness is deemed as 
converged. Two filters of different lengths are used to smooth the best fitness 
across the generations. When the smoothed best fitness from the long filter is 
less than the Threshold” percentage away from the smoothed best fitness from 
the short filter, the fitness is deemed as converged and the evolution 
terminates. Both filters are defined by the following equations. 
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y(0) = 0.9 * f(0)  if the objective is set to maximize (3.3) 
y(0) = 1.1 * f(0) if the objective is set to minimize (3.4) 
y(n) = (1- b) f(n) + b y(n - 1) (3.5) 
 
where n is the generation number, y(n) is the filter output, y(n-1) is the previous 
filter output, and f(n) is the best cost. The only difference between the short and long 
filters is the coefficient b.  From the above equations, the higher the b, the more that 
the past values are averaged in. The short filter uses b = 0.3 and the long filter uses b 
= 0.9. 
 Fitness Threshold - Stops the evolution when the best fitness in the current 
population becomes less than the fitness threshold and the objective is set 
to minimize the fitness. This work uses the threshold value as 0.001. 
Table 3.7 Parameters used for genetic feature subset selection 
S.No Genetic operator(s) Genetic operator value(s) 
1    Maximum generation 100 
2    Chromosomes 50 
3    Selection method Top percent (10%) 
4    Crossover One-point 
5    Crossover probability  0.9 
6    Mutation probability 0.01 
7    Population size 50 
8    Termination type Fitness threshold (0.001) 
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S.No Genetic operator(s) Genetic operator value(s) 
9    Architecture MLP, SVM 
10    Training algorithm Online backpropagation 
 The number of features selected during experiments is shown in Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8 GA features subset selection based on MLP and SVM 
Feature No SVM(10) MLP(12) MLP(20) MLP(27) 
1    Х Х √ √ 
2    Х √ √ Х 
3    √ √ √ Х 
4    √ Х Х √ 
5    Х Х √ √ 
6    Х Х Х √ 
7    Х Х √ √ 
8    Х Х √ √ 
9    Х √ Х Х 
10    Х Х √ √ 
11    Х √ √ Х 
12    √ √ √ √ 
13    Х Х Х Х 
14    Х Х Х √ 
15    Х √ √ √ 
16    Х Х Х Х 
17    Х √ Х √ 
18    Х √ Х Х 
19    Х Х √ Х 
20    Х Х √ √ 
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Feature No SVM(10) MLP(12) MLP(20) MLP(27) 
21    Х Х Х √ 
22    √ Х Х √ 
23    Х Х Х Х 
24    Х √ √ Х 
25    Х Х √ √ 
26    √ Х Х √ 
27    √ √ Х √ 
28    √ Х √ √ 
29    Х Х √ √ 
30    Х Х Х Х 
31    Х Х Х √ 
32    √ Х Х √ 
33    Х Х √ √ 
34    √ √ Х √ 
35    Х Х Х √ 
36    √ √ √ √ 
37    Х Х √ √ 
38    Х Х √ √ 
 
This research work found an optimized subset of features with ten features from 
the above four subsets of features. Consequently, this work used a subset of features 
with ten principal components with different index values. A sample of final subset of 
features for ten records is shown in Table 3.9. 
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Table 3.9 A sample of final subset of features for ten records 
Sr Principal components indexes selected based on genetic algorithm 
No 3 4 12 22 26 27 28 32 34 36 
1 
-310.209 -456.64 -0.00116 0.0028 -0.00243 0.00106 0.0010 0.00018 0.00011 -6.49E-5 
2 
-310.209 -456.64 -0.00116 0.00282 -0.00243 0.00106 0.0010 0.00018 0.0011 -6.49E-05 
3 
-960.96 268.699 0.26708 0.77291 0.01081 -0.0144 -0.060 0.00072 -0.0476 -0.00198 
4 
442.687 219.551 0.13768 -0.07388 -0.04755 -0.0302 -0.097 -0.0024 -0.0173 0.00040 
5 
-299.009 275.682 0.32907 0.70899 0.07318 0.01681 -0.061 0.01833 -0.0413 0.00645 
6 
-310.209 -456.64 -0.00116 0.00282 -0.00243 0.00106 0.0010 0.00018 0.00011 -6.49E-05 
7 
485.004 274.342 -0.02324 -0.12817 0.10374 0.01239 0.0067 0.00014 -0.0102 0.00409 
8 
517.0306 244.1791 0.121362 -0.14683 -0.04805 0.00237 -0.097 0.00345 0.00243 0.000388 
9 
618.482 255.107 -0.24427 -0.00891 0.037715 0.00984 -0.003 -0.0053 0.00075 -0.00093 
10 
-310.209 -456.64 -0.00116 0.002827 -0.00243 0.00106 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 -6.49E-05 
3.4 Classification Approach 
This work used two types of approaches for intrusion detection; multilayered 
perceptron (MLP) and Support Vector Machine (SVM). These two architectures are 
very popular in different areas of research; image processing, character recognition, 
speech recognition, bioinformatics, data classification, intrusion detection and 
machine translation (Sun et al. 2004). The MLP with one hidden layer is equivalent to 
SVM. In this way, the performance of both architectures can be compared in terms of 
their discriminatory power and efficiency to classify network activity into normal and 
intrusive. Both the architectures will be described in details in Chapter 4. 
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3.4.1 MLP Classifier 
There are two important characteristics of the multilayer perceptron (MLP). First, its 
processing elements (PEs)/neurons are nonlinear. The nonlinearity functionality is 
provided by the functions; logistic and hyperbolic tangent. Second, they are massively 
interconnected such that any element of a given layer feeds all the elements of the 
next layer (Ahmad et al. 2007). 
Advantages 
The following are some advantages of using MLP in my problem. 
 MLPs are very powerful pattern classifiers. 
 With one or two hidden layers they can approximate virtually any input-
output map. 
 They showed better performance to other classifier in difficult problems. 
 They efficiently use the information contained in the input data. 
Disadvantages 
The following are some disadvantages of MLP. 
 They need lots of input data. This can slow training process. 
 The setting of parameters can be tricky for difficult problem. 
 Stuck in local minima 
3.4.2 SVM Classifier 
SVMs are primarily two-class classifiers that have been shown to be an efficient and 
possess more systematic approach to learn linear or non-linear decision boundaries 
(Vapnik V. 1995) and (Burges 1998). Their key characteristic is the mathematical 
tractability and geometric interpretation.  A rapid growth of interest in SVMs has 
been observed over the last few years, demonstrating remarkable success in fields as 
diverse as text categorization, bioinformatics, and computer vision (Cristianini et al. 
2002). Specific applications include text classification (Tong et al. 2001), speed 
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recognition (Smith N. and Gales M. 2002) , gene classification (Brown et al. 1999), 
and webpage classification(Yu H et al. 2002).  
This work used SVM using kernel adatron algorithm. The kernel adatron maps 
inputs to a high dimensional feature space, and then optimally separates data into their 
respective classes by isolating those inputs that fall close to the data boundaries (Yu et 
al. 2008). Therefore, kernel adatron is especially effective in separating sets of data 
that share complex boundaries. SVMs are generally useful for classification problems. 
Advantages 
The following are some advantages of using SVM in my problem. 
 SVMs produce excellent results in classification problems. 
 SVM performs better in term of not over generalization. SVM control over 
training by maximizing the margin. 
 There are no parameters specific to the SVM that needs to be configured. 
 Some other features of SVMs are the use of kernels, the absence of local 
minima, the sparseness of the solution and the capacity control obtained by 
optimizing the margin. 
Disadvantages 
The following are some disadvantages of SVM. 
 SVMs assign one gaussian function for each input exemplar in the training 
set. This can slow training process. 
 SVMs are not suitable for huge datasets. 
3.5 Training the System 
During the training of the system, both input patterns and desired outputs related to 
each input exemplar. The aim of the system‟s training is minimizing the difference 
between the output produced by the system and the desired output. In order to achieve 
this goal, weights are updated by carrying out certain steps known as training.  First 
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of all, 20,000 samples of network connections are selected randomly from KDD cup 
dataset. The selected dataset consists of 12,800 (64%) normal and 7200 (36%) 
intrusive ones (DOS, Probe, U2R and R2L). After that, the selected dataset is 
transformed into another space (the PCA space). Then, GA is applied for the selection 
of optimal features subset as described in section pre-processing. The resultant dataset 
is further divided into two parts; training and production datasets. 
3.5.1 Training Dataset 
The training dataset consists of five thousand (5000) labeled connections (network 
records with label as normal or intrusive) that are randomly selected from 20,000 
connections. Further, the training dataset (five thousand) is divided into three parts; (i) 
cross validation dataset, (ii) test dataset and (iii) training dataset. This section 
describes each of these datasets. 
3.5.1.1 Cross-validation Dataset 
Cross-validation is highly recommended method for training the system. This method 
monitors the error on an independent set of data and stops training when this error 
begins to increase. The size of dataset for cross-validation is recommended as 
follows: 
 Normal generalization protection specifies that 20% of data should be for 
cross validation.  
 High generalization protection specifies that 40% of data should be for 
cross validation.   
Hence, This work used one thousand (1000) dataset for cross-validation. 
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3.5.1.2 Testing Dataset 
The testing dataset is used to test the performance of the system. Once the system is 
trained the weights are then frozen, the testing dataset is fed into the system and the 
system output is compared with the desired output. In this work, 30 % of dataset 
(5000) that is fifteen hundred (1500) is used to test the performance of trained system. 
3.5.1.3 Training Dataset 
The training dataset is used to train the system. The 50% of the dataset (5000) that is 
2500 is used to train the system. The training of the system (MLP & SVM) should be 
stopped when the system has learned the task. There are no direct indicators that 
measures how and when to stop the training of the system. However, there are some 
ways on the bases of which the training process can be stopped. These methods are 
explained in next section. 
3.5.2 Training Stop Criteria 
There are three common methods; (i) Number of iterations, (ii) Mean Squared Error 
(MSE), and (iii) Generalization to stop the training of the system (Principe et al. 
2000). This section explains each of these methods. 
3.5.2.1 Number of Iterations 
First method is the simplest way to stop the training phase. This uses a predefined 
value. It does not use any information or feedback from the system before or during 
training. When the number of iterations is reached at a predefined value, there is no 
guarantee that the learning system has found coefficients that are close to the optimal 
values.  
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3.5.2.2 Mean Squared Error (MSE) 
This method uses a recursive analysis of the output MSE to stop the training. There 
are two common approaches to stop training that are based on MSE. 
 The training is set to terminate when the MSE drops to some threshold. 
 The training is set to terminate when the change in the error between epochs is 
less than some threshold.  
 
 
Figure 3.8 Behavior of MSE for training and test datasets 
Stop criteria are all based on monitoring the mean square error. Monitor the MSE 
for the test set, as in cross validation. One should stop the learning when error in the 
test set starts increasing as shown in Figure 3.8. This is where the maximum 
generalization takes place. 
3.5.2.3 Generalization 
The above two methods did not deal with the trouble of generalization, that is, how 
well the learning system performs with data that does not belong to the training set. 
Recent development in learning theory indicate that after a critical point an MLP 
trained with backpropagation will continue to do better in the training set, but the test 
set performance will begin to deteriorate. This process is called overtraining. One 
method to solve this problem is to stop the training at the point of maximum 
generalization. This method is called early stopping or stopping with cross-validation. 
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It has been experimentally verified that the training error always decreases when the 
number of iterations is increased as shown in Figure 3.9. If the error is plot in a set of 
data with which the network was not trained (the validation set), than the error 
initially decreases with the number of iterations but eventually starts to increase 
again. Therefore, training should be stopped at the point of the smallest error in the 
validation set and when the error in the cross-validation set starts to increase. This 
method has one advantage and one disadvantage.  
 This provides an accurate stopping point. 
 The cross-validation dataset decreases the size of the training dataset.  
 
Figure 3.9 Cross validation vs. training dataset 
This method is recommended for real world applications. Even though, the MSE 
is a good overall measure of whether a training run was successful, sometimes it can 
be misleading (Principe et al. 2000). This is particularly true for classification 
problems.  
3.5.2.4 Confusion matrix 
This work deals the classification problem and there is a chance of misleading. 
Hence, in this research work, a confusion matrix is used to resolve this problem of 
misleading and to verify the training. The confusion matrix tallies the results of all 
exemplars of the last epoch and computes the classification percentages for every 
output vs. desired combination.  
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There are four parameters in a confusion matrix; (i) true positive, (ii) false positive, 
(iii) true negative , and (iv) false negative as shown in Table 3.10. 
 True positives: when system classifies normal as normal packet then it will be 
called as true positive. True positives indicate correctly prediction of normal 
packets. 
 False positives: when system classifies normal as intrusive packet then it will 
be called as false positive. False positives indicate incorrectly prediction of 
normal packets. 
 True negative: when system classifies intrusive as intrusive packet then it will 
be called as true negative. True negatives indicate correctly prediction of 
intrusive packets. 
 False negative: when system classifies intrusive as normal packet then it will 
be called as false negative. False negatives indicate incorrectly prediction of 
intrusive packets. 
Table 3.10 A confusion matrix 
 Normal Attack 
Normal 
True Positive 
Normal as normal 
Correctly predicted 
False Positive 




Intrusive as Normal 
Minimize 
True Negative 
Intrusive and Intrusive 
Correctly predicted 
3.6 Testing the System 
When the training is completed then weights of the system are frozen and 
performance of the system is evaluated. Testing the system involves two steps; (i) 
verification step, and (ii) generalization step.  
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3.6.1 Verification Step  
In verification step, system is tested against the data which are used in training. Aim 
of the verification step is to test how well trained system learned the training patterns 
in the training dataset. If a system was trained successfully, outputs produced by the 
system would be similar to the actual outputs. This work used 30% of the training 
dataset (5000) that is 1500. 
3.6.2 Generalization Step 
In generalization step, testing is conducted with data which is not used in training. 
Aim of the generalization step is to measure generalization ability of the trained 
network. After training, the system only involves computation of the feedforward 
phase. For this purpose, a production dataset is used that has input data but no desired 
data. This research work uses a dataset of fifteen thousand (15,000) as a production 
dataset. Further, this technique is also tested on total dataset (20,000) that consist of 
both training dataset and production dataset. Table 3.11 shows statistics of the dataset 
used for experiments. 
Table 3.11 Statistics of dataset used in experiments 
S.No Dataset(s) Number of network connections 
1 
Selected dataset (64% 
normal and 36% intrusive) 
20,000 network connections are selected 
randomly from KDD cup dataset, in which 12800 
are normal and 7200 are intrusive connections. 
2 Training dataset 5,000 connections are randomly selected  
3 Cross-validation dataset 1,000 connections (20 % of 5000) 
4 Testing dataset 1,500 connections (30% of 5000) 
5 Production dataset 1,5000 
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3.7 Summary 
This chapter describes the five-phased methodology incorporated in my research. 
Explains different sections of applied methodology: (i) selection of dataset: There are 
three ways of selecting dataset for training and testing purpose such as real, sanitized 
and simulated. However, due to security issues and cost ineffectiveness and 
complexity this research work used MIT KDD cup, as it is considered a benchmark in 
the intrusion detection evaluation world. (ii) Pre-processing of dataset by the 
application of PCA and GA. Searching of PCA feature space using GA space for the 
selection of optimal feature subset selection is my principal contribution, which has a 
magnanimous effect on the overall performance (accuracy improvement, 
simplification of the architecture and minimizes training and testing overheads) of the 
intrusion analysis engine. The necessity of the preprocessing of the dataset is of prime 
importance for the classifier to discriminate data into classes such as normal and 
intrusive. (iii) Classification Approach: this technique used MLP and SVM as a 
classifier to classify network activity into normal and intrusive. (iv) Training the MLP 
and SVM classifier using the back-propagation algorithm and kernel adatron 
respectively. (v) Testing: Post-training, the system‟s performance is evaluated by 








SYSTEM DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the proposed model with its basic architecture via block 
diagram, and then details of each part or block of its main architecture. Explains 
features description of the dataset used for experiments, feature transformation 
process using PCA and optimal features subset selection using GA. The chapter also 
describes the details of classification architectures with basic algorithms and 
mathematical foundation of multilayered perceptron (MLP) and Support Vector 
Machine (SVM). Thus, the chapter explains system implementation, and the basic 
parameters used during training and testing followed by the description of the 
contributions and summary. 
4.2 Proposed Model 
The proposed model consist of different parts; dataset used for experiments, feature 
transformation and organization, optimal feature subset selection, classification 
architectures, implementation, training and testing, and results comparison. The block 
diagram of proposed model is shown in Figure 4.1 
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Figure 4.1 Block diagram of proposed model 
4.2.1 Dataset used for Experiments 
This research work used KDD cup 99 dataset for my experiments. The selection of 
this dataset is due to its standardization, content richness and it helps to evaluate my 
results with existing researches in the area of intrusion detection. This has already 
been described  in Chapter 3 . The raw dataset consists of 41 features. 
 
                                             Where n=41 (4.1) 
4.2.2 Dataset Pre-processing for Experiments 
After selection of the dataset, the raw dataset is pre-processed so that it can be given 
to the selected classifiers; MLP and SVM. The raw dataset is pre-processed in three 
ways; (i) discarding symbolic values, (ii) feature transformation and organization 
using PCA, and (iii) optimal features subset selection using GA.  
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5.2.2.1 Discarding Symbolic Values 
In first step of pre-processing, three symbolic values (e.g. udp, private & SF) are 
discarded out of 41 features of the dataset. The resultant features are; 
 
                     
                                                                           Where m=38 
(4.2) 
4.2.2.2 Feature Transformation and Organization  
In second step of pre-processing, PCA has applied on 38 features of the dataset. 
Mostly, PCA is used for data reduction, but here, PCA is used for feature 
transformation into principal components feature space and then organized principal 
components in descending order. 
 
                            
                                                                                            Where l=38 
(4.3) 
4.2.2.3 Optimal Feature Subset Selection 
In third step of pre-processing, GA is applied for optimal features subset selection 
from principal components search space. Four different experiments are performed as 
described in Chapter 3 and selected a subset of ten features that indicated better 
performance as compared to others. The aim is to select minimum features that 
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     Ten different principal components are selected using GA process 
(4.4) 
After features subset selection, this approach used this dataset for training and 
testing in the experiments. The features are reduced to 10 from the 41 raw features 
set. 
4.2.3 Classification Architectures 
This work used two classifier approaches; MLP and SVM as an analysis engine for 
intrusion classification into normal and intrusive. These both approaches are 
commonly used in different areas due to their effective discrimination power as 
described in chapter 3. This section explains the MLP and the SVM architectures 
applied for experiments. 
4.2.3.1 Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) 
A MLP is a feed forward neural network that maps sets of input data onto a set of 
appropriate output. Here, a MLP architecture is used that consists of three layers; 
input, hidden and output. In this architecture, hidden layer and output layer consist of 
neurons (processing elements) and each neuron has a nonlinear activation function. 
The layers are fully connected from one layer to the next. MLP is an amendment of 
the standard linear perceptron, which can discriminate data that is not linearly 
separable. The MLP architecture, used in this work  is shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
















MLP applied for intrusion analysis
 
Figure 4.2 MLP architecture 
 
MLP network used to make basic input-output mapping. MLP network is trained 
in such way that, it produces value of 1 if the presented input pattern is intrusive and 0 
if the presented input pattern is normal network packet. This section describes the 
main components; layers and synapses of above MLP architecture. The architecture 
consists of three layers; input, hidden and output that are connected through synapses.  
a). Input Layer  
The input layer takes input from the input file that contains dataset for training of the 
network. The row of the dataset is called a pattern representing an instance of the 
input dataset. The neural network reads and elaborates sequentially all the input rows, 
and for each one it generates an output pattern representing the outcome of the entire 
process. For this purpose, an axon is used that has its activation function as; 
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 Where    input,   associated weight and output of input layer is    
(4.5) 
b). Hidden Layer 
This model uses one hidden layer in MLP architecture that represents a good non-
linear element of the neural network. The TanhAxon is used as hidden layer in the 
architecture. It can also be used to build whatever layer (hidden or output) of a neural 
network. This hidden layer takes inputs from the outputs of the input layer, and 
applies its activation function. Then, it sends its output to the output layer. The 
TanhAxon applies a bias and tanh function to each neuron in the layer. This will 
squash the range of each neuron in the layer to between -1 and 1. Such nonlinear 
elements provide a network with the ability to make soft decisions. For this purpose, 
the MLP used TanhAxon as shown in Figure 4.3 that has its activation function as; 
                
     
  Where   
        is the scaled and offset activity inherited from the 
LinearAxon and   parameter represent slope which is not adaptive 
(4.6) 
 
Figure 4.3 Activation function of Tanh 
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c). Output Layer 
The output layer allows a neural network to write output patterns in a file that are 
used for analysis of intrusion. For this purpose, MLP used TanhAxon that has already 
described above in hidden layer section. 
d). Synapses 
The synapse represents the connection between two layers, permitting a pattern to be 
passed from one layer to another. The synapse is also the „memory‟ of a neural 
network. During the training process the weight of each connection is modified 
according the learning algorithm. The layers are fully connected with each other. For 
this purpose FullSynapse object is used that connects all the nodes of a layer (axon) 
with all the nodes of the other layer (axon), as showed in Figure 4.2. 
Since each axon represents a vector of PEs, the FullSynapse simply performs a 
matrix multiplication. For each PE in its output axon, the FullSynapse accumulates a 
weighted sum of activations from all neurons in its input axons. The activation 
function is described here. 
 
                          
 Where     is a connection weight linking PEj to PEi . Time t is 
discrete, and it relates to one simulation step and discrete time delay is 
d. 
(4.7) 
e). Training algorithms 
This work used backpropagation algorithm that is one of the most popular supervised 
learning algorithms (Ahmad et al. 2008). The algorithm consists of two phases: 
forward phase and backward phase. In the forward phase, first, the weights of the 
network are randomly initialized. Then, the input signals are propagated through the 
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network. Afterwards, the output of the network is calculated and compared to the 
desired value. In the end of the forward phase, the error of the network is calculated. 
Error of the output neuron i (ei) is calculated by the formula: 
         
  Where di is the desired response and yi is the output produces by 
the neural network in response to the input xi. 
(4.8) 
 
Aim of the backpropagation algorithm is to reach global minimum value on the 
error surface as shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4 Global and local minimum in error surface 
In backward phase, calculated error signal is propagated backward and in order to 
minimize the error, weights are updated. Change in weights can be calculated by 
gradient descent learning rule .According to the gradient descent learning rule, 
correction applied to the weight wji at the iteration n is denoted by  
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Where   is a numerical constant (learning-rate parameter of the 
backpropagation algorithm) and       is local gradient. 
(4.9) 
 
Local gradient of output neurons is equal to the product of the derivative of 
activation function,      ), and error signal,      , and defined by 
            
          
                 Where error signal is       and       is local gradient. 
(4.10) 
 
Local gradient for neurons in hidden layer is defined by 
       
                       (4.11) 
Learning rate parameter,  , is used to reduce the training time. But if the learning 
rate parameter is chosen too high (e.g. 0.9), algorithm oscillate between local 
minimums, and may not achieved to reach the global minimum, whereas selecting 
learning rate too small results in long training periods.  
One way to speed up the learning when learning rate is chosen small or avoid 
oscillation between local minimums when learning rate is chosen to big is to utilize a 
parameter, momentum. By introducing the momentum parameter, change in weight, 
 wji(n), is made dependent to the previous weight change,  wji(n-1). Modified 
backpropagation algorithm which uses momentum,  , is given; 
 
                               (4.12) 
After the training was completed, connection weights are frozen. Afterwards, in 
order to validate whether the neural network was trained sufficiently or not, a test set, 
which is not part of the training set, was presented to the trained network and its 
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performance is evaluated. Backpropagation algorithm is simple to implement. 
However, when dealing with difficult learning tasks, training time of the 
backpropagation networks can be lengthy and even algorithm may not converge to the 
desired error rate. The pseudo code of the backpropagation algorithm is given in 
Figure 4.5. 
Backpropagation Algorithm: 
Input: training-examples, η, Ø,    ,  
Output: trained network 
Initialize all weights of    ; 
for each pair <       >   training-examples do 
Step 1       Forward phase; 
Present the input    to the input layer of the    ; 
for each unit          do 
calculate the output   of unit  ; 
Step 2      Backward phase: 
Calculate errors: 
for each unit     output layer, calculate its error    do 
                                        ; 
for each hidden unit  , calculate its errors     do 
                                
 
         ; 
 Update weights: 
for each weight       net do 
                             ; 
                             ; 
 
Figure 4.5 Backpropagation Algorithm 
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There is another algorithm used in my implementation known as Levenberg-
Marquardt (LM) algorithm that is one of the most appropriate higher-order adaptive 
algorithms used for minimizing the MSE of a neural network (Hagan and Menhaj 
1994). It can be used to update the weights in the network just as backpropagation 
algorithm. It is reputably the fastest algorithm available for such training. The 
Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm is designed specifically to minimize the sum-of-
squares error function, using a formula that assumes that the underlying function 
modelled by the network is linear. A move is only accepted if it improves the error, 
and if necessary the gradient-descent model is used with a sufficiently small step to 
guarantee downhill movement. The weight update vector    is calculated as 
 
                 
  
        (4.13) 
Where   is the vector of errors,    is the learning rate parameter, and J(x) is the 
Jacobian matrix that is the matrix of partial derivatives of the errors with respect to 
the weights. Jacobian matrix can be calculated with the following formula: 









      
   
      
   
  
      
   
      
   
      
   
   
      
   
 
      
   
      
   
      











Levenberg-Marquardt outperforms the basic backpropagation and its variations 
with variable learning rate in terms of training time and accuracy. However the 
computation and memory requirements of the algorithm are high. 
4.2.3.2 Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
Support vector machines (SVMs) are a very different type of classifier that have 
attracted a great deal of attention recently due to the novelty of the concepts that they 
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bring to pattern recognition, their strong mathematical foundation, and their excellent 
results in practical problems. There are two motivating concepts behind SVMs: 
 The idea that transforms the data into a high- dimensional space makes 
linear discriminant functions practical.  
 The idea of large margin classifiers to train the perceptron.  
This research work used  these two concepts and created the SVM. The advantage 
of a kernel machine is that its capacity (number of degrees of freedom) is decoupled 
from the size of the input space. By mapping the input to a sufficiently large feature 
space, patterns become linearly separable, so a simple perceptron in feature space can 
do the classification. Here SVM used the Radial basis function (RBF) network, which 
can be considered a kernel classifier. Actually, the RBF places Gaussian kernels over 
the data and linearly weights their outputs to create the system output. 
When used as an SVM, the RBF network places a Gaussian in each data sample 
such that the feature space becomes as large as the number of samples. But an SVM is 
much more than an RBF. To train RBF network as an SVM, this work use the idea of 
large margin classifiers which uses the Adatron algorithm, which works only with 
perceptrons. Training an RBF for large margins will decouple the capacity of the 
classifier from the input space and at the same time provides good generalization. 
This approach directs towards powerful classifiers. The adatron algorithm can be 
extended here in two ways: (i) apply it to kernel-based classifiers such as RBFs, and 
(ii) modify the training for nonlinearly separable patterns. 
a). Extension of the Adatron to Kernel Machines 
The Adatron algorithm is able to adapt the perceptron to maximize its margin. 
The idea is to work with data-dependent representations, which lead to a very simple 
on-line algorithm to adapt the multipliers.  The discriminant function of the RBF in 
terms of the data-dependent representation is given in the Equation: 
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(4.15) 
Where         represents a Gaussian function, L is the number of PEs in the 
RBF,    are the weights, N is the number of samples,    are a set of multipliers (one 
for each sample), and this approach consider the input space augmented by one 
dimension with a constant value of 1 to provide the bias. 
The inner product of Gaussians is a Gaussian. The kernel function (the Gaussian) 
first projects the inputs (x, xi) onto a high-dimensional space and then computes an 
inner product there. The amazing thing is that the Gaussian kernel avoids the explicit 
computation of the pattern projections into the high-dimensional space, as shown in 
Eq. 5.13 (the inner product of Gaussians is still a Gaussian). Any other symmetric 
function that obeys the Mercer condition has the same properties. The topology used 
in this work is depicted in Figure 5.5, where one can easily see that it is an RBF, but 
where each Gaussian is centered at each sample and the weights are the multipliers  . 
The adatron algorithm can be easily extended to the RBF network by substituting 
the inner product of patterns in the input space by the kernel function, leading to the 
following quadratic optimization problem: 
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This can define as, 
            
 
   
             
                        
 
(4.17) 
and choose a common starting multiplier (e.g.    =0.1), learning rate  , and a 
small threshold (e.g., t = 0.01). 
While M>t, this approach choose a pattern xi and calculate an update     
          and perform the update 
 
                                 
                                   
 
                                 
                                                       
(4.18) 
After adaptation, only some of the    are different from zero (called the support 
vectors). They correspond to the samples that are closest to the boundary between 
classes. This algorithm is called the kernel adatron and can adapt an RBF to have an 
optimal margin. This algorithm can be considered the "on-line" version of the 
quadratic optimization approach utilized for SVMs, and it can find the same solutions 
as Vapnik's original algorithm for SVMs. It is easy to implement the kernel adatron 
algorithm since g(xi) can be computed locally to each multiplier, provided that the 
desired response is available in the input file. In fact, the expression for g(xi) 
resembles the multiplication of an error with an activation, so it can be included in the 
framework of neural network learning. The Adatron algorithm essentially prunes the 
RBF network of Figure 4.5 so that its output for testing is given. 
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      (4.19) 
b). The Adatron with a Soft Margin 
If the patterns in feature space are not linearly separable than an idea is introduce a 
soft margin using a slack variable      and a function         
 
   , which 
penalize the cost function. 
Further minimize the function F, but now subject to the constraints 
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The new cost function becomes 
          
 




    
 
   
 
   
                 
    
   
 
 
               
 
   
   




Normally, instead of computing the optimal C, this method chooses a value. A 
priori C can be regarded as a regularizer. This means that the matrix of kernel inner 
products is augmented in the diagonal by the factor    , that is, 
                        
 
                            
(4.21) 
The only difference in the algorithm for this case is the calculation of       which 
becomes 
           
 
   
              (4.22) 
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These calculations can be easily implemented as an iterative algorithm, but large 
data sets produce very large RBF network (one gaussian per data). One disadvantage 
is that it does not directly specify the number of support vectors to solve the problem. 
In principal, SVMs should be sensitive to outlier, even when using soft computing. 
Therefore, this approach used the SVM to transform the data into high-dimensional 
space using RBF that places a gaussian at each data sample. The RBF uses the 
backpropagation to train a linear combination of the gaussian to produce the results. 
The SVM used in my work, however, uses the idea of large margin classifiers for 
training. This decouples the capacity of the classifier from the input space and at the 









SVM applied for intrusion analysis
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Figure 4.6 SVM applied for intrusion analysis 
The SVM is implemented using the kernel adatron algorithm. The kernel adatron 
maps inputs to a high-dimensional feature space, and then optimally separates data 
into their respective classes by isolating those inputs which fall close to the data 
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boundaries. Therefore, the kernel Adatron is especially effective in separating sets of 
data which share complex boundaries. The kernel Adatron algorithm is given in 
Figure 4.7. 
 
Kernel Adatron Algorithm: 
Step 1: Initialize     . 
Step 2: Starting from pattern     , for labeled points 
         Calculate                   
 
   
. 
Step 3: For all patterns    calculate           and execute steps 4 to 5 below. 
Step 4: Let              be the proposed change to the multipliers     . 
Step 5.1: If             then the proposed change to the multipliers would result in a 
negative      Consequently to avoid this problem set       
Step 5.2: If             then the multipliers are updated through the addition of the             
    i.e.           . 




        
          
    
Where    
  are those patterns    with class label    and    
  are those with class label  . 
Step 7: If a maximum number of presentations of the pattern set has been exceeded then stop, 
otherwise return to step 2. 
Figure 4.7 Kernel Adatron Algorithm 
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4.2.4 Implementation 
The proposed model is implemented using different types of softwares: 
NeuroSolutions, PCA and MS-excel. This work implemented the MLP and the SVM 
in two different modules. This section explains briefly their implemented 
architectures. 
4.2.4.1 MLP Implementation 
The MLP architecture consists of different components is shown in Figure 4.8. This 
section describes the components that constitute multilayered perceptron neural 
network architecture. Further, these components are explained in Table 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.8 MLP implemented  architecture 
 
Table 4.1 Components of MLP architecture 
S.No Components Description 
1 StaticControl  It controls the forward activation phase of network. 
2 
BackStaticControl It controls the backward activation phase of network 
(backpropagation). 
3 
Axon It is a layer of PE's with identity transfer function.  It can act 
as a placeholder for the File component at the input layer. 
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S.No Components Description 
4 File It is used for network input and desired data from a file. 
5 
FullSynapse It is a Full matrix multiplication and it is used to connect two 
axon layers. 
6 
BackFullSynapse It is a Back full matrix multiplication. Attaches to "dual" 




This pseudo second-order learning algorithm tends to train in 
fewer epochs and arrive a lower error. The Levenberg-
Marquardt (LM) algorithm is one of the most appropriate 
higher-order adaptive algorithms known for minimizing the 
MSE of a neural network 
8 
TanhAxon It  is Layer of PE's with hyperbolic transfer function (output 
range –1 to 1). 
9 
BackTanhAxon It is Layer of PE's with transfer function that is the derivative 
of the TanhAxon. It Attaches to "dual" forward TanhAxon, 
for use in backpropagation network. 
10 
L2Criterion It is Square error criterion. Computes the error between the 
output and desired signal, and passes it to the 
backpropagation network. 
11 
BackCriteriaControl It provides Input to backpropagation network.  It Attaches to 
Criterion, for use in backpropagation network. Receives error 
from Criterion. 
12 
MatrixViewer It is a Numerical probe. Displays numerical values at the 
current instant in time. 
13 DataGraph It is Graphing probe. Displays data versus time. 
14 File It is used for network input and desired data from a file. 
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4.2.4.1 SVM Implementation 
The SVM architecture consists of different components is shown in Figure 4.9. This 
section describes the components that constitute SVM network architecture. 
 
Figure 4.9 SVM implemented  architecture 
Table 4.2 Components of SVM architecture 
S.No Components Description 
1 StaticControl  It controls the forward activation phase of network. 
2 BackStaticControl 
It controls the backward activation phase of network 
(backpropagation). 
3 Axon It is a Layer of PE's  with identity transfer function. 




It is a Full matrix multiplication and it is used to connect 
two axon layers. 
6 GaussianAxon The GaussianAxon implements a radial basis function. 
7 Back axon 
The back axon Attaches to "dual" forward Axon, for use 
in backpropagation network.  
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S.No Components Description 
8 SVM Output Synapse 
This is used to implement the "Large Margin Classifier" 
segment of the SVM model. 
9 BackFullSynapse 
It is a Back full matrix multiplication. Attaches to "dual" 
forward FullSynapse, for use in backpropagation 
network. 
10 SVM 
This component is used to implement the "Large Margin 
Classifier" segment of the SVM model. 
11 L2Criterion 
L2Criterion is Square error criterion. Computes the error 
between the output and desired signal, and passes it to 
the backpropagation network.  
12 BackCriteriaControl 
It provides Input to backpropagation network.  It 
Attaches to Criterion, for use in backpropagation 
network. Receives error from Criterion. 
13 
MatrixViewer MatrixViewer is a Numerical probe. Displays numerical 
values at the current instant in time. 
14 DataGraph DataGraph is Graphing probe. Displays data versus time. 
15 
File File component is used for network input and desired 
data from a file. 
4.2.5 Training and Testing of the System  
The evaluation of system‟s performance consists of two phases; training and testing 
as described in chapter 3. This section describes these two phases and their parametric 
setting during training and test of the system. 
4.2.5.1 Training the System 
The system is trained on labeled data set such as intrusive and normal. The aim of 
training is the adjustment of networks weights on base of the difference between the 
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output produced by the system and the desired output. This process of weights 
adjustment and training is called learning. The parameters used in my experiments to 
tune the neural network are given in the following tables. The parametric 
specification used for MLP architecture during training phase is given in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 MLP tuning parameters during training 
S.No Parameter Name Value 
1 Architecture MLP Feedforward 
2 Layers 03 ( input, hidden and output) 
3 Input samples features 38 (original), 22 (PCA), and 10 (GA) 
4 PEs in Input layer It depends on features subset selections. For 
examples; 38, 22, & 10. 
5 PEs in Hidden Layer If number of features are 10 than PEs are 22 in 
hidden layer. 
6 Epochs 1000 
7 PE in output layer One that has value 0 and 1 
8 Activation function Tanh 
9 Training algorithm Backpropagation (Forward & Backward) 
10 Training dataset 5000 connections in which 20% for cross-validation 
and 30% for testing 
11 Production dataset 20,000 connections 
 
The parametric specification used for SVM architecture during training phase is 
given in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 SVM parameters during training 
S.No Parameter Name Value 
1 Architecture SVM 
2 Layers 03 ( input, gaussian and output) 
3 Input samples features 38 (original), 22 (PCA), and 10 (GA) 
4 PEs in Input layer It depends on features subset selections. 
For examples; 38, 22, & 10. 
5 SVM Input Synapse If input are 10 then its outputs are 2500 
6 PEs in Gaussian Layer If number of features are 10 than PEs are 
2500 in gaussian layer. 
7 SVM output Synapse Inputs 2500 and output 1 
8 SVM step size 0.01 
9 Weight decay 0.01 
10 Epochs 1000 
11 PE in output layer One that has value 0 and 1 
12 Activation function Gaussian 
13 Training algorithm Backpropagation (RBF) and Kernel 
Adatron (SVM) 
14 Training dataset 5000 connections in which 20% for 
cross-validation and 30% for testing 
15 Production dataset 20,000 connections 
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 4.2.5.2 Testing the System 
When the system is trained well then weights of the system are frozen and 
performance of the system is evaluated. Testing of trained system involves two steps; 
(i) verification step, and (ii) generalization step.  
a). Verification Step  
In verification step, trained system is tested against the data which are used in 
training. The purpose of the verification step is to investigate how well trained system 
learned the training patterns in the training dataset. If a system was trained 
successfully than the outputs produced by the system would be similar to the real 
outputs. In this research work 30% of the training dataset (5000) is used as 
verification that is 1500. 
 b). Generalization Step 
In generalization step, testing is conducted with data which is not used in training. 
The purpose of the generalization step is to measure generalization ability of the 
trained network. After training, the system only involves computation of the feed 
forward phase. For this purpose, a production dataset is used that has input data but 
no desired data.  
This work used a dataset of fifteen thousand (15,000) as a production dataset. 
Further, the system performance is also tested on total dataset (20,000) that consist of 
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The parameters used during MLP testing phase are given in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 MLP parameters during testing 
S.No Parameter Name Value 
1 Architecture MLP Feedforward 
2 Layers 03 ( input, hidden and output) 
3 Input samples features 38 (original), 22 (PCA), and 10 (GA) 
4 PEs in Input layer It depends on features subset selections. For examples; 38, 
22, & 10. 
5 PEs in Hidden Layer If number of features are 10 than PEs are 22 in hidden layer. 
6 Epochs 1 
7 PE in output layer One that has value 0 and 1 
8 Activation function Tanh 
9 Supervised/Teacher 
layer 
No need of this layer in testing phase. 
10 Training algorithm NO. But it involves feedforward phase only. 
11 Desired dataset No need of desired dataset in testing phase. 
12 Testing dataset 1500 that is 30% of training dataset (5000). 
13 Production dataset 20,000 connections 
 
The parametric specification used for SVM architecture during testing phase is 
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Table 4.6 SVM parameters during Testing 
S.No Parameter Name Value 
1 Architecture SVM 
2 Layers 03 ( input, gaussian and output) 
3 Input samples features 38 (original), 22 (PCA), and 10 (GA) 
4 PEs in Input layer It depends on features subset selections.  
5 SVMInputSynapse If input are 10 then its outputs are 2500 
6 PEs in Gaussian Layer If number of features are 10 than PEs are 2500 in 
gaussian layer. 
7 SVMoutputSynapse Inputs 2500 and output 1 
8 SVM step size 0.01 
9 Weight decay 0.01 
10 Epochs 1 
11 PE in output layer One that has value 0 and 1 
12 Activation function Gaussian 
13 Supervised/Teacher layer No need of this layer in testing phase. 
14 Training algorithm Feedforward phase only of Backpropagation (RBF) 
and Kernel Adatron (SVM) 
15 Training dataset 5000 connections in which 20% for cross-validation 
and 30% for testing 
16 Production dataset 20,000 connections 
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4.2.6 Results Comparison 
The results of MLP and SVM based systems and their comparison are discussed in 
Chapter 5. Further, the detail analysis of results will be discussed as well as their 
performance comparison with other recent approaches in the area of intrusion 
detection. 
4.3 Summary 
This chapter decomposes the methodology described in Chapter 3 in general and the 
special focus being classification architectures in particular. This is represented using 
block diagram, mathematical foundations. Then the block diagram is treated block by 
block, as a phase and details of each part or block of its main architecture. The 
chapter then explained the features description of the dataset used for experiments, 
feature transformation process using PCA and optimal features subset selection using 
GA. Thus, the chapter describes the details of classification architectures with basic 
algorithms and mathematical foundation of multilayered perceptron model (MLP) and 
SVM. The explanation continues to the system implementation level, and the basic 
parameters used during training and testing.  The selection of optimal features subset 
using GA by searching the PCA features space as mentioned before is the main 
contribution that makes the architecture simple as well as increases the overall 
performance of the intrusion analysis engine. The application of LM learning rule 
enhances the MLP training and testing performance as compared to traditional 
propagation algorithm. The hybrid architecture of SVM that consists of RBF and 
large margin classifier enhanced its performance in intrusion analysis. The evaluation 
of these approaches; MLP and SVM will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
 




RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the experimental results obtained by the utilization of 
techniques like Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Genetic Algorithm (GA), 
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) and Support Vector Machine (SVM) in the proposed 
network intrusion detection mechanism, whose methodology and designed 
architecture already covered in Chapters 3 & 4. After the training process was 
completed, testing was conducted in two steps. In the first step, both classifiers (MLP 
and SVM) were tested against the training dataset, in order to examine how well the 
system „learned‟ the training dataset after the training process. In the second step of 
the testing, trained systems were tested against a dataset, which is not a part of the 
training set, in order to observe generalization performance of the trained systems. In 
both testing steps, performance of the systems was tested by investigating the number 
of false positives, false negatives, true positives and the true negatives that they 
generated. 
5.2 Experimental Results 
The SVM and MLP architectures implemented independently to conduct different 
experiments with different scenarios. The implemented systems based on MLP and 
SVM for network intrusion detection tested on a system having the following 
specification as shown in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 System specification for experiments 
Hardware/Software   Specification 
Operating system Windows vista with service pack 2 
System Manufacturer Toshiba 
Processor Intel (R) core(TM)2 Duo CPU T5800 2GHz 
Memory (RAM) 3.00 GB 
The experiments of both classifier architectures; MLP and SVM for intrusion 
analysis are performed on different size of datasets to testify the proposed mechanism 
for network intrusion detection. This research work performed several experiments on 
different feature subsets with GA and without GA. First, the following section present 
results obtained using MLP architecture. Then, it illustrate results obtained using 
SVM. 
5.2.1 MLP Experimental Results 
The MLP based intrusion analysis engine is evaluated on different feature subsets. 
This section presents MLP results and their sensitivity analysis in different scenarios. 
First of all, MLP is tested on original dataset without using PCA and GA, which 
consists of 38 features. Five thousand exemplars or input samples are randomly 
selected from twenty thousand dataset. Five thousand exemplars contains two types of 
connections; normal and intrusive, in which 3,223 are normal and 1,777 are intrusive. 
The five thousand dataset is further divided into three subsets; training dataset (2500), 
cross-validation dataset (1000) and testing dataset (1500). 
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 Scenario 1: MLP with original 38 feature set 
 Testing Phase Analysis 
The purpose of testing phase in scenario 1 is to observe the system‟s learning ability 
after the training process with original 38 feature set. The sensitivity results of 
mentioned above three datasets are shown in Table 5.2-5.4. 
Table 5.2 MLP-org-38: Sensitivity analysis of training  dataset 








100 0.0 2.59 97 









98.71 1.28 2.25 97.74 
Table 5.4 MLP-org-38: Sensitivity analysis of testing dataset 







97.07 2.92 2.54 97.45 
The overall performance of testing phase based one time, epochs, detection 
rate and false alarm are expressed in Table 5.5. 









1:29:36 1000 97.26 2.73 
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 Verification Phase Analysis 
In verification phase, the trained system is tested against a dataset, which is not a 
part of the training set, in order to examine generalization performance of the 
trained system. The results are presented in Table 5.6 shows system‟s performance 
on production dataset. 


















760000 1456 18544 7.28 92.72 11344 
Scenario 2: MLP with PCA 38 features set 
 Testing Phase Analysis 
The purpose of testing phase is to observe the system how well the system „learned‟ 
the training dataset with PCA38 feature set after the training process. The sensitivity 










100 0.0 0.0 100 









99.84 0.153 0.0 100 
Table 5.7 MLP-TF38: Sensitivity analysis of training dataset 
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100 0.0 0.0 100 
 
Table 5.10 shows overall performance of MLP in terms of time, epochs, detection 
rate and false alarm. 
 Verification Phase Analysis 
In verification phase, the trained system is tested against a dataset, which is not a part 
of the training set (such as production dataset), in order to examine generalization 
performance of the trained system. Table 5.11 shows MLP performance on 
production dataset. 


















760000 12793 7207 63.965 36.035 07 









1:20:07 1000 100 0.0 
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Scenario 3: MLP with PCA 22 feature set 
 Testing Phase Analysis 
The purpose of testing phase is to look at the system how well the system „learned‟ 
the training dataset in scenario 3 after the training process. The sensitivity analysis of 
datasets (training, cross-validation & testing) is given in Table 5.12-5.14.  









100 0.0 0.0 100 
 
 
























100 0.0 0.0 100 
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The overall performance of testing phase in terms of time, epochs, detection rate 
and false alarm is shown in Table 5.15. 
 Verification Phase Analysis 
In verification phase, the trained system is verified against a dataset, which is not a 
part of the training set, in order to examine generalization performance of the trained 
system in this scenario 3. Table 5.16 shows whole performance on production dataset. 



















440000 12789 7211 63.945 36.05 11 
Scenario 4: MLP with GA12 feature set  
 Testing Phase Analysis 
The purpose of testing phase is to study the system with GA12 feature set in scenario 
4 and monitor how well the system „learned‟ the training dataset after the training 













0:53:28 1000 100 0.0 
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Table 5.17 MLP-GA12: Sensitivity analysis of training dataset 







100 0.0 0.0 100 









100 0.0 0.0 100 
    
Table 5.19 MLP-GA12:Sensitivity analysis of testing dataset 





















0:53:28 1000 100 0.0 
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 Verification Phase Analysis 
In verification phase, the trained system is assessed against a dataset, which is not 
a part of the training set, in order to inspect generalization performance of the 
trained system in this scenario 4. The whole performance of MLP with GA 12 
feature set on the production dataset is presented in Table 5.21. This approach used 
different parameters (number of features, true positives, true negatives, number of 
normal connections , number of intrusive connections, detection rate and false 
alarms) to verify the MLP classifier with GA 12 feature set. 
Scenario 5: MLP with GA10 feature set  
 Testing Phase Analysis 
The purpose of testing phase is to study the system with ten features as selected by 
GA and to observe the behaviour how well the system „learned‟ the training dataset 
after the training process. Table 5.22- 5.25 show sensitivity results of testing phase. 










100 0.0 0.0 100 
 


















440000 12797 7203 63.945 36.05 03 
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Table 5.24 MLP-GA10: Sensitivity analysis of testing dataset 
























100 0.0 0.0 100 










0:23:28 174 100 0.0 
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 Verification Phase Analysis 
In verification phase, the trained system is verified on a production dataset in order 
to check up generalization performance of the trained system. The whole 
performance of MLP with GA 10 feature set is shown in Table 5.26. 
Table 5.26 MLP-GA10: Overall performance of verification phase 
No. of Features 














200000 12797 7203 63.985 36.01 03 
5.2.2 SVM Experimental Results 
Scenario 1: SVM with original 38 feature set 
 Testing Phase Analysis 
The purpose of testing phase is to observe the system how well the system „learned‟ 
the training dataset after the training process. The sensitivity analysis of confusion 
matrix of testing phase is shown in Table 5.27-5.30. 









100 0.0 0.0 100 
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93.65 6.34 2.47 97.52 
Table 5.29 SVM-org-38: Sensitivity analysis of testing dataset 







93.65 6.34 2.47 97.52 
Table 5.30 SVM-org-38: Overall performance of testing phase 







2:21:17 1000 95.585 4.405 
In verification phase, the trained SVM with original 38 feature set is tested on 
production dataset, which is not a part of the training set, in order to observe 
generalization performance of the trained system. The overall performance of 
SVM with 38 raw feature set is shown in Table 5.31. 
Table 5.31 SVM-org-38: Overall performance of verification phase 
No. of 
Features 















760000 1345 18655 6.72 93.27 11455 
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Scenario 2: SVM with PCA 38 feature set 
 Testing Phase Analysis 
The purpose of testing phase of SVM with PCA 38 feature set is to monitor the 
system how well the system „learned‟ the training dataset after the training process.  
The sensitivity analysis of SVM with PCA 38 feature set (transformed feature set) is 
shown in Table 5.32-5.35. 









100 0.0 0.0 100 












99.07 0.93 0.58 99.42 










98.66 1.33 0.759 99.24 










2:39:04 1000 98.95 1.0445 
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 Verification Phase Analysis 
In verification phase, the trained system is tested on production dataset, which is not a 
part of the training set, in order to check generalization performance of the trained 
system with PCA 38 feature set. The whole performance of SVM with TF38 
(transformed feature) set is given in Table 5.36. 



















760000 12721 7279 63.605 36.395 79 
Scenario 3: SVM with PCA 22 feature set 
 Testing Phase Analysis 
The purpose of testing phase is to observe the SVM with PCA 22 feature set how well 
it „learned‟ the training dataset after the training process. The sensitivity analysis of 
SVM with PCA 22 feature set is shown in Table 5.37-5.40. 









99.37 0.63 0.56 99.44 
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Table 5.39 SVM-PCA-22: Sensitivity analysis of testing dataset 




















99.48 0.51 0.95 99.05 
 Verification Phase Analysis 
In verification phase, the trained system (SVM with PCA 22 feature set) is 
evaluated against a dataset, which is not a part of the training set (i.e. the 
production dataset), in order to observe generalization performance of the trained 













2:08:18 1000 99.26 0.735 
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Table 5.41 SVM-PCA-22: Overall performance of verification phase 
No. of Features 















440000 12776 7224 63.88 36.12 24 
Scenario 4: SVM with GA12 feature set  
 Testing Phase Analysis 
The purpose of testing phase is to observe the system (the SVM with GA 12 feature 
set) how well the system „learned‟ the training dataset after the training process. The 
sensitivity analysis of testing phase is shown in Table 5.42-5.45. 









98.30 1.7 0.0 100 










100 0.0 0.0 100 
Table 5.44 SVM-GA12: Sensitivity analysis of testing dataset 







99.79 0.2 0.75 99.24 
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 Verification Phase Analysis 
In verification phase, the trained system (the SVM with GA12) is tested on 
production dataset, which is not a part of the training set, in order to observe its 
generalization performance with GA 12 feature set. The whole performance is 
given in Table 5.46. 


















240000 12811 7189 64.055 35.945 11 
Scenario 5: SVM with GA10 feature set  
 Testing Phase Analysis 
The purpose of testing phase is to observe the system how well the system „learned‟ 
the training dataset after the training process.  The sensitivity analysis of SVM with 
GA 10 feature set is shown in Table 5.47-5.50. 
 
 









0:53:28 1000 99.51 0.485 
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Table 5.47 SVM-GA10: Sensitivity analysis of training dataset 







99.38 0.61 0.0 100 









99.38 0.61 0.0 100 
Table 5.49 SVM-GA10: Sensitivity analysis of testing dataset 







99.89 0.10 0.94 99.05 











0:16:14 1000 99.47 0.52 
 
  Verification Phase Analysis 
In verification phase, the trained system (the SVM) is verified against a dataset (the 
production dataset), which is not a part of the training set, in order to check up 
generalization performance of the trained system with GA 10 feature set. The overall 
performance of this scenario is shown in Table 5.51. 
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200000 12807 7193 64.035 35.965 07 
5.2.3 Comparison between MLP and SVM 
This section makes a tabular comparative analysis between five different scenarios for 
MLP and SVM respectively based on above-mentioned results. This comparison is 
based on number of false alarm, number of epochs, number of features, training time 
and the results of confusion matrix and is presented in Table 5.52 and Table 5.53. 
Table 5.52 MLP performance for intrusion analysis 
Classifier MLP-A10 MLP-A12 MLP-22 MLP-TF38 MLP-org-38 
False Alarm 03 03 11 07 11344 
Epochs 174 217 1000 1000 1000 
Time 00:20:07 00:23:00 01:08:07 01:28:07 01:29:36 




False + 03 03 11 07 11344 
False - 0 0 0 0 0 
True + 12797 12797 12789 12793 1456 
True - 7203 7203 7211 7207 18544 
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Table 5.53 SVM performance for intrusion analysis 
Classifier SVM-GA10 SVM-A12 SVM-F22 SVM-F38 SVM-org-38 
False Alarm 07 12 24 79 11455 
Epochs 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Time 01:16:14 01:36:01 02:08:18 02:39:04 02:21:17 
Features 200000 240000 440000 760000 760000 
False + 0 0 24 79 11455 
False - 01 11 0 0 0 
True + 12807 12811 12776 12721 1345 
True - 7193 7189 7224 7279 18655 
The above comparison proved that my mechanism using GA to search the PCA 
features space provides optimal performance as compared to traditional way of 
selecting features from PCA search space. The key focus of my research was to select 
sensitive features and minimum features as well as to increase accuracy of the system. 
Thus, research work achieved this objective by using GA and PCA that made the 
classifier simpler as well as more efficient in performance. Hence, this method shows 
that proposed method provides an optimal intrusion detection mechanism that 
outperforms the existing approaches and has the capability to minimize the number of 
features and maximize the detection rates 
5.2.4 Comparative analysis of applied approach with other approaches 
This section presents here, a visual comparative analysis of applied approach with 
other approaches in the literatures (Liu et al. 2007) as described in Chapter 2. The 
analysis is presented in various graphs using the Multi-criteria Decision Making 
Technique (MCDM). The main criteria consist of accuracy, minimum training 
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overhead, more simple architecture, generalization ability, and computational 
overhead. The main criteria are further divided into sub criteria.  The criterion 
„accuracy‟ is subdivided into „detection rate‟ and „minimum false alarm‟. The 
criterion „more simple architecture‟ is sub-divided into „minimum features‟ and 
„minimum processing elements (PEs)‟. The criterion „computational overhead‟ is 
divided into „memory‟ and „processing‟. The criteria hierarchy is shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Criteria hierarchy 
 
5.2.4.1 Comparative Analysis of applied approach based on MLP with other MLP 
approaches 
This section compares MLP approach based on defined criteria as shown in Figure 
5.1 with other approaches based on the obtained results as aforementioned in Table 
5.52. The detail comparative analysis is presented in graphs in Figure 5.2 - 5.10. 
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Figure 5.2 MLPGA10 vs. MLPGA12 (criteria) 
Figure 5.2 shows MLP results comparison between two datasets: GA 10 feature 
set and GA 12 feature set based on main criteria. The MLP shows better performance 
with GA10 feature set as compared to GA12 feature set based on main criteria: 
accuracy, minimum training overhead, generalization ability, computational overhead 
and in architectural simplification. 
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Figure 5.3 MLPGA10 vs. MLPGA12 (sub-criteria) 
Figure 5.3 shows MLP results comparison between two datasets: GA 10 feature 
set and GA 12 feature set based on sub criteria: detection rate, minimum false alarm, 
minimum features, minimum processing elements (PEs), usage of memory, 
processing time, generalization ability and minimum training overhead. The use of 
GA12 feature set increases training and computational overhead as compared to 
GA10 feature set. Thus, the MLP with GA10 feature set demonstrates better 
performance as compared to MLP with GA12 feature set based on aforementioned 
sub criteria.  
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Figure 5.4 MLPGA10 vs. MLP-PCA22 (criteria) 
Figure 5.4 shows MLP results comparison between two datasets: GA10 feature 
set and PCA12 feature set based on main criteria. The MLP shows better performance 
with GA10 feature set as compared to PCA22 feature set. 
 
Figure 5.5 MLPGA10 vs. MLP-PCA22 (sub-criteria) 
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Figure 5.5 shows MLP results comparison between two datasets: GA 10 feature 
set and PCA22 feature set based on sub criteria: detection rate, minimum false alarm, 
minimum features, minimum processing elements (PEs), usage of memory, 
processing time, generalization ability and minimum training overhead. The use of 
PCA22 feature set increases training and computational overhead as compared to 
GA10 feature set. Thus, the MLP with GA10 feature set demonstrates better 
performance as compared to MLP with PCA22 feature set based on aforementioned 
sub criteria.  
 
Figure 5.6 MLPGA10 vs. MLPTF38 (criteria) 
Figure 5.6 shows MLP results comparison between two datasets: GA 10 feature 
set and TF38 (Transformed features from raw dataset using PCA) feature set based on 
main criteria. The computational overhead increases as used TF38 instead of GA10 
feature set. Hence, the MLP shows better performance with GA10 feature set as 
compared to TF38 feature set based on main criteria: accuracy, minimum training 
overhead, generalization ability, and in architectural simplification.  
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Figure 5.7 illustrates comparison between MLPs with GA10 and TF38 feature set 
on the bases of above mentioned sub criteria. The MLP with GA10 outperforms as 
compared to MLP with TF38 feature set. 
 
Figure 5.7 MLPGA10 vs. MLP-org-38 (criteria) 
 
Figure 5.8 MLPGA10 vs. MLP-TF38 (sub-criteria) 
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Figure 5.8 demonstrate that the MLP with GA10 feature set outperforms the MLP 
with original 38 (the raw feature set) feature set based on main criteria. The MLP with 
raw feature set suffers computational and training overheads. 
 
 
Figure 5.9 MLPGA10 vs. MLP-org-38 (sub-criteria) 
Figure 5.9 demonstrate that the MLP with GA10 feature set outperforms the MLP 
with the raw feature set based on sub criteria. The MLP with raw feature set suffers 
processing, memory and training overheads that decrease on the whole performance 
of intrusion analysis engine. 
Figure 5.10 demonstrates the MLPs results comparison with GA10, GA12, 
PCA22, TF38 and org38 (original raw feature) feature set. The MLP with GA10 and 
GA12 feature set present optimal results as compared to other approaches; PCA22, 
TF38 and org38 based on main criteria and sub criteria. The main criteria consist of 
accuracy, minimum training overhead, generalization ability, computational overhead 
and in architectural simplification. The sub criteria consist of detection rate, minimum 
false alarm, minimum features, minimum processing elements (PEs), usage of 
memory, processing time, generalization ability and minimum training overhead.  The 
selection of feature set by searching the PCA space using GA technique results more 
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sensitive feature set that directly impact on performance of the intrusion detection 
classifier such as MLP. 
 
Figure 5.10 MLP Overall performance for intrusion detection 
 
5.2.4.2 Comparative Analysis of applied approach based on SVM with other SVM 
approaches 
The comparison of SVM approach based on pre-defined criteria as shown in Figure 
5.1 with other approaches based on the achieved results as mentioned in Table 5.53. 
The detail comparative analysis of both approaches is depicted in graphs in Figure 
5.11 – 5.18. 
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Figure 5.11 SVMGA10 vs. SVMGA12 (criteria) 
 
Figure 5.11 represents the SVM results comparison between two datasets: GA 10 
feature set and GA 12 feature set based on main criteria. The SVM shows enhanced 
performance with GA10 feature set as compared to GA12 feature set based on main 
criteria: accuracy, minimum training overhead, generalization ability, computational 
overhead and in architectural simplification. 
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Figure 5.12 SVMGA10 vs. SVMGA12 (sub-criteria) 
 
Figure 5.13 SVMGA10 vs. SVMPCA22 (criteria) 
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Figure 5.12 shows SVM comparative results between two datasets: GA 10 feature 
set and GA 12 feature set based on sub criteria: detection rate, minimum false alarm, 
minimum features, minimum processing elements (PEs), memory usage, processing 
time, generalization ability and minimum training overhead. The utilization of the 
GA12 feature set slightly increases training and computational overhead which is a 
contrary to the comparative result with GA10 feature set. Thus, the SVM with GA10 
feature set demonstrates enhanced performance as compared to SVM with GA12 
feature set based on aforementioned sub criteria.  
Figure 5.13 shows SVM results comparison between two datasets: GA10 feature 
set and PCA22 feature set based on main criteria. The SVM shows better performance 
with GA10 feature set as compared to PCA22 feature set. 
 
Figure 5. 14 SVMGA10 vs. SVMPCA22 (sub-criteria) 
Figure 5.14 shows SVM comparative results between two datasets: GA 10 feature 
set and PCA22 feature set based on sub criteria: detection rate, minimum false alarm, 
minimum features, minimum processing elements (PEs), memory usage, processing 
time, generalization ability and minimum training overhead.  
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Hence, the use of PCA22 feature set improvises the training and computational 
overhead as compared to GA10 feature set. Thus, the SVM with GA10 feature set 
demonstrates better performance than SVM with PCA22 feature set based on 
aforementioned sub criteria.  
Figure 5.15 shows SVM comparative results between the two datasets: GA 10 
feature set and TF38 (Transformed features from raw dataset using PCA) feature set 
based on main criteria. The computational overhead amplifies, as used TF38 instead 
of GA10 feature set. Hence, the SVM shows better performance with GA10 feature 
set than the TF38 feature set based on main criteria: accuracy, minimum training 
overhead, generalization ability, and in architectural simplification.  
Figure 5.16 illustrates comparative analysis between SVMs with GA10 and TF38 
feature set which bases on the supra-mentioned sub criteria. The SVM with GA10 
outperforms the SVM with TF38 feature set. 
Figure 5.17 demonstrates that the SVM with GA10 feature set outdoes the SVM 
with the raw feature set based on sub criteria. The SVM with raw feature set suffers 
processing, memory and training overheads traits, which results in the deterioration of 
the whole performance of intrusion analysis engine. 
Figure 5.18 demonstrates that the SVM with GA10 feature set supersedes than the 
SVM with original 38 (the raw feature set) feature set based on main criteria. The 
SVM with raw feature set suffers computational and training overheads. 
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Figure 5.15 SVMGA10 vs. SVMTF38 (criteria) 
 
Figure 5.16 SVMGA10 vs. SVM-TF38 (sub-criteria) 
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Figure 5.17 SVMGA10 vs. ML-org-38 (criteria) 
 
Figure 5.18 SVMGA10 vs. SVM-org-38 (sub-criteria) 
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Figure 5.19 SVM Overall performance for intrusion detection 
Figure 5.19 demonstrates the SVMs comparative results with GA10, GA12, 
PCA22, TF38 and org38 (original raw feature) feature sets. The SVM with GA10 and 
GA12 feature set present optimal results as compared to other approaches; PCA22, 
TF38 and org38 based on main criteria and sub criteria. The main criteria consist of 
accuracy, minimum training overhead, generalization ability, computational overhead 
and architectural simplification. The sub criteria consist of detection rate, minimum 
false alarm, minimum features, minimum processing elements (PEs), memory usage, 
processing time, generalization ability and minimum training overhead.  The selection 
of the feature set by searching the PCA space using GA technique offers more 
sensitive feature set that directly has an impact on the overall performance of the 
intrusion detection classifier such as SVM. 
5.3 Research Contributions 
This section presents research contributions in intrusion detection using soft 
computing techniques; MLP, SVM, GA with PCA. The main objective was to induce 
an intrusion detection mechanism that produces optimal detection rate and minimize 
 178   
features that makes architecture simple and reduces training and computational 
overheads. A List of the contributions mentioned below: 
 Performance optimization in case of detection rate and false alarm: The 
applied approach based on PCA and then application of GA for optimal 
features subset selection positively affects the accuracy of the proposed 
model based on MLP and SVM. 
 Minimize training overhead: The adopted mechanism demonstrates less 
training time as compared to other approaches. Minimum number of 
features and features with higher discriminatory power reduces the training 
overheads. 
 Simplified Architectural framework: The application of PCA and GA for 
features transformation and selection, made the intrusion analysis engine 
simple and more efficient. 
 Minimize computational overhead: This approach considerably reduces 
memory and computational overheads during training and testing process. 
The smaller the number of features, the reduced is the memory requirement 
as well as processing overheads. 
 Contribution in the existing approaches: The applied approach performed 
accurately in detection rates, simplification in architecture, and reduced 
memory and processing requirements. 
 Aides and guides in network security. The applied mechanism provides help 
and guides security implementers and researchers in the field of intrusion 
detection analysis by using the concepts introduced and applied in my work.  
5.4 Summary 
This chapter describes the following: (1) the results obtained through MLP and SVM 
in different scenarios during testing and verification phases. (2) The overall 
performance of both the intrusion analysis engines. Further, the comparison of the 
performance of MLP along with GA‟s ten features to other scenarios of MLP and 
similarly with SVM based on, criteria and sub-criteria as mentioned in this chapter.  




CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter emphasizes the conclusion of my work in the vertical of intrusion 
detection. This is followed by the explanation of the achievements accomplished 
during this research work. Lastly, the chapter discusses limitations of the work and 
recommendations/suggestions for the future work.  
 
6.2 Conclusion 
Presently, Intrusions on computer and network systems are main security issues. 
Therefore, it is very important to adhere to such tribulations. The prevention of such 
intrusions is entirely dependent on their detection which is a key part of many 
security tools such as: Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Intrusion Prevention System 
(IPS), Adaptive Security Alliance (ASA), checkpoints and firewalls. Further, accurate 
detection is another important issue in these days.  A number of intrusion detection 
approaches are available but the main problem is their performance and efficiency, 
which has been enhanced by increasing the detection rates (99.96% in case of SVM 
and 99.98% in case of MLP) and reducing false alarms (0.04% in case of SVM and 
0.02% in case of MLP).  
There are some other drawbacks in the existing intrusion detection approaches 
such as: usage of raw dataset, bad features extraction, bad features selection, complex 
classifier architecture, training overhead, and memory and computational overheads. 
To overcome these issues, this research work presented an optimized intrusion 
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detection mechanism using techniques; PCA, Genetic Algorithm (GA), Multilayer 
Perceptron (MLP), and Support Vector machine (SVM). One of the main 
contributions is the application of GA for optimal feature subset selection that 
positively affects the whole performance of the applied intrusion detection 
mechanism. Firstly, a standard dataset; KDD cup is selected and then discard three 
symbolic features from it.  After this, the dataset is further processed in a system 
acceptable format. For this, the pre-processing process is divided into two steps; 
feature organization and feature selection. In the first step, the features are organized 
and arranged to increase their visual discrimination using Principal Component 
Analysis. Secondly, the GA is applied in order to select a subset of principal 
components from the principal components space, which offers a subset of features 
with optimal sensitivity and highest discriminatory power. Then, the selected 
principal components or PCA features are fed to the proposed model for intrusion 
analysis. Two classifiers; MLP and SVM are used for intrusion analysis. Firstly, MLP 
classifier is trained and tested in different scenarios and the results arising out of it are 
evaluated and compared. Secondly, SVM classifier is trained and tested the same 
way. Results proved that this research mechanism provides an optimal intrusion 
detection mechanism that outperforms the existing approaches and has the capability 
to minimize the number of features and maximize the detection rates. 
6.3 Achievements 
The main achievements of this research work are as follows:  
 Accuracy improvement: The applied approach based on PCA and GA for 
features subset selection improves substantially the accuracy of the proposed 
intrusion model based on MLP and SVM. 
 Reduces training overhead: This intrusion detection mechanism reduced 
training overheads as compared to other approaches.  Smaller number of 
features with higher discriminatory power decreases the training overhead. 
 Architectural framework Improvement: The application of PCA and GA for 
features transformation and selection made the intrusion analysis engine more 
simple and efficient. 
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 Reduces computational overhead: This approach considerably reduces 
memory and computational overheads during training and testing process. The 
smaller the number of features decreases memory requirement as well as 
processing overhead. 
 Contribution in existing approaches: The applied approach performed better 
in accuracy, and provided a simple architecture that reduced memory and 
processing requirements. 
 Help and guide in network security: The applied mechanism provides help 
and guidance for security implementers and researchers in the field of 
intrusion detection by using the concepts introduced and applied in this work.  
6.4 Limitations and Future Work 
This research work identifies some of the limitations of the applied approach as 
follows: 
 The proposed system works on two classes; normal and intrusive. This generates 
alarm about the network activity, which is analysed as to whether it is normal or 
an attack. Therefore, the research can be further extended in the future to classify 
network activity based on the categories. 
 Principal component analysis is used for features organization and arrangement in 
this research. There are some other alternative techniques; K-dimensional scaling, 
K-means clustering, self-organizing map, and Kernel PCA. This can  further be 
explored and applied in the future work. 
 The features selection is performed using GA in this work. This selection process 
can be further investigated and deployed using some other techniques; greedy 
search, back elimination, and Memetic Algorithm (MA) etc. 
 This system used two classifiers as intrusive analysis engines; MLP and SVM. 
This model can further be testified using some other techniques as modular neural 
network, Jordan/Elman network, recurrent network and fuzzy techniques. 
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 DEFINATION OF TERMINOLOGIES 
Attack: The act of attempts to bypass one or more computer security control to 
achieve unauthorized access. 
Penetration: The intentional passage through an equipment or computer system by 
illegal way.  
Anomaly Detection: Activities which vary from established patterns for users, or 
groups of users. 
Misuse Detection: Comparison of a user's activities with the known behaviors of 
attackers. 
ANN: A network of highly interconnected processing elements called neurons that 
transform a set of inputs to a desired output. 
Layer: A component of ANN containing neurons. 
Synapse: A component of ANN used as connection between layers. 
Intruder: An illegal user that can access network/system resources and play some 
thing havoc. 
IDS: A system that detect unauthorized access to a computer or network. 
Kddcup: An attack database that is standard for the evaluation of IDS. 
DOS: A type of attack on a network that is designed to bring the network by flooding 
it with useless traffic.  
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Probing: It involves discovering the algorithms and parameters of the recommender 
system itself. It may be necessary for an intruder to acquire this knowledge through 
interaction with the system itself.  
R2U:  It involves unauthorized access from a remote machine.  
U2R: It involves unauthorized access to local super user privileges by a local 
unprivileged user.  
Packet: A basic communication unit. 
False Positive: When the system classifies an action as intrusion when it is a legal 
action. 
False Negative: Intrusion occurred but passed a normal by IDS. 
Subversion: The processing of changing behavior of IDS to false negative occurs. 
Support Vector Machines (SVMs): SVMs are a set of related supervised learning 
methods that analyze data and recognize patterns, used for classification and 
regression analysis. 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA): PCA is a mathematical procedure that uses 
an orthogonal transformation to convert a set of observations of possibly correlated 
variables into a set of values of uncorrelated variables called principal components. 
Genetic Algorithms (GAs): GAs are adaptive heuristic search algorithm based on 
the ideas of natural selection and genetic. The basic concept of GAs is designed to 
simulate processes in natural system essential for evolution, particularly those that 
follow the principles first laid down by Charles Darwin of survival of the fittest. 
 
